Caciquismo in post-revolutionary Mexico : the case of Gabriel Barrios Cabrera in the Sierra Norte de Puebla by Brewster, Keith
  
 
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap  
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick 
 
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/53144 
 
 
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.  
Please scroll down to view the document itself.  
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to 
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.  
 
 
 
 
CACIQUISMO IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY 
MEXICO: THE CASE OF 
GABRIEL BARRIOS CABRERA IN THE SIERRA 
NORTE DE PUEBLA 
BY 
KEITH BREWSTER 
THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE QUALIFICATION OF 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK 
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY 
SEPTEMBER 1995 
SUMMARY 
This thesis focuses upon the cacicazgo of Gabriel Barrios Cabrera, in the Sierra 
Norte de Puebla, Mexico during the 1920s. It seeks to analysis the extent to 
which previously identified trends in post-revolutionary regional politics can be 
applied to this isolated mountainous region. 
Conclusions are based upon evidence obtained from national, state, municipal, 
and private archives in Mexico. In addition, a programme of oral history was 
conducted within the Sierra de Puebla. 
The study is divided into six main components, each representing a significant 
aspect of Barrios' cacicazgo. These comprise: local historical precedents of 
Indian leadership and co-operation with non-Indian politicians; the range of 
responsibilities and opportunities that Barrios enjoyed in his pivotal role as a 
federal military officer under Carrancista and Sonorense administrations; the 
nature of his grass-roots support, his use of cuerpos voluntarios and patronage 
of municipal officials; Barrios' political affiliations beyond the Sierra and his 
struggle for political supremacy within the Sierra; the nature and motives of the 
cacique's regional development initiatives, and an analysis of the contradiction 
of his apparent pro-campesino, yet anti-agrarian, stance; a case study of the 
district of Zacapoaxtla, which demonstrates the importance of local factionalism 
and portrays the practical application of the Barrios cacicazgo at the most local 
level. 
After identifying the causes of Barrios' fall from grace in 1930, the thesis 
concludes by arguing that caciquismo in the Sierra de Puebla was essentially 
different from models of regional power-broking found elsewhere in post- 
revolutionary Mexico. While similarities existed, Barrios' style of leadership 
displayed more of a consistency with local conditions and precedents than any 
broader ideological tendencies. Continued research at the local level is essential 
if we are to obtain a clearer understanding of the diversity of experiences 
endured by Mexicans in the aftermath of revolution. 
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1. Introduction 
Alluding to Madero's call to arms in autumn 1910, Porfirio Diaz reputedly 
remarked, 'Madero has unleashed a tiger. Now let us see if he can control it. ' For 
over a decade, events showed the animal's character to be so unpredictable that 
neither Madero nor anyone else could achieve more than a fleeting mastery. Even 
when contained, the tiger would periodically lash out, perpetuating an atmosphere 
of uncertainty and mistrust. Two decades would pass before it was finally returned 
to its cage. 
The beast, whose anger sustained the Mexican Revolution, remained at large 
because of its multi-faceted character. Its rage portrayed both popular rural and 
urban discontent. The Revolution was a national and a local struggle; ideological 
and personal. In the uncertain times that characterised the violent years of the 
Revolution between 1910-1920, one of the few constants in life was the personal 
bond between a rebel and his leader. And leaders did rise above the chaos to 
provide direction. As central authority crumbled, so power fell to those in the 
provinces with the greatest military potential. Mexico had become, as Jose 
Vasconcelos later lamented, a country in which 'once more figures like Sarmiento's 
Facundo walked the land'. I 
This thesis examines the rise and fall of one such figure. Between 1917 and 
1930, the voice of military authority in the Sierra Norte de Puebla belonged to the 
Barrios Cabrera family. For over a decade, Gabriel Barrios and his brothers, 
Bardomiano and Demetrio, directed every important decision affecting public life in 
the region. Yet their story is not one of military power alone. At an early stage in 
the cacicazgo's development, the brothers demonstrated an acute awareness of 
politics. Although they remained aloof from the chaos in Puebla City, their 
influence became an important factor in state politics. While their ambitions were 
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limited to the Sierra and its environs, their actions attracted warm praise from 
national politicians and intellectuals alike. Such prestige for any rural leader was 
rare: for this feat to be achieved by, what many depicted as 'a family of illiterate 
Indians', was almost unique and deserves closer attention. 
Venustiano Carranza's assassination in May 1920 and the consequent rise of 
the Sonorenses, marked the beginning of a shift in the balance of national politics. 
With national caudillos assuming a tentative hold on central government, so began 
the slow, hazardous process of reclaiming the political initiative from the provinces. 
Two underlying factors impeded the operation: the reticence of provincial caudillos 
to relinquish their influence, and the weakness of the Sonorenses to enforce their 
will. Indeed, as Romana Falcön comments: 'the efficiency and loyalty of those 
caciques possessing their own significant military potential [... ] was fundamental to 
the survival of the national leaders and for the integration and functioning of the 
national political life'. 2 Not until the 1930s did central government feel sufficiently 
confident to complete the task of expropriating the power of the remaining regional 
leaders. Between these two points in Mexican history, the process of subordination 
to the centre varied in both pace and nature. The tiger of the Revolution was still 
capable of fighting against those who tried to contain it. 
A fundamental aspect of the historical debate on post-revolutionary 
caudillismo concerns the various methods employed by regional leaders to 
encourage military recruitment. 3 A leader's ability to act free from government 
interference was often directly linked to his control of an independent military 
force. Tlaxcala's post-revolutionary leaders failed to establish popular support. 
With the death in 1917 of the local agrarista rebel leader, Domingo Arenas, the 
path was clear for the civilian bureaucrats, Ignacio Mendoza and Rafael Apango, to 
assume political control of the state. Their strength derived almost entirely from 
their manipulation of the state political machinery: they had little popular support 
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that might be converted into a military reserve. Increasingly dependent upon 
federal favour to keep them in office, Mendoza and Apango never enjoyed the 
autonomy possessed by regional caudillos in neighbouring states. 4 
Two overlapping, but not totally complementary, concepts emerge from the 
studies of revolutionary leaders: one concerns the character of the rebel movement, 
while the other concentrates more upon the nature of a leader's relationship with his 
followers. In Alan Knight's The Mexican Revolution, the former category is 
subdivided according to the specific social and political circumstances of the 
territory in which a rebel movement operated. Serrano rebel leaders, frequently 
occupying remote regions on the periphery of governmental jurisdiction, often led 
their followers into combat to protect or reassert local autonomy. s Elsewhere, 
particularly in areas experiencing recent incorporation into the broader economic 
and political environment, agrarian leaders had more specific motives for rebelling; 
the recovery of land from hacendados or caciques. 
The vital relationship between the caudillo and his following is an theme 
developed in Caudillo and peasant in the Mexican Revolution, edited by David 
Brading. Many of the studies in this collection reflect the human characteristics of 
leadership and combine to produce a broad distinction between 'traditional' and 
'modem' caudillos. Leaders in the former group developed close personal ties of 
loyalty with their soldiers and displayed a sensitive awareness of their specific 
anxieties. Loyalty was often retained through a blend of charismatic leadership and 
the promise of land in the form of ejidos or military colonies. Such leaders were 
rarely concerned with broader ideological concepts, their ambitions were to gain 
control of their own localities. In contrast, a new generation of regional figures 
demonstrated a greater willingness to become involved in the emerging modern 
political environment. 6 Alan Knight summarises this development as one that 
adopted 'new forms of authority, increasingly civilian and bureaucratic, with sound 
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rational-legal foundations'. 7 These leaders often came from the urban middle 
classes, rarely sharing the social background of their followers. This prompted 
them to use a more impersonal style of leadership that relied upon mass 
organisations to rally support. 
Attempts to merge these two concepts of regional leadership can be 
problematic. Serrano groups usually occupied remote locations, far from the seat of 
state government. Often free from the agrarian conflict witnessed in terrain more 
suited to large scale agriculture, it is tempting to see serrano leaders as more 
traditional, charismatic and politically ambivalent, likely to adopt any stance to 
advance their underlying desire for local autonomy. Similarly, greater exposure to 
the varying effects of government interference highlighted an agrarian leader's need 
to gain access to, or preferably control over, the machinery of state government to 
ensure the adoption of favourable agrarian reform. 
Such categorisation, however, threatens to impose an artificially rigid 
structure upon what was, by nature, an indeterminate phenomenon. Knight, 
qualifies his definition of the serrano movement by identifying variations within the 
movement according to region and chronology. Additionally, agrarian leaders often 
saw local autonomy as the most effective means of achieving land reform, while it 
was not uncommon for serrano rebels to include agrarian elements within their 
ranks. 8 
Although agrarian caudillos occupied the governorships of San Luis Potosi 
and Veracruz, Saturnino Cedillo and Adalberto Tejeda attracted popular support in 
different ways. Dudley Ankerson's Agrarian Warlord, and Romana Falcon's 
Revoluciön y caciquismo. San Luis Potosi, 1919-1938, set Cedillo's ascendancy 
within the contemporary regional and national political climate. Both accounts 
identify Cedillo's charismatic leadership as a reflection of a style reminiscent of 
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nineteenth century caudillismo. Cedillo's soldiers were loyally bound to their leader 
by the strong personal ties that evolved from the dangers shared in numerous 
revolutionary battles. 9 Nonetheless, Cedillo was blatant in his linkage of land 
grants on military colonies with the continued support of the recipients of the land. 
Those whose loyalty wavered, would find their access to land retracted. 
Like Cedillo, the agrarian governor of Veracruz, Adalberto Tejeda, was able 
to muster an army of campesinos in response to national or regional emergencies. 
But, as Heather Fowler's study Agrarian Radicalism in Veracruz shows, Tejeda's 
influence derived from a very different approach. 10 Tejeda established a network of 
patronage, not through agrarian military colonies of the kind formed by Cedillo, but 
by the creation of local agrarian leagues which offered campesinos the hope of land 
reform. By controlling the centralised bureaucratic system of patronage to which all 
these leagues were linked, Tejeda established an impersonal, but nonetheless 
effective, influence upon the veracruzano campesino. II 
Tejeda's agrarianism originated more from his need to build an independent 
mass following, than from any deep political convictions. By contrast, Gilbert 
Joseph depicts Felipe Carrillo Puerto, in Revolution from Without, as an agrarian 
leader whose endeavours to muster popular support were fired by profound socialist 
ideology. Like Tejeda, Carrillo Puerto's strength came from a network of 
patronage that relied upon state bureaucracy. Ligas de resistencia took the place of 
Cedillo's military colonies as the means of incorporating the campesinos. Through 
such leagues, Carrillo Puerto encouraged agrarian militancy and, by doing so, 
sought to establish links of loyalty between himself and the rural masses. 
Expediency dictated that his modem form of control used the existing network of 
local caciques to implement his reforms. This contradiction at the base of his power 
structure proved fatal when, in 1924, Carrillo Puerto's allies failed to save him 
from the Delahuertista rebels. 
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Even among caudillos who shared Cedilla's conservatism, relationships with 
national politicians varied considerably. Indeed, the fact that such ties were often 
tenuous made it all the more important for the federal government to keep its 
supporters content. Although Cedilla helped the federal government crush the 
Delahuerta rebellion, Jacobs suggests that a combination of personal and political 
factors persuaded the powerful ranchero family, the Figueroas, to join the rebellion. 
Despite their control of the region's federal military contingent, the subsequent 
defeat of Delahuertismo heralded the fall of the Figueroas, and with it the demise of 
traditional caudillismo in the state of Guerrero. 
Yet the Figueroas fell not so much because they were militarily weak, but 
because of the circumstances which forced them to side with the Delahuertistas. 
Despite their military power in Guerrero, the Figueroas' control was less than 
absolute. With the radical policies of the agrarian governor, Rodolfo Neri, 
attracting mass support among worker and campesino organisations, the Guerrero 
governor represented a credible threat to the Figueroas' regional hegemony. 12 
Pledging support for Neri's policies rather than the more conservative aspirations of 
the Figueroas, does not mean that the federal government favoured radicalism. 
Rather, it reflected the government's willingness to adopt a flexible approach in 
gaining its long-term ambition of curbing the powers of regional leaders. 
At a more local level, similar ambiguities exist concerning the nature of 
caciquismo in the post-revolutionary period. Frans Schryer's study, The Rancheros 
of Pisaflores, shows that traditional caudillos and caciques often rose from the midst 
of the campesino armies they led. Many local leaders had enjoyed a degree of 
influence in more peaceful times; they often belonged to the rural bourgeoisie as 
artisans, small traders and rancheros. 13 They offered continuity: pillars of social 
stability in a world of shifting political sands. Yet, the political opportunism 
displayed by serrano caciques in their quest to establish local autonomy meant that 
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they often adopted misleading positions regarding issues of local concern. Frans 
Schryer shows how, in the Sierra Alta de Hidalgo, leaders of rival factions rallied 
support by fomenting agrarian conflict in an area which had been free of such 
tension throughout the Revolution. Otilio Villegas identified with the agrarian cause 
in order to attract campesino support, while his rival, Porfirio Rubio, preyed on the 
concerns of the larger landowning farmers to gain his following. 14 Although their 
ranchero background and limited ideological ambitions suggest that Villegas and 
Rubio were fundamentally conservative and inward looking, by paying lip service to 
the agrarian issue they nonetheless demonstrated an appreciation of the changing 
political environment beyond their locality. 
Paul Friedrich's portrayal of the cacicazgo of Primo Tapia, Agrarian Revolt 
in a Mexican Village, demonstrates the operation of links between regional and local 
leaders. 15 Using a form of radical mobilisation similar to that of Carrillo Puerto in 
Yucatan, Primo Tapia swiftly gained control of the agrarian movement in the 
Zacapu region of Michoacan. Under the patronage of the equally radical state 
governor, Francisco Mügica, Tapia's network of local agrarian committees 
represented more than a mere forum for agrarian demands. 16 As in Veracruz under 
Tejeda, the committees provided a nucleus for military mobilisation used to 
reinforce the position of the state governor. 
The intimacy and intricacy of local politics, as in the case of Primo Tapia, 
prevent us from depicting post-revolutionary caciquismo purely as a battle between 
old and new forms of leadership. Certainly, Tapia's message reached a wider 
audience through his use of the network of local agrarian committees, but Friedrich 
emphasises more personal factors. The history of radicalism within the Tapia 
household; the family's traditional position of influence among its neighbours; 
Tapia's awareness and respect for local Indian customs, all combined to legitimise 
his position in negotiations with leaders of Zacapu communities. By synthesising 
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Indian and mestizo traditions, Tapia blurred the distinction between tradition and 
modernity. Continuity with the past placed Tapia in a position from which he could 
use modem bureaucratic methods to implement radical reform. 
As in the Zacapu district of Michoacan, the Revolution in the Sierra Norte 
de Puebla reflected the peculiarities of the region's recent history. Agrarian 
radicalism was not an issue in the Sierra, and in this respect the Revolution took a 
different form from that found elsewhere in Puebla and the adjacent regions of 
Tlaxcala and Veracruz. '? Consequently, campesinos were not bound by horizontal 
organisations, such as agrarian leagues, but identified more closely with traditional 
family and community structures. Where campesinos were already in possession of 
their own plots, the promise of land could not be used as an incentive to follow a 
leader into battle. Those who wished to recruit the campesinos of the Sierra de 
Puebla would have to use a different means of penetrating and influencing Indian 
communities. 18 
While events confirm that the Barrios brothers were successful in gaining the 
confidence of the Indian serrano, the exact nature of their assumed position is less 
obvious. On the one hand, the Barrios brothers represented federal military 
authority: they were officially recognised by the Ministry of War throughout the 
Carranza and Sonorense administrations. Yet their soldiers remained campesinos 
who spent more time tending their crops than fighting and few received a regular 
wage from the Ministry of War. The Barrios brothers themselves appeared to 
reflect the broader trend of revolutionary leaders who emerged from the ranks of the 
rural bourgeoisie. Yet Gabriel Barrios in particular is remembered as a simple 
campesino; he rarely wore fine clothes or a military uniform, preferring the simple 
traje de manta of his neighbours and companions. Lacking the revolutionary 
ideology of Tejeda across the border in Veracruz, the Barrios brothers nonetheless 
presided over a programme of regional development that won the acclaim of the 
9 
radical revolutionaries, Jose Vasconcelos and Vicente Lombardo Toledano. 
Clearly, the Barrios cacicazgo was too complex to be placed within any one 
category of post-revolutionary leadership. 
The underlying theme of this thesis is to use the cacicazgo of Gabriel Barrios 
as a prism to shed light on the aftermath of the Revolution as it affected the people 
of the Sierra Norte de Puebla. In doing so, attention is given to the extent to which 
the cacicazgo was a product of the region's past, and whether Gabriel Barrios' 
personal qualities placed him in a unique position to assume regional prominence. 
As such an approach relates directly to the cacique's biographical details, a broad 
sketch of Gabriel Barrios' background serves the dual purpose of resolving existing 
misconceptions and placing Barrios within the more general framework of Mexico's 
twentieth-century history. 
It is unclear when and for what motive Barrios' mestizo father, Jose Maria, 
made the decision to settle in the Indian village of Cuacuila. It appears that he had 
once lived in the town of Amixtlän, located in the valley below Cuacuila. 19 Jose 
Maria subsequently married a local Indian, Dominga Cabrera, and the couple had 
five children: Amado, Gabriel, Bardomiano, Pilar and Demetrio. Confusion 
surrounds the year of Gabriel Barrios' birth as the event was not registered at the 
time. However, the weight of later evidence suggests that he was born on 18 March 
1888.20 
At first sight, the Barrios family's social position in the rural district of 
Zacatlän would appear to place Gabriel Barrios in that category of ranchero leaders 
who enjoyed prominence during the Revolution as a result of their previous status. 
Born and raised in Cuacuila, the Barrios brothers received no formal education and 
their childhood and adolescence were heavily influenced by the cultural values of 
their Nahua mother. Nevertheless, the family's activities in breeding and selling 
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horses led to considerable contact with mestizo traders in Tetela de Ocampo and 
Zacatlän, providing the family with a measure of economic wealth akin to that 
enjoyed by rancheros in the nearby Sierra Alta de Hidalgo. Before the Revolution, 
their relative wealth enabled the family to buy sufficient land to warrant the 
employment of seasonal labourers. 
It was this combination of relative economic prosperity and Indian cultural 
background that provided Gabriel Barrios with the qualities necessary to fulfil his 
assumed role. Mestizos such as Carrillo Puerto, Primo Tapia and Juvencio 
Nochebuena were able to gain legitimacy within Indian communities as a 
consequence of their sensitivity to Indian cultural values. 21 The Barrios brothers, 
however, were different in that their continued reliance upon their ethnic 
constituency was directly attributed to the social and ethnic childhood experiences 
that they shared with their Nahua neighbours. The family's social prestige preceded 
revolutionary action and suggests that cuacuilenos had accepted mestizo culture to 
the extent of correlating wealth with local influence. However, the Barrios family's 
success in broadening their base of popular support in the face of strong mestizo 
opposition reflected the region's ethnic historical precedents. 
No study of the power structure in the Sierra de Puebla during the 1920s can 
afford to ignore the region's past. A predominant theme that emerges from 
Thomson's work on nineteenth century liberalism within the Sierra is the 
interdependence that existed during the latter half of the century between mestizo 
liberal politicians and local Indian leaders. 22 Just as Cedillo acted as a social and 
political intermediary between national figures and campesinos, so the liberal 
politicians of the Sierra sought an agent to harness the fighting potential of the 
region's Indians. This role was occupied by the Indian 'Patriarch of the Sierra', 
Juan Francisco Lucas. The cultural barriers that created the need for such an 
intermediary were as apparent in the 1920s as they had been in the 1850s. Indian 
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communities in the nineteenth century had looked to 'Tata Juan Francisco' for 
guidance: in the 1920s, Gabriel Barrios was the Indian leader who provided 
direction and continuity with the past. 
Inevitable comparisons have been made between Juan Francisco Lucas and 
Gabriel Barrios. Yet the two men held power in distinctly different political 
environments. An important part of this thesis will analyse the way in which 
Barrios was able to balance the need to adjust to modern circumstances while 
remaining sensitive to the expectations of the patriarchal role he had inherited. This 
went beyond the issue of discarding old ideas for new, and reached to the heart of 
the differing psychologies of the ethnic groups who inhabited the Sierra. Barrios 
could not afford to ignore the values upon which Indian society was based. Barrios' 
military potential, like that of Juan Francisco Lucas' fifty years earlier, relied upon 
recruitment from the Indian communities of the Sierra. At the same time, Barrios 
could not fail to establish links with the external political influences that had begun 
to erode the region's former isolation. 
The blend of incentives and compromises that Lucas devised to satisfy Indian 
communities and mestizo Liberals in the nineteenth century, needed modifying to 
suit the environment in which Barrios operated. This thesis will identify the 
methods adopted by Barrios in his successful attempt to sustain the intermediary role 
of his predecessor. In doing so, it will be possible to gauge the extent to which the 
region's social, economic and ethnic peculiarities led Barrios into using methods 
substantially different from those used by his contemporaries in other regions of the 
Republic. 
Several Mexico City archives were consulted during my research for this 
thesis, although few contain details of the Barrios cacicazgo. Essential information 
regarding the Barrios brothers' rise to power and their clashes with opponents lies in 
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the Cancelado and Histörico sections of the Archivo de la Defensa Nacional (ADN). 
Relevant personal files in the Secciön Cancelado, provide information that reaches 
beyond purely military matters and sheds light on the cacique's involvement with 
political figures at local, regional and national levels. By extremely good fortune, 
the Secciön Histörico holds a file entitled, Historia del 46o Batallön. Summarising 
the military history of Barrios' unit, the account contains detailed descriptions of all 
the operations conducted by the battalion from the Revolution to the 1950s. 
The Archivo General de la Naciön (AGN), particularly the Obregön-Calles 
presidential section, contains much correspondence concerning Barrios' activities in 
the Sierra. Documents relating to military matters frequently duplicate information 
available in the ADN. The archive is most useful, however, in providing evidence 
of the ways in which regional development schemes promoted by Barrios within the 
Sierra helped to establish close ties between his civilian representatives and the 
presidency. The archive also reveals much about the political battle between 
Barrios and Puebla's governor, Claudio N. Tirado. 
The combined resources of the National Hemeroteca at the Universidad 
Nacional Autönoma de Mexico (UNAM), Mexico City, and the State Hemeroteca 
in Puebla City, provide indications of how Barrios' actions in the Sierra were 
received by political commentators in regional and national capitals. Particularly 
useful are the collections of the Puebla newspapers, El Monitor between 1920-22, 
and La Opiniön between 1928-30. Both collections can be found in the hemeroteca 
in Puebla City. 
A major burden for the student of Puebla's history is the absence of an 
archive for the executive branch of the state government. The legislature archive 
contains little material of obvious relevance to the Barrios cacicazgo. Municipal 
archives vary greatly in both condition and utility. With the notable exception of 
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Teziutlän, other municipal archives in the Sierra were in good order and were easy 
to access. Although the Libres archive contains interesting details of clashes 
between Barrios' representatives and local agraristas on the altiplano, few archives 
hold specific information on the nature of Barrios' influence during the 1920s. 
They are useful, however, in providing a clear impression of how each district tried 
to maintain a semblance of orderly life in the face of revolutionary disruption. 
By far the richest primary source for all aspects of the Barrios cacicazgo, 
particularly relating to the network of grass-root support, resides in the RHAM 
archive of the Biblioteca Luis Cabrera in Zacatlän. Regular communiques between 
the Barrios brothers and their personal network of local military commanders, jefes 
de armas, give invaluable information of the daily operation of the cacicazgo. They 
reveal the nature of the relationship that existed between the Barrios brothers and 
their clients, and the scope of the jefes de arenas' military and political duties. The 
archive contains military reports, review lists, details of weapons and provisions 
pertaining to the 46th. Battalion. Private and official correspondence identifies the 
important role that Demetrio Barrios played in the day to day running of the 
cacicazgo, as well as documenting the relationships between the cacicazgo and 
politicians and military officers outside the region. 
Considerable time was spent walking through the landscape in which the 
Barrios brothers operated. Ostensibly conducting oral history, a physical 
appreciation of the topographical and climatic conditions of the Sierra provided an 
appreciation of the physical realities of rural life in this region. 23 Interviews were 
conducted with a range of people with personal experiences of the Barrios 
cacicazgo. Elderly serranos who had served under Barrios or fought against his 
troops, members of the Barrios family, children of his political allies and foes, all 
contributed towards providing a vivid addition to the documentary evidence. 
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A published collection of interviews recorded by Carlos Marentes Bravo 
contains recollections of those who served under Barrios as jefes de armas, or who 
experienced revolutionary life in the Sierra under the Barrios brothers' rule. 24 
Equally revealing are the observations made in a government report written by the 
Under-Secretary of Education, Moises Saenz, published in 1927.25 Although 
predominantly relating to the condition of federal education in the Sierra, Saenz 
makes many pertinent observations regarding the relationship between municipal 
politicians and Gabriel Barrios. 
Personal archives proved less useful for documentary evidence, although 
Vicente Barrios Vargas (Demetrio Barrios' son), has copies of documents held in 
the ADN. Gabriel Barrios' sons, Jose Maria and Amulfo, possess many fascinating 
photographs of their father and uncles taken during and after the Revolution when 
the cacicazgo was at its height. 
Existing testimonies of the life of Gabriel Barrios Cabrera produce a 
sketchy, inaccurate image. Mention of the Barrios cacicazgo appears in Hernandez 
Enriquez's work, Historia Moderna de Puebla. While the three volume work 
details Puebla history in great detail, a major weakness is the strong reliance on 
newspaper articles as a primary source. Certainly, in relation to Gabriel Barrios, 
this has led to a false assessment of the leader's influence in the Sierra. A few lines 
in Cordero y Tones, Historia compendiada del estado de Puebla give a brief 
summary of the Barrios cacicazgo. 26 Luisa Pare's study of rural society in the 
region during the 1960s has some interesting, if at times inaccurate, details relating 
to Barrios and those local caciques who followed during the 1930s. 27 David La 
France's essay, 'El resurgimiento militar del cacicazgo de Lucas durante la 
Revoluciön', also contains a summary of Gabriel Barrios' rise to power and 
describes the basic framework of the Barrios cacicazgo. 28 LaFrance's eventual 
conclusion of Barrios as a repressive cacique, while conforming to the general 
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opinion, is weakened by the paucity of supporting documentation. Only a more 
comprehensive study of the cacicazgo can provide the evidence needed to make an 
accurate analysis: in this respect, this thesis sheds important new light on post- 
revolutionary caciquismo in the Sierra de Puebla. 
While recognising the limitations inherent in his reliance on newspaper 
articles as a primary source, Rogelio Sänchez's dissertation of political events in 
Puebla during the 1920s and 1930s, is nonetheless a useful source of reference. 29 
Wil Panters' study of the avilacamachismo in Puebla politics provides a clear 
impression of how the Avila Camacho family's authoritarianism survived the 
broader trend of regional political capitulation under the weight of pressure from 
central government. 30 
There are several local historical studies concerning various districts of the 
Sierra. The majority rely heavily upon anecdotal evidence, are overwhelmingly 
partisan and present an interpretation of events from the perspective of the dominant 
mestizo minority. 31 While they are of some value in identifying the role played by 
prominent families in a district's history, the most revealing aspect is the elitism that 
pervades the texts. The deference shown to local powerful families in the 1920s is 
still evident in the accounts written decades later. One of the more factual and least 
biased of these studies is Marco Barrios Bonilla's study of the development of a 
coffee economy in the municipality of Cuetzalan. It provides useful data on the 
municipality's early twentieth century social and economic development. 
Mention has already been made of the significant influence that ethnicity has 
played in serrano politics. The only contemporary observations regarding ethnic 
considerations in the Sierra are those included in Moises Saenz's report. He gives 
some indication of the relationship between different ethnic groups during the 
1920s. More recently, a wave of anthropological studies has swept across the 
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Sierra. 32 Some, such as Torres-Trueba's investigation into the relationship between 
factionalism and ethnicity in Zacapoaxtla during the 1960s, have direct relevance to 
the region's post-revolutionary experience. Other studies contribute towards an 
appreciation of the complexity of Indian values: a subject which Barrios was bound 
to confront if he hoped to gain legitimacy within the Sierra. 
A few words need to be added concerning the terminology used throughout 
this thesis. The generic term 'serrano' is universally used within the Sierra de 
Puebla to describe all those who live within the region. In order to avoid confusion 
with Alan Knight's use of the word to define an adherent of a local autonomist 
movement, when used in the latter context, the word 'serrano' will be italicised. 
Accurate definitions of ethnic groups in the Sierra are fraught with potential 
pitfalls. Local expressions are often derogatory, while generally accepted 
definitions beyond the Sierra, such as gente de razön and criollo, are not readily 
transferable to a serrano society that is particularly conscious of ethnic differences. 
While the following divisions may appear clumsy, in striving to reflect how 
serranos perceive themselves and their neighbours, terms have been chosen which 
are readily understood by those without a knowledge of the region. 
The expressions 'white serrano' and 'white elite' are reserved for those 
regarded by others as members of the serrano elite. Their physical features, 
customs and social mores reflected their proud links with Spanish colonial ancestry. 
The majority of white elite lived in the cabeceras and were often educated in Puebla 
and Mexico City. 
The term 'Indian' is more problematic because no consensus exists within 
the Sierra regarding membership of this category: white elite use a much broader 
definition than the Indians themselves. In order to reflect most accurately the local 
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usage of the term, the word Indian is used for all those serranos whose first and 
preferred language is one possessing pre-Columbian origins. 33 While this definition 
appears capacious, it does reflect an individual's likely cultural background and 
ethnic self-perception. Those individuals with strong desires and opportunities to 
break out of their Indian environment were likely to have sought a mestizo 
education and adopted the Spanish language as their own. Conversely many 
serranos, such as Gabriel Barrios, who had a good deal of contact with mestizo 
society, nonetheless spoke Spanish badly and preferred their native nahuatl. 
Consequently, while it was recognised by all serranos that Gabriel Barrios 
was something special, he was nonetheless viewed by white serranos as the 'indito' 
cacique. Indian serranos defined him according to their relationship with him: in 
more peripheral regions of the Sierra, especially in non-Nahua communities, he was 
seen as a mestizo. Yet in areas closer to his stronghold of Cuacuila, evidence 
suggests that many Indians bestowed mythological qualities upon him; a strong 
indication of his acceptance as one of their own. 
One further issue regarding Indian ethnic identity requires clarification, and 
this relates to the nature of the Indian community in the Sierra during the 1920s. 
Later anthropological studies of serrano communities clearly discern many of the 
traditional features associated with Indian culture: elders, cargo systems, annual 
ceremonial cycles. Yet it is equally clear that each Indian community adapted to 
non-Indian influences in different ways. Evidence suggests that in the 1920s, 
similar flexibility was displayed by Indian communities in their relationships with 
their non-Indian neighbours, and that an Indian community could retain its ethnic 
character even though inhabited by some mestizo families. For the purposes of this 
thesis, therefore, the term, 'Indian community' is indicative of the predominance of 
Indian traditions and values rather than any racial demarcation of its residents. For 
example, although the Barrios family's external commercial activities indicated that 
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Indian traditions in Cuacuila had been modified, the underlying traditional character 
of the community led it to be viewed as an Indian settlement. 
As elsewhere in Mexico, the term 'mestizo' refers to the wide range of 
serranos that fall between the two socio-ethnic extremes outlined above. Whenever 
appropriate, however, further information will be given in the text to clarify how 
particular mestizo subjects were ethnically perceived by their fellow serranos. 
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2. El "Indito" General: Militarism 
in the Sierra Norte 
While the strength of the Barrios cacicazgo was the eventual 
interdependence of each its many components, the lifeblood from which all else 
flowed was Gabriel Barrios' role as the senior federal military officer in the 
Sierra. As in other regions of the Republic, an official military position was 
little more than the federal recognition of a cacique's ability to mobilise an 
independent military force. Yet, in the Sierra de Puebla the ethnic composition 
of serrano society created particular circumstances. Without the opportunities 
provided by the years of civil strife, the entrepreneurial and organisational talent 
that Barrios later displayed would have failed to flourish: frost-bitten in its 
infancy by a minority non-Indian society that had long dominated political, 
social and economic life in the cabeceras. His military position, however, gave 
him an opportunity to break free from the usual restraints of his racial origins 
and gave him a degree of influence in the Sierra superior to that possessed by 
any other Indian in the region's post-conquest history. 
This chapter discusses the character of Barrios' Indian army: a force so 
significant as to prompt fears of a caste war in the minds of some of the region's 
non-Indian population. The rationale for such fears is tested by investigating the 
historical precedent for Indian mobilisation. Within this history, particular 
attention is placed upon the role of the cultural intermediary and, in identifying 
the requisite characteristics of such an individual, an assessment will be made of 
Gabriel Barrios' suitability for the position. Finally, an analysis will be made of 
the ways in which Barrios steered the Sierra through the turbulent years of the 
Revolution: how, during times of military and political intrigue, he managed to 
gain the confidence of successive presidents and, under their gaze, establish the 
foundations of a cacicazgo that encompassed the entire Sierra and beyond. 
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National Guardsmen: Patriots or opportunists? 
Throughout the nineteenth century, National Guard recruitment in the 
Sierra de Puebla produced a pattern of localised response. It was not infrequent 
for Indian communities to organise their own Guard unit, using their freedom 
under the terms of the Liberal Constitution to appoint their own leaders. The 
Liberal politician, Juan N. Mendez, and Juan Francisco Lucas had laid down the 
ground rules during the 1860s, and in the battles that followed, serrano Indians 
and mestizos frequently fought side by side. The Indians' reward for their 
service was the large measure of local autonomy, so cherished by Lucas, that 
allowed them to determine their own affairs free from excessive outside 
interference. I 
Thomson's work makes it clear that the serrano National Guardsman 
understood the issues raised by the wars he waged. Far from being mere 
cannon-fodder in the wars of others, the serrano proved able to engage with the 
ideological debates of the day, and to choose those items on the Liberal menu 
that most served his interests. Javier Guerra suggests active service made many 
national guardsmen 'view the rights derived from Guard membership as an 
exclusive charter of liberal-patriotic citizenship' .z 
One should be careful, 
however, when transposing this essentially national perception to the Sierra de 
Puebla. Even in the bastions of popular liberalism, Xochiapulco and 
Cuahuigtic, it was local issues and interests that encouraged National Guard 
membership. 3 Infact, the only national aspect of these Guard units was their 
title. Lucas' National Guards were concerned with issues that directly 
concerned them: exemption from leva and crippling tax contributions, and 
greater community autonomy were of more interest to the serrano than universal 
suffrage and equality. 4 
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Whatever the underlying motives of National Guard membership, the 
units did create a military precedent. Certain cabeceras and barrios developed a 
tradition of military involvement: communities became accustomed to retaining 
their weapons and reacting to local emergencies by mobilising locally organised 
militias. Although these units were by no means exclusively Indian, beyond the 
cabeceras, the preponderance of Indian communities meant that many militia 
units were led by figures whose right to lead was determined by criteria laid 
down by a community's customs and traditions. 
Nineteenth century militarism also established a measure of 
understanding and a channel of communication between those communities 
willing to fight and the mestizo politicians who, in return for such services, 
promised to address their local concerns. The function of the cultural 
intermediary, personified at the regional level by Lucas, was to ensure that each 
side honoured their commitments. In order to gain the acceptance of the serrano 
communities, units demanded that Lucas negotiate to satisfy their local 
objectives: anything less might provoke the form of angry, direct response 
exemplified by the rebellion led by the National Guard leader, Francisco 
Agustin Dieguillo ('Palagustin') in Cuetzalan. 5 Equally, Lucas' value to 
mestizo politicians depended upon the political climate. As Thomson observes, 
with Lucas' patron, Mendez, in the ascendancy, progress was made in providing 
the Sierra communities with the sort of protection they sought. 6 When the 
political climate changed and the need for a serrano fighting force decreased, the 
source of patronage ran dry and Lucas' influence correspondingly diminished. 
Despite the fact that the changing political climate eventually eclipsed 
Lucas' role, his place in Tetela de Ocampo's illustrious history had been 
assured. Folklore and lyric contributed towards the creation of a mythical 
image of a man respected by Indians and mestizos alike.? (see appendix I. ) Yet, 
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as Palagustin's bellicosity in Cuetzalan highlights, in times when Lucas' services 
as a recruiting officer diminished, so his defence of regional autonomy became 
less effective at holding back the encroachment represented by outside economic 
interests. LaFrance describes Lucas' brave struggle to retain a measure of unity 
within the Sierra that might yet save the autonomy of the region. 8 Yet by 1910, 
Lucas was surely chasing an illusion. True, he again became a pivotal figure as 
military chiefs from all sides sought his intermediary skills, but the Sierra in 
1910 was a very different world from that of the 1860s. 9 Whatever Lucas might 
have been able to offer the serrano communities, autonomy had been removed 
from the political agenda. 
There is no doubt, however, that during the Revolution Lucas still 
commanded the respect that he had earned in former times. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that when Lucas called upon his fellow serranos to take up arms, he 
once again received a positive response. While the presence in his estado mayor 
of the mestizo, Tranquilino Quintero from Cuautempan, warns against viewing 
Lucas' military following as purely Indian, as in the past, the underlying 
structure of the Brigada Serrana was the coalition of locally organised groups led 
by popular leaders of Indian communities. The pattern of National Guard 
recruitment was repeated: Lucas, acting as an intermediary, persuaded 
community leaders to organise units to fight local versions of a national 
struggle. Among the many who responded to Lucas' call to arms was Gabriel 
Barrios Cabrera and his fellow Indian campesinos from the hill-top village of 
Cuacuila. 10 
Bardomiano Gabriel Demetrio 
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The Barrios brothers and their Indian army. (Cuacuila, Pue., 1923). 
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Ethnicity and the Indian military leader 
On 6 June 1913 the Barrios brothers recruited 120 of their fellow 
serranos and descended the slopes to Acatlän where they enlisted in the ranks of 
Lucas' Brigada Serrana. ll (The Brigada Serrana formed part of the Third East 
Division under the overall command of General Antonio Medina. ) Gabriel 
Barrios received the rank of second captain and was placed in command of the 
new recruits, thereafter called the Cuacuila company. 12 His military career had 
an inauspicious start: illness determined that for the first five months he was 
reduced to directing his troops from his headquarters in Cuacuila. By December 
1913, however, Barrios personally led his troops as a part of a greater force 
under the command of Colonel Gaspar Marquez in the defeat of Huertista troops 
in Zacatlän and Chignahuapan. The Cuacuila company continued to liaise with 
Märquez's forces in the Sierra, and later was deployed to various locations in 
the nearby sierra caliente of Veracruz, where its military successes earned 
Barrios promotion to the rank of first captain. 
In December 1914 the decision of the Marquez brothers to switch their 
allegiance to the Conventionists. prompted the Cuacuila company's return to the 
Sierra. During the next two years, Lucas marshalled his troops in opposition to 
the Marquez clan, whose headquarters at Otlatlän lay on the far side of a range 
of hills that separated it from Cuacuila. Previous cooperation gave way to open 
hostility between the dominant families of two communities that had harboured 
frictions for several years. 13 Neighbourly friction was compounded by personal 
revenge when, in one of the many clashes between the rival forces, Demetrio 
Barrios was injured and another brother, Amado, died from wounds sustained in 
battle. '4 
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A brief summary of Gabriel Barrios' military record during the years of 
Revolution suggests that he flourished in the heat of battle. On 29 September 
1915 he received the rank of major and was given command of the 'Juan 
N. Mendez' Battalion, one of two battalions that comprised the Brigada Serrana. 
(The 'Tetela de Ocampo' Battalion, was led by Lieutenant Colonel Tranquilino 
Quintero). 15 On 9 February 1917 Juan Francisco Lucas, commander of the 
Brigada, died and amid much grief and ceremony was buried in Tetela de 
Ocampo. Although Tranquilino Quintero outranked Gabriel Barrios, the 
Ministry of War received and accepted the news that Barrios had taken over as 
jefe accidental of the Brigada Serrana. 16 The Brigada Serrana continued the 
fight against the Marquez forces, obtaining a decisive victory on 12 August 
1917 in an early morning surprise raid on Otlatlän. The attack virtually 
destroyed the estado mayor of the Conventionist forces. Esteban and Emilio 
Marquez were killed in combat while later the same day Barrios received orders 
to execute Colonel Gaspar Marquez. After the attack Barrios received 
immediate promotion to Lieutenant - Colonel and, with the Marquez threat 
eliminated, the battalion was now free to redirect its endeavours against enemies 
based on both flanks of the Sierra: the rebels Adampol Gavino and Rodolfo 
Herrero operating in the districts of Zacatlän, Huauchinango and the stretch of 
land dropping to the tierra caliente; and the Villista forces of Salvador Vega 
Bernal, Rafael Alcäntara and Bernardo Mora who continued to pose a threat in 
Zacapoaxtla and Cuetzalan. 17 By engaging the enemy in its own territory, 
Barrios' military jurisdiction expanded rapidly beyond its origins. By 1919 the 
Brigada Serrana held jurisdiction in Tetela, Zacatlän, Huauchinango, 
Tlatlauquitepec and Zacapoaxtla in the State of Puebla, and in the district of 
Papantla in Veracruz. Gabriel Barrios, together with his surviving brothers 
Bardomiano and Demetrio, controlled the brigade's operations in Cuacuila and 
Zacatlän while relatives and trusted friends were given officer ranks and placed 
in charge of the various units deployed throughout the Sierra. The Brigada 
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Serrana, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Gabriel Barrios continued its 
campaign against revolutionary groups and, despite subsequent accusations, no 
evidence exists to suggest that adherence to the Constitutionalist cause wavered 
until the very last days of the Carranza administration. 18 
Although his later successes proved him to be an impressive military 
tactician, present explanations appear inadequate to resolve the question of why, 
upon the death of Lucas, Barrios should assume military command in preference 
to superior mestizo officers. LaFrance implies that the brutal attack against the 
Marquez brothers revealed the true nature of Barrios' ambition. He sees Barrios 
as a cruel, deceptive leader whose relentless purge of enemies was fuelled by a 
ruthless personal ambition to attain power. 19 Yet to portray Barrios' attack as a 
sudden change of policy is inaccurate. Numerous earlier battles had 
demonstrated that Lucas saw the Marquez brothers as identified enemies rather 
than possible co-sponsors of a united serrano front against attacks on regional 
autonomy. 20 The attack on the Marquez forces in August 1917 was merely the 
continuation of a campaign launched against a recognised enemy. Days before 
the final assault, the Marquez brothers contacted Carranza offering a 
compromise in which they would go into voluntary exile and place their forces 
under the command of Barrios. 21 The Carrancista reply was the assault on the 
Marquez stronghold two days later, an attack ordered by Barrios' superior 
officers. Following the attack, a jubilant Carranza sent his congratulations to 
Barrios and authorised his immediately promotion. 22 While it is true that the 
victory greatly helped Barrios' ambitions as a Carrancista military commander 
and a local cacique, the evidence confirms that these w, ere subsidiary benefits 
accrued as a result of Barrios following the orders of his superiors. 
Ruthless ambition alone was insufficient to secure Gabriel Barrios' rise to 
supremacy. It must be remembered that had the Ministry of War wanted to 
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prevent Barrios from assuming command, Quintero or either of Lucas' own sons 
were logical options. Yet, there is clear evidence that successive administrations 
in Mexico City showed a reluctance to place a mestizo officer in charge of 
federal troops in the Sierra. Huertista generals, conducting a military appraisal 
of the Sierra in January 1914, concluded that it would be unwise to replace 
Lucas with another military commander, and that in the event of his death, 
neither of his two sons, Abraham and Miguel, would make a suitable 
replacement. The report suggested that all officers in the Brigada Serrana 
should be Indians, preferably from Xochiapulco, and that no 'gente de razön', 
including the Marquez brothers, should assume control of the Brigade. 23 This 
bias towards Indian leadership reveals a general uncertainty that pervaded both 
Huertista and Carrancista armies regarding the personal and political motives of 
their generals. Conversely, Indian leaders may have been viewed as less 
concerned with global issues and, therefore, more controllable than their mestizo 
counterparts. 
The Huertista report may have reflected more than a mistrust of mestizo 
intentions: for many decades, the Indian forces of this part of the Sierra had 
served under the command of Lucas. To replace Lucas with a mestizo would be 
to step into the unknown. It is doubtful whether any of the Carrancista officers 
choosing Lucas' successor could even speak nahuatl, let alone gauge the likely 
reaction of the brigade's Indian troops to the imposition of a mestizo 
commanding officer. One must remember the broader climate in which such 
events took place. A large sector of serrano society had long been under the 
paternal spell of their charismatic patron. In a period when the support of the 
Brigada Serrana could effectively determine the military and political balance of 
a crucial portion of the state of Puebla, Carrancista generals were naturally 
unwilling to do anything that would upset the historical precedent of troop 
mobilisation and control through the good offices of a cultural intermediary. 
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Given the delicacy of the situation in the Sierra, Carranza's refusal to accept the 
overtures of the Marquez faction becomes clearer: it was better to eliminate the 
threat than to allow the survival of a potentially volatile mestizo agent with 
Conventionist credentials within a region struggling to adjust to the death of 
Lucas. 
By its very nature, the role of an intermediary has to acknowledge the 
expectations of both sides. Carrancista generals would not continue to support 
Gabriel Barrios if he failed to deliver, and Barrios could only meet this 
requirement if he could persuade the serrano communities that he was a worthy 
successor to Lucas. Thomson's work on nineteenth century recruitment in the 
region highlights two salient aspects: the strategic importance of gaining military 
control of the Sierra during periods of national crisis; and that the only decisive 
way of ensuring such control was to employ an intermediary who commanded 
respect within serrano communities and was sensitive to local values and 
concerns. In successfully fulfilling such a role, Lucas received considerable 
freedom from external interference, while his image within the Indian 
communities reached mythical proportions. The same issues returned during the 
early years of the Revolution. As with National Guardsmen fifty years earlier, 
serrano recruits had a tangible, local motive to join Lucas' forces. Many 
serranos had become tired of being the victims of arbitrary revolutionary 
violence and saw military recruitment as the best chance of protecting their 
families and communities from external pressures. Lucas' call to arms was a 
spectre from the past, a paternal figure who once again offered the hope of 
providing them with the protection they sought. 
The attraction of the patriarchal figure appears to have disproportionate 
significance within the Sierra. Doris Slade's study of social organisation in the 
Nahua community of Chignautla identifies the predominance of unilineal 
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paternal ties common to many Nahua communities in the Sierra. Given such 
tendencies, Slade argues, Nahua serranos are particularly receptive to the 
approaches of patriarchal figures such as Juan Francisco Lucas. 24 As Moises 
Saenz, Under-Secretary for Education, noted in his tour of the Sierra in 1926, 
Gabriel Barrios appeared to possess similar prestige, 'a style of benevolent 
feudalism, a strong and loving paternalism ... ' . 25 There is little doubt that 
Barrios' style of leadership was largely determined by the nineteenth century 
precedents set by Lucas. 
The temptation for many serranos to draw parallels between the mystical 
powers attributed to 'Tata Juan Francisco' and those inherited by his successor 
has proved irresistible. Drawing upon the investigations of Masferrer Kan, it 
seems feasible that leaders such as Lucas, who were able to react sensitively to 
local traditions, could achieve a form of legitimacy verging on reverence. 
Gonzalez de la Rama's study of the Totonac rebellion of 1885 has one important 
conclusion. He argues that, at least in part, the rebel leader Diaz Monfort 
employed his knowledge of Indian spiritual beliefs as an means of encouraging 
recruitment. Of particular interest. is the fact that manipulation of a common 
spirituality united communities across the region despite their many individual 
differences. In the case of Lucas, there is little doubt that secular rather than 
any spiritual considerations first enabled him to obtain a measure of legitimacy 
within serrano communities. However, as Kan's work suggests, by satisfying 
secular demands Lucas obtained a form of legitimacy that transcended the 
secular and put him into that category of leaders for which secular and spiritual 
reverence converged. 26 
Marentes Bravo's oral history of the Revolution in the Sierra lends 
weight to Masferrer Kan's suggestion that Lucas was accredited with 
shamanistic qualities. Marentes' study goes further, however, in suggesting that 
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Gabriel Barrios enjoyed a similar reputation among the region's revolutionary 
combatants. 27 A former servant of the Barrios household suggests that such was 
the esteem in which Gabriel Barrios was held by Indian serranos who knew him 
well, that he was seen as a god-like figure rather than a mere mortal; a paternal 
figure who offered protection and advice. 28 In both Zacatlän and Tetela, a 
strong lasting impression of Barrios is his extremely shrewd character; a 
foremost tactician who left nothing to chance. Within the Sierra, stories persist 
of the shadowy figure of Gabriel Barrios: a firm but fair man; a man who never 
appeared to need sleep; who would rest at night in one village only to appear 
early the next morning in another many miles away; who was rarely seen by day 
and who conducted secret meetings with his local commanders under cover of 
darkness; who was witnessed to have been in two places at the same time. 
Within these anecdotes, the ambiguous image of Gabriel Barrios within Nahua 
society is revealed. His mystical attributes display the reverential position that 
his paternal role earned him. However, equally apparent is his intimidatory 
image, anecdotes relating to his nocturnal movements betraying the Nahua 
spiritual association of darkness with foreboding and evil spirits. 29 These were 
the beliefs of the communities from whom Barrios sought his troops: he could 
not afford to ignore his Indian cultural background. 
In the pragmatic world of post-revolution caudillismo, it might appear 
superficial to talk of supporters being attracted through cultural manipulation 
rather than material reward. Yet the historiography produces examples of 
mestizos, such as Carrillo Puerto and Juvencio Nochebuena, who realised the 
benefits of adapting their image to suit their Indian following. 30 Friedrich's 
study of the cacicazgo that developed during the Revolution in Zacapu, 
Michoacän, describes the way in which a charismatic leader, Primo Tapia, used 
his understanding of local cultural values to obtain a measure of legitimacy 
rarely attainable through the existing hierarchical structure. Friedrich describes 
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a man who retained the common touch: he spoke in local Tarascan dialects and 
lived an outwardly modest life that never threatened to distance himself from the 
campesinos. While strongly anti-clerical, Tapia recognised the deeply religious 
beliefs of the Tarascans and moved to capitalise upon the differences that existed 
between national Catholicism (as represented by the parish priest) and a folk 
religion embedded in witchcraft and magic. 31 A heavy drinker by nature, he 
had a passion for drama, music and traditional fiestas. At the height of his 
popularity, Primo Tapia wrote: 'such has been my influence that some of my 
believers even think that I perform miracles, many have seen me in Zacapu 
when I was in Morelia. '32 In the year of his death, thirty babies and young 
children died of disease in the community. A year later a naranjena 'confessed 
a secret', that the Virgin Mary had appeared to her saying that thirty angelitos 
were required for the two choirs that would sing to Primo Tapia as he entered 
Heaven. 33 
Barrios, like Lucas before him, spoke in nahuatl and was rarely seen in 
the Sierra dressed in anything other than the simple garments of a serrano 
peasant. Unlike his brother, Demetrio, who elected to live in Zacatlän and later 
developed a taste for imported consumer goods, Gabriel Barrios consistently 
preferred the Campo; those who wished to consult him, mestizo, officers 
included, were forced to use the steep mountain tracks of the campesinos. 
Barrios, like Primo Tapia, developed an interest in music and during his period 
of domination sponsored a brass band that played a strange blend of classical 
and traditional music from the ridge above Cuacuila that echoed eerily 
throughout the mountain valleys at dusk. All the musicians were Indians, 
instructed by the best teachers that Puebla City could provide. Their range of 
instruments and repertoire greatly exceeded that of other brass bands and the 
Cuacuila band gained an excellent reputation. 34 Organisers of community fiestas 
stood to gain much local credit by enticing the band to make an appearance. 35 
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In a rural environment where music was, and remains, a central part of a 
community's social and religious life, the Cuacuila band created ties between 
Barrios and those influential members of a community charged with organising a 
fiesta. These links frequently went beyond mere goodwill and placed the 
organisers of fiestas under an obligation to Barrios. Such relationships proved 
particularly useful as the Barrios brothers began to expand their influence 
beyond matters of a purely military nature. 
Despite their distinctly different backgrounds and few common 
ideological motives, Primo Tapia and Barrios were both fundamentally operating 
the same strategy. Their success within the Indian regions they controlled 
depended on their respect for, and association with, the cultural values of the 
Indian people: patriarchal families within hierarchical systems that afforded 
prestige through cargo sponsorship; societies bound by tradition; language and 
religious concepts which still bore pre-Columbian traits. These were common 
elements of both regions. By recognising and appealing to these cultural values, 
both Primo Tapia and Gabriel Barrios successfully reached the communities of 
their respective regions. 
A more dispassionate interpretation of the Barrios' leadership qualities 
might conclude that the many aspects that helped to foster his image as a 
mystical leader were nothing other than sound military tactics, precautionary 
measures of survival within a dangerous environment. During the attack on 
Otlatlän in August 1917, a major factor in the victory was Barrios' tactical 
superiority. It is said that Esteban Marquez saw no need to place look-outs on 
the approaches from Cuacuila because an attack by night was not expected, and 
certainly not during the most severe period of the wet season. 36 Gabriel Barrios' 
son suggests that when Carranza fled Mexico City in 1920, he passed through 
his father's territory unscathed only because Barrios had insisted that the 
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presidential party was moved from one house to another under cover of 
darkness. He points out that had this practice continued, the ambush at 
Tlaxcalantongo would not have been successful. 37 It can be appreciated how 
such tactical decisions might contribute towards the 'mystification' of Barrios in 
the minds of Nahua communities. Sudden appearances, days of absence, 
nocturnal movements through the Sierra, simultaneous sightings: in a culture 
where barriers between the worldly and supernatural are already thin, such a 
reputation might easily make the leap from one to the other. 
For non-Indian supporters of Gabriel Barrios, equally strong imagery 
was at play. The ranchero background of the Barrios family, as suggested by 
studies of rural leadership in other areas, provided Barrios with a certain local 
prestige. In the cabeceras of Tetela and Zacatlän, Gabriel Barrios was known 
and respected for his knowledge of horses. His military tactics were recognised 
by all and his standing as a fighter grew in line with his rapid promotion through 
the ranks of the Brigada Serrana. In time his reputation as an admirer of 
thoroughbred horses, was only surpassed by his even greater passion for 
women. 38 Guns, horses and women, the accoutrements of the Mexican hero, 
helped gain admiration among members of the non-Indian serrano society for 
whom mysticism had no place. 
While Gabriel Barrios was far from unique in managing to persuade his 
fellow campesinos that he was a legitimate military leader, a constant concern 
for all regional leaders was the ability to retain the loyalty of their followers. In 
the case of Primo Tapia, the Tarascan campesinos were offered land and 
protection against the repression that the recent influx of hacendados had 
stimulated. Lucas too, had offered a form of protection. Not only did he 
uphold a form of local autonomy that decelerated the pressures on Indian land in 
the region, but he also demanded mestizo respect for the rights of Indians under 
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the Constitution in relation to military service. But what could Barrios offer a 
region that had suffered the ravages of civil war long before he was in a position 
to influence events? 
In many regions of the Republic, mobilisation of campesinos was 
frequently linked to the hopes and fears raised by the prospect of local agrarian 
reform. However, the recruiting tactics of agrarian caudillos, such as Cedillo, 
Tejeda, and the cacique of Pisaflores, Otilio Villegas, were not easily 
transferable to the nearby Sierra de Puebla as the region was largely free from 
agrarian conflict. Although several families possessed significant amounts of 
land, the region's topography and climate inhibited large scale agriculture. 
Furthermore, campesinos in the Sierra had been largely successful in protecting 
their interests from the worst excesses of desamortizaciön during the 
Porfiriato. 39 The voluntary division and sale of land on larger estates before and 
during the Revolution meant that many campesinos had acquired their own plots 
and did not share the plight of campesinos in other regions. Such influences 
created a general acceptance of the sacrosanct nature of private ownership and in 
strongly affirming such rights, the Barrios family were merely reflecting the 
sentiments of the majority of their fellow serranos. 
More than land reform or revolutionary social change, the serranos 
desired, above all else, peace and stability. In the crucial few years following 
Lucas' death, communities were bound by a desire for a cessation to the 
indiscriminate violence that had so interrupted social and economic life. Sierra 
municipal archives abound with reports from municipal presidents relating 
incidents of bandits attacking settlements, robbing them of funds, horses and 
provisions. 40 In such an environment, any village that tried to maintain 
neutrality became the target for raids by opposing sides. Barrios' son suggests 
that cuacuilenos joined Lucas' Brigada Serrana primarily to acquire an armed 
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presence that might deter the arbitrary demands for provisions from the Marquez 
troops in nearby Otlatlän. 41 Following the death of Lucas and the increasing 
strength of Barrios' military influence, to be a pro-Barrios community was to 
enjoy the best chance of gaining the protection required to ensure peace and 
stability. In the more peaceful times that followed, the prospects of material 
gain undoubtedly attracted support for the cuacuileno cacique and these links 
will be discussed in later chapters. But during times when the Sierra was 
crippled by civil turmoil, patronage once again assumed a military character. 
When Gabriel Barrios assumed command of the Brigada Serrana in 1917, 
senior Carrancista officers were relieved of a major problem. Barrios emerged 
from the crowd of mourners at Lucas' funeral as the 'natural' heir to the dead 
native hero. The death of Lucas left a vacuum in the lives of many serranos, 
both mestizos and Indians. Lucas had achieved his position through serving 
mestizo demands while maintaining his association with Nahua traditional 
values. His understanding of the Nahua culture made Barrios the only feasible 
replacement for the great patriarch. Even Lucas' own college educated sons had 
lost their Nahua roots: despite their undoubted aspirations, neither they nor local 
mestizo leaders could hope to fill the role in the way that Barrios might. 42 When 
faced with the choice of risking the unknown consequences of imposing a 
mestizo military leader at the head of the Brigada Serrana, or allowing power to 
move to a local Indian of proven loyalty and military qualities, the Carrancista 
generals showed little hesitation. 
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'Siempre leal': Militarism under Gabriel Barrios 
Having attained a military position which, to all intents and purposes, 
amounted to a direct succession to the Lucas empire, Barrios had little time to 
adjust to his elevated status. The anti-Carrancista threat posed by the presence 
of armed bands led by Marquez, Vega Bernal and others made it vital that the 
momentum was not lost. The fundamental requirement that successive 
presidents would demand of Barrios was that he should pacify the Sierra and 
firmly establish it as a federal government stronghold. Particularly during the 
presidency of Carranza, but periodically thereafter, this required Barrios to show 
his unfailing loyalty by reacting swiftly to emergencies that threatened the 
federal government. Whether Barrios succeeded can be judged by scrutinising 
the salient events of his military command in the Sierra and placing them in a 
regional and national context. 
Throughout Barrios' period of military command of the Sierra, 
accusations of his political infidelity were never far from the surface. The 
sentiments of many allegations are typified by the letter sent in 1935 by citizens 
of Tlaxco, Tlaxcala. Responding to a rumour that Barrios might be redeployed 
to their region, they begged the Ministry of War to reconsider and highlighted 
the failings of the serrano commander: 
[... ] His loyalty to the Government has left much to be desired. He 
betrayed the government of Senor Carranza and by doing so 
contributed directly to his death. He alone bears the responsibility for 
the tragic end of President Carranza. Having received great quantities 
of money to organise forces to be placed at the disposal of the 
Government, these funds were taken to make Barrios a profiteer and a 
speculator[... ]. During the Delahuerta movement, [Barrios] assumed a 
similar role, vacillating in his support for General Obregön's 
government when he considered its future to be threatened, and 
maintaining contact with the enemy in order that he might switch sides 
if the conflict resulted in defeat for the federal government. [... ] 
During the Serrano and Gomista movement, when he was forced to act 
under the command of other military officers, [Barrios] was prevented 
from assuming his usual tactic of vacillation. During the Escobar 
movement, however, he was once more witnessed to be covering all 
eventualities, since he received various representatives from the rebel 
leader. 43 
42 
This picture of corruption, infidelity and vacillation would have come as 
no surprise to a contemporary observer of Mexican affairs, Ernest Gruening. In 
his analysis of Mexican political events written in 1927, Gruening offered a 
jaundiced image of the Mexican army whose officers, he concluded, were 
almost all driven by one characteristic: treachery. 44 This criticism was no doubt 
heavily influenced by ceaseless internal divisions within the army; each one 
threatening to drag Mexico once more into widespread violent turmoil. 
Gruening suggests that the divisions within the Carrancista forces between 
Carranza on one side and the Sonora group on the other only compounded 
inherent weaknesses in an army that had always suffered a history of 
dishonourable behaviour. Garciadiego portrays a Carrancista army characterised 
by indiscipline and corruption, with generals being constantly moved from one 
region to another not for any military reasons but to stop the chance of collusion 
between supposed enemy forces. While reform of the armed forces may have 
been desirable, to conduct such reform at a time of national instability was 
particularly hazardous. Any anti-corruption campaign that dramatically 
threatened Carrancista officers also risked splitting the army and would probably 
have achieved little but augment the numbers in the enemy camp. Carranza's 
only realistic option was damage limitation. Even if corruption could not be 
eradicated, he could act to eisure that those military officers in crucial positions 
were least likely to betray him. 45 
The opportunism of local military leaders was a necessity of military life 
in the Revolution. Within a national political environment governed by the 
varying military fortunes of the different groups, those generals who stood the 
best chance of surviving the Revolution were those who correctly judged the 
time to transfer allegiances. Carranza's policy of switching his generals from 
one region to another was not without cost. During the seven years that Barrios 
fought under the Constitutionalist banner, command of the Jefatura de 
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Operaciones Militares in Puebla frequently changed hands. While the tactic 
reduced the likelihood of a regional military consensus to challenge Carranza's 
authority, as Garciadiego points out, the need to limit the threat of treason was 
achieved only by sacrificing military effectiveness. 
One of the consequences of such a policy was that generals were sent to 
the Sierra de Puebla possessing little or no understanding of the land or its 
people. In a plea from Governor Alfonso Cabrera to Carranza, the president 
was asked to intervene in the deployment of General M. Arrieta to the Sierra. 
Cabrera suggested that Arrieta's lack of tact had caused great resentment among 
serranos and threatened to drive them towards supporting the enemy. 46 
Conversely, correspondence relating to General Antonio Medina, who had been 
commander of military operations in Northern Puebla some years earlier, 
provides an example of the dangers of keeping officers in one region for any 
extended period. Carranza received a letter from the local authorities in Tetela 
informing him that soldiers acting under the direct orders of Medina had 
descended upon the town and kidnapped several leading members of the 
community. This act, they claimed, was causing widespread indignation 
verging on open revolt. In a subsequent letter of explanation, it became clear 
that Medina was embroiled in a local political dispute: he suggested that he was 
the victim of a political vendetta by his enemies who had incited Brigada 
Serrana troops to insubordination and rebellion. 47 The atmosphere of mistrust 
that pervaded the Carrancista forces is shown in a subsequent letter from Medina 
to the Ministry of War, in which he stated that he could not complete his duties 
satisfactorily unless all the troops in his military jurisdiction were placed under 
his command. Medina further asked that neighbouring Carrancista forces should 
be made to co-operate more fully in any military operation that he considered 
necessary. 48 Carrancista forces in Puebla were no different from their 
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counterparts in other regions; confusion and mistrust often replaced 
professionalism. 
Any attempt to discern the true political sympathies of the Barrios family 
during this period is clouded by the number of unsubstantiated claims lodged 
by their opponents. During his period as a Carrancista, such accusations never 
seriously suggested collaboration with Villista or Zapatista groups, rather they 
concentrated more on alleged corruption. Ironically, following the fall of 
Carranza, Gabriel Barrios' apparent loyalty as a Carrancista officer led to 
speculation that he was planning to give support to a Sierra based rebellion led 
by Alfonso and Luis Cabrera. 49 During the Sonorense administrations, when 
every military revolt could count upon the support of rebels based in, or near, 
the Sierra de Puebla, the character of accusations against Barrios changed from 
those of corruption to alleged complicity in rebel activity. Local authorities in 
Cuetzalan accused Barrios of political assassinations, of openly courting local 
Delahuertistas and of supporting Angel Flores in his presidential campaign 
against Calles in 1924. Lending weight to their argument, the Puebla governor 
Claudio Tirado entered into lengthy correspondence with President Calles giving 
details of the abuses and political interference of Barrios forces and accusing 
Barrios of being 'in open opposition to the state government creating a state of 
anarchy so serious and delicate as to warrant radical and decisive action that 
only you can order'. 50 
Throughout the years that the Barrios brothers controlled the Sierra, the 
Ministry of War sent various commissions to investigate charges made by 
Tirado and others, and to make more general reviews of the prevailing military 
situation. 51 The first of these commissions took place during the months 
immediately following the death of Carranza and resulted in Obregön's 
confirmation of Barrios as the military commander of the Sierra. This was 
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despite various allegations by the incumbent military officers that Barrios had 
refused to recognise the Obregön government and was inciting serranos to rebel. 
Statements from senior officers at the Jefatura in Puebla, however, confirmed 
that Barrios had made a public declaration in support of the Plan de Agua Prieta 
and that, in the interests of peace, he had voluntarily withdrawn his troops to 
their barracks in Cuacuila and Xochiapulco. 52 Interestingly, while the report 
highlighted the potential threat that Barrios' forces represented and suggested 
that it might be prudent to dismantle the Brigada Serrana, Obregön placed his 
faith in Barrios and, instead, set about the demobilisation of the ex-Villista 
forces that had previously warned that the Barrios brothers could not be 
trusted. 53 
As the virulent accusations made in the letter from Tlaxco demonstrate, 
the relatively smooth transition that the Barrios brothers made from Carranza to 
Obregön nonetheless established a platform from which all future charges 
imputing their loyalty were launched. Such accusations support LaFrance's 
conclusion that, following the death of Lucas, ideology was replaced by cynical 
opportunism as Gabriel Barrios became primarily concerned with empire 
building. Yet Barrios' actions defy simple analysis. Unlike Knight's serrano 
movements that were primarily concerned with preserving regional autonomy, 
the Sierra went in a different direction. 54 LaFrance admits that the Sierra under 
Barrios did not turn inwards: Barrios was either unable or unwilling to isolate 
the region. Conversely, the area experienced an acceleration of a process of 
change which had begun before the Revolution. By the time of his death, the 
cherished autonomy that Lucas had fought to maintain was frail, perhaps non- 
existent. The Revolution had contributed to mestizo penetration of the Sierra. 
While this process was not sufficiently advanced to make Barrios' role as 
cultural intermediary redundant, neither could Barrios use his mediation to 
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forestall further integration in the way that Lucas had attempted to do in the 
past. 
From a purely practical perspective, previous erosion of the region's 
autonomy meant that Gabriel Barrios could not vacillate in his support for one 
side or another in the way that Lucas had previously done. As in other areas, 
the Ministry of War made increasing demands upon local leaders such as 
Barrios. With military leaders being exposed to the vagaries of revolutionary 
politics, new skills were needed to anticipate and reflect changes in the political 
environment. If a military leader was to retain his influence, pragmatism had to 
replace ideology; the revolutionary years were strewn with dead heroes who had 
chosen to follow their convictions. 
Gabriel Barrios' denial of Carranza is an issue which was frequently 
cited as a prime example of Barrios' political cynicism and disloyalty. The 
tenor of this attack is reflected in the sentiments expressed by the residents of 
Tlaxco in 1935; that Barrios was a traitor and bore a major responsibility for his 
president's death. 55 However, Carranza's daughter Julia, placed no direct blame 
upon the cacique for her father's death. 56 Others still, point to the dilemma that 
Barrios faced: should he commit his troops in an uneven battle to protect a 
president whose powers had already been eclipsed? 57 In the event, Barrios 
neither deserted nor helped his president. In refusing to meet Carranza, he 
avoided the possibility of personally betraying the president for whom he had 
fought during the past seven years. Barrios was no hero: he side-stepped the 
issue. Instead, Barrios used his influence to keep the presidential party informed 
of their pursuers' whereabouts. In doing so he conveyed the president safely 
across his region and avoided the inevitable loss of life that would have occurred 
had he and his troops made a stand. Simultaneously, although Barrios may not 
have complied fully with Obregön's orders to stop Carranza, his actions did 
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leave the door open for the Aguaprietistas to accept his declaration of 
allegiance. 58 As events soon confirmed, Barrios managed to weather the 
political storm and convince the new administration that his future now lay in 
loyalty to Obregön, rather than with any Carrancista diehard. 
The next crucial test of his loyalty to the federal government hinged 
upon his response to the Delahuerta rebellion. The weakness of General 
Almazän's federal military authority in Puebla City was exposed by their 
untimely withdrawal from the city when confronted by the rebel forces of 
General Maycotte in early December 1923. The rebels' failure to consolidate 
their grip on Puebla City and use it as a base to launch an attack on the national 
capital, owed much to Almazän's successful counter-attack using vital 
reinforcements from Tlaxcala. The presence of these extra troops was a crucial 
factor in preventing a Delahuerta military assault on Mexico City. 
As had happened so many times in Mexico's history, the strategic 
importance of the Sierra was revealed. Had Barrios led his men into rebellion, 
then the Delahuerta army in the East could have mounted a broad, unbroken line 
of combat: from the borders of Oaxaca, where Higinio Aguilar's forces lay, to 
Maycotte's troops pushing through the Mexico/Veracruz corridor, and Barrios' 
forces uniting with others in the Sierra and Veracruz coast. From the Sierra, 
Barrios' forces, only hours from Tlaxcala, could have mounted a challenge of 
such strength as to deplete seriously the reinforcements upon whom Almazän's 
counter-attack depended. By remaining loyal, Barrios considerably reduced the 
chances of a successful Delahuerta assault on Mexico City. 
While his accusers alleged that Barrios had colluded with Delahuertistas 
in order to establish a position of accommodation in the event of their rebellion 
being successful, the speed and tenacity of his forces' response against these 
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same rebels prove otherwise. Far from displaying hesitancy, military reports 
suggest that the Barrios brothers led a comprehensive campaign against 
Delahuertistas, from Perote in the state of Veracruz, to the borders of Hidalgo. 
Even had Gabriel Barrios been tempted towards a more neutral stance, the 
personal tragedy caused by the death of his brother in a battle against the 
Delahuerta general, Cavazos, made it inconceivable that any accord would be 
found in the future. 59 The death of Bardomiano Barrios Cabrera in December 
1923 bore to the heart of the Barrios cacicazgo. Bardomiano, together with his 
younger brother Demetrio, had taken a leading role in the organisation of troops 
in Zacatlän. With Gabriel Barrios conducting operations from Cuacuila, the 
three brothers formed an intimate estado mayor from which a clear and unified 
policy emerged. There was no time to mourn the loss of Bardomiano. 
Demetrio immediately assumed overall responsibility for affairs in Zacatlän and 
the pattern of future responsibilities within the cacicazgo was set. With much of 
the cacique network having been established, Demetrio took over routine 
operations while Gabriel Barrios confirmed his seniority by concentrating more 
upon broader military and political strategies. 
Ironically, Barrios' troops found themselves confronting Delahuertista 
officers who, in 1920, were the same ex-Villistas who had advised Obregön of 
Barrios' dubious loyalty. It appears that Obregön's judgement of loyalties in 
1920 was vindicated by later events. As early as October 1922, the Jefe de las 
Operaciones Militares in Veracruz reported that Lindoro Hernandez and others 
were showing signs of rebellion and were receiving financial support from 
several oil companies. The report added that public feeling in Cuetzalan 
suggested that Salvador Vega Bernal was dissatisfied with the government and 
was only biding time before rebelling. 60 In reality, the gulf-facing slopes of the 
Sierra had never been completely free from hostilities since the death of 
Carranza. Although Obregön had eventually disbanded Vega Bernal's forces, 
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his followers continued to exercise political and military influence in Cuetzalan 
and in the adjacent tierra caliente region of Veracruz. Throughout 1922 various 
reports emanating from Barrios' headquarters gave details of ex-General Vega 
Bernal's movements throughout the tierra caliente, which included meetings 
with his disbanded revolutionary troops and with rebel leaders such as ex- 
general Antonio Medina. 61 Medina, according to rumours published in El 
Monitor, had rebelled against the federal government in the Sierra de 
Zacapoaxtla. 62 His actions validated the rumour and during the months that 
followed, Medina's rebels sustained a campaign on the Llanos of Puebla 
consisting of raids on haciendas and communication links. They continued to 
cause problems in the region until Medina was eventually killed in May 1922 
while leading a raid on a hacienda near Chalchicomula. 63 
Across the Sierra in Villa Juarez, General Lindoro Hernandez typified 
the intrigue and mistrust that continued to pervade the federal army. 64 In early 
1923, federal troops led by General Juan A. Almazän, which included Barrios 
forces, waged a guerrilla war against Hernandez and his men who were in 
apparent revolt against the government. Hernandez went into hiding and later 
expressed his loyalty to the federal government explaining that his campaign was 
not a rebellion but a local dispute against his personal enemy, ex-general 
Rodolfo Herrero (Carranza's alleged assassin). Further clashes between Barrios' 
and Hernändez'troops occurred in November 1923, yet when De la Huerta 
launched his rebellion, Hernandez promptly placed his forces at the service of 
the federal government and appealed to Calles for funds with which to pay 
them. Simultaneously, Calles received reports casting doubt on the loyalty of 
Hernandez. Acting cautiously, Calles ordered Hernandez to place himself and 
his troops at the disposal of military authorities in Tulancingo where the 
required funds would be made available to him. 65 
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This maze of ambiguous signals, the tangle of local and national interests 
and conflicts, had plagued regional stability during the Carrancista years and 
continued after his fall. Beyond the Sierra de Puebla, other events were 
contributing to a rising atmosphere of mistrust. Obregön provided General 
Maycotte with $200,000 with which to fight the rebellion in Oaxaca, only to 
learn in December 1923, that Maycotte had promptly switched sides and was 
using the federal funds to support, rather than defeat, the rebels. 66 Such a 
betrayal would have done little to encourage trust in regional generals like 
Hernandez. Mistrust, however, had to be balanced by the federal government's 
need to ensure that its own response would not deter genuine offers of support, 
or worse still, turn hitherto loyal military leaders towards the enemy camp. In 
Gabriel Barrios' case, there is no evidence to suggest that the federal 
government hesitated in providing him with the necessary material support. 
When rebellion finally broke in December 1923, Barrios swiftly expressed his 
loyalty to the Obregön administration and was given permission to increase his 
troop numbers to 1000. So effectively did he use them that, by June 1924, 
Barrios was pleased to report that the Delahuerta threat in the Sierra had been 
extinguished. 67 
As the letter of accusation from Tlaxco citizens correctly relates, when 
the ill-fated Serrano rebellion was launched, Barrios was given little opportunity 
to display anything but absolute loyalty to the federal government. On 2 
October 1927 the president informed the Jefatura de Operaciones Militares in 
Puebla that General Arnulfo R. Gomez had left Mexico City and was expected 
to launch a rebellion in either Puebla or Veracruz. The following day Barrios 
received orders to bring his troops immediately to Puebla City in order to quell 
any attempted rebellion. 68 Upon receiving news of the rebellion, Barrios sent a 
telegramme to Calles expressing his loyalty. Barrios asked for, and received, 
permission to recruit volunteer auxiliary forces to fortify the various garrisons of 
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the 46th. Battalion. Throughout the emergency, Barrios liaised with 
neighbouring federal forces in Veracruz and Hidalgo in countering rebel 
movements. 69 Again, the swift deployment of Barrios' troops and the 
willingness of superior officers to allow him to recruit suggest that the loyalty 
of Barrios and his battalion was never questioned. 
Not one of the military investigations commissioned by the Ministry of 
War found sufficient proof that Barrios ever contradicted Lucas' death-bed 
orders that he should always remain loyal to the federal government. 70 Military 
reports generally concluded that accusations of disloyalty and corruption against 
Barrios were made by his political and personal enemies within the Sierra who 
would benefit from Barrios' removal. 7' The political dog-fight within the Sierra 
which stimulated many of these accusations, and in which Barrios was 
unquestionably involved, is the topic of a later chapter. However the evidence 
suggests that in his military actions, at least, Barrios remained loyal to the 
federal government and that, in return, a large measure of trust and freedom was 
earned by the commander of the 46th. Battalion. 
The need for military reform 
If accusations of disloyalty and subversion against the Barrios brothers 
proved largely unfounded, the charges of corruption would not have taken the 
Ministry of War completely by surprise. As Gruening comments, Calles faced 
difficulties in reforming the army because it was: 
[... ] a collection of chieftains, if one wishes to speak in terms of the Indian lineage, or of robber barons, if one prefers the Spanish analogy. Certainly it had no relation to that modern institution, the State. Not Mexico, but where the pesos were - that was their fatherland. 72 
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Gruening despairs at the folly displayed by consecutive administrations 
who, rather than tackle corruption at source, preferred to buy the loyalty of their 
senior military staff. Gruening mocks Carranza's decision to place General Juan 
Barragän as head of the Ministry of War, accusing him of being the most 
corrupt member of a thoroughly corrupt administration. 73 The links between 
dishonesty and indiscipline are not hard to envisage. Regional generals, local 
commanders and company paymasters all had access to federal funds and many 
were not above making the most of their privileged positions to enrich 
themselves. Little appeared sacred as officer rankings went to the highest bidder 
and arms were sold to the enemy in order to extend the period during which the 
gravy train might continue. 74 This inevitably reduced the funds available to pay 
the troops; the absence of wages quickly fostered low morale, with troops 
resorting to pilfering or desertion in order to survive. 
If Luis Cabrera was correct in asserting that Carranza lacked sufficient 
time to develop a remedy to the major problem of military unprofessionalism, 
then Gruening suggests that the question had not dawned on Obreg6n. 75 The 
folly shown by Obregön in allowing corrupt revolutionary generals back into the 
fold was crowned in 1922, Gruening suggests, by the appointment of a 
pathological gambler, General Francisco Serrano, to the Ministry of War. 76 
According to the critical opinions of Gruening, only with the appointment of 
General Joaquin Amaro did the Sonorense attempts at reform begin to have 
effect: only then did the regional generals begin to yield to the strict reform and 
anti-corruption measures implemented by the disciplinarian at the Ministry. 77 
Reform had, of course, begun long before Amaro's appointment by 
president Calles. Lozoya describes the massive demobilisation during the 
Obregön presidency which encouraged soldiers to exchange guns for ploughs. 78 
While this pattern of land reform and military colonisation provoked other 
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problems, the initiative was indicative of an attempt to streamline and 
professionalise a corrupt, and often unreliable, army. This reform included a 
warning issued by the Ministry of War that any officer found guilty of 
defrauding the federal government would face immediate dismissal. 79 In a 
different approach, the Ministry distributed manuals, such as the one written by 
General Gomez in 1924, that promoted military professionalism and emphasised 
the need to educate the rank and file. 80 
Within the Sierra one of the most prevalent recollections of the Barrios 
brothers' period of military control was the strict disciplinary code they imposed 
upon their troops. This portrayal directly contradicts accusations that Barrios 
troops were guilty of all manner of unruly and abusive behaviour. 81 Before 
investigating possible reasons for such ambiguity, it is worth reflecting, once 
more, upon the Indian nature of the Barrios forces. As in Lucas' period of 
influence, military service under Barrios displayed a fundamentally local 
character. Discipline was not obtained by careful adherence to daily instructions 
as prescribed in military manuals written in Spanish, or by appealing to a 
soldier's sense of patriotism. Discipline lay more in the traditional channels of 
respect that serrano communities held for patriarchal figures such as Lucas and 
Barrios. 82 Furthermore, many of the soldiers in the 46th. Battalion were the 
sons of men that Barrios had chosen as his trusted representatives at the 
municipal level. Loyalty of such soldiers, therefore, was tied into a complicated 
web of patronage influenced by practical considerations as well as tradition. 
Nonetheless, the sheer number of complaints against Barrios' forces 
suggests that discipline was never as complete as it might have been. Much of 
the confusion regarding the actions of these troops relates to the fact that it was 
by no means clear who constituted a regular soldier. Provided the Barrios 
brothers remained loyal, the Ministry of War ignored the finer details of their 
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recruitment policy. Although the brothers received federal funds to pay the 
wages of all those present at reviews, Barrios' troops were paid only for the 
days in which they were required for military duties; for the remainder of their 
time, these 'soldiers' returned to their campesino activities. This is not 
particularly surprising: the National Guard units had worked on a similar basis, 
and, in maintaining a soldier's links with his land and family, military service 
was not so onerous as to cause conflict between the duties of a soldier and those 
expected of him within the family and the community. During the more violent 
years of the Revolution, a soldier's pay acted as a considerable incentive. When 
widespread violence diminished, these veterans of the Revolution were often 
willing to resume their peace-time agricultural activities, only reverting to 
military status in emergencies or during visits from the Ministry of War's 
inspectorate. 
Furthermore, as these 'soldiers' returned to their communities, they were 
often formed into cuerpos voluntarios, charged with the responsibility for 
keeping the peace in their localities. As will be explored in the following 
chapter, geographic expansion of the cacicazgo meant that the Barrios brothers 
were forced to employ peace-keeping forces that had not served in a more 
formal military capacity. Further away from the heart of the cacicazgo in 
Zacatlän, it became increasingly difficult to control the everyday actions of these 
groups. While the distinction was academic to the victims of such atrocities, in 
assessing the military discipline that the brothers tried to instil upon their regular 
troops, many accusations were wrongly attributed to a federal army unit that 
later earned a reputation for its discipline and obedience. 
Despite many internal investigations carried out by Barrios himself, and 
others by the Jefatura in Puebla, the 46th. Battalion was never censured for any 
major breaches of discipline during its period of control in the Sierra. This is 
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not to say that such abuses never occurred. A proportion of the accusations 
were probably fabricated: it has already been observed how political enemies 
accused Barrios and his forces of disloyalty to the federal government. A 
further tactic in their attempt to discredit Barrios was to gather the grievances of 
others and, at times, manufacture some of their own, to create the impression 
that Barrios was in command of an unruly battalion which was guilty of 
numerous abuses of power. 83 It seems inconceivable, however, that Barrios was 
as free from guilt as the lack of convictions suggests. The failure to punish 
Barrios and his men probably reflects an unwillingness within the Jefatura to 
investigate charges and a degree of naivety on the part of investigating officers 
when they did pursue complaints. Serranos frequently refused to appear at 
proceedings in Puebla, many lacking the means to make such a journey. Others 
were intimidated by the thought of giving evidence before a tribunal conducted 
in a language other than their own: others still, feared reprisals from those they 
accused. 84 Such individuals would have been unmoved by promises made in 
Puebla City that their constitutional guarantees would be respected. 
The Ali-Baba of the Sierra Norte! 
The process of federal military reform was necessarily moderate, because 
for much of the 1920s the federal government had little direct influence over 
regional military chieftains. Perhaps for similar reasons, Barrios was never 
indicted for the other major charge against his rule. corruption. The most 
eloquent, certainly the most flamboyant, accusation of corruption made against 
Barrios came from Alejandro Berriozäbal, sent to the Ministry of War in April 
1920. In a lengthy letter, Berriozäbal permits himself to launch the 'I accuse' 
against Barrios and advises the Ministry that: 
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(... ] the actions of the most hardened criminal are insignificant 
compared to those committed by this troglodyte. The famous Rufiar, 
would be jealous of this modern robber. 
After listing the murders committed by Barrios troops Berriozäbal accuses 
Barrios of using intimidation to accrue a fortune including; 
[... ] magnificent urban properties in Tetela and Zacatlän and enviable 
country estates: this new Ali-Baba boast a fortune which includes 
$100,000 in coins and $200,000 in gold [... ]. 85 
Obregön's administration took the charges seriously enough to order a military 
investigation. Despite exhaustive efforts throughout the municipalities of 
Zacatlän and Tetela, together with notices published in the Diario Oficial, no 
evidence was produced to suggest that Senor Berriozäbal was living, or had ever 
lived in the Sierra Norte. 86 Without the accuser's appearance before the tribunal 
to ratify his accusations, the tribunal was left with no alternative but to find 
Barrios innocent of all charges. 87 
The tactic of anonymous accusations against Barrios was a frequent, yet 
ultimately, futile exercise. Barrios' value to his military and political superiors 
demanded that firmer evidence was needed to remove him from command. 
Indeed, the more obviously contrived accusations deflected the Ministry of 
War's gaze from Barrios' more flagrant abuses. The non-payment of soldiers 
and the falsification of review lists in order to inflate troop numbers was 
commonly employed. Two of the many anonymous letters sent to the Ministry 
of War claimed to be from members of Barrios' own forces. They specifically 
mention the practice of employing civilians to pose as soldiers during reviews in 
return for a small fee, while regular soldiers were paid only 4 to 5 pesos a 
month and lived in their communities unless required for campaigns. 88 
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Another tactic allegedly used by Barrios was brought to light by the 
mother of second lieutenant Vulfrano Luna, one of Barrios' officers killed in 
battle in April 1919. Even though she was able to produce documentary 
evidence of her son's death, she complained that his name continued to appear 
on the review lists, thus preventing her from receiving the war pension to which 
she was entitlement. 89 An investigation was ordered but no records exist of the 
outcome. This may have been an administrative oversight by Barrios' staff. 
Barrios' son, however, suggests a motive that seems more plausible. He refers 
to his father's preference for placing members of his own family in positions of 
authority in order to ensure troop discipline. He suggests that the only way 
Barrios could quickly deploy his brothers and many half-brothers into such 
positions without military training, was for the brothers to assume the identity of 
officers killed in battle. 90 
The Barrios brothers, therefore, were not among that rare breed of 
Mexican officer that was free from corruption. It was widely believed that 
through the good offices of Carranza's finance minister, Luis Cabrera, the 
Carranza administration fed generous quantities of arms and ammunitions into 
the Sierra to strengthen Barrios' position. This flow of goodwill and provisions 
continued under both Obregön and Calles and reflects the delicacy of the 
Sonorenses' relationship with their military officers. As Garciadiego suggests, 
it was a very fine balance between reducing military expenditure to ease the 
economy, while retaining a military deterrent sufficient to safeguard social and 
political stability: the only true solution to long term economic recovery. As the 
frequent rebellions of the 1920s illustrated, there was no shortage of disgruntled 
officers willing to express their grievances in a forceful way, and sweeping cuts 
in the military budget threatened to exacerbate, rather than solve, the dilemma. 
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The military aspect of the Barrios cacicazgo's relationship with the 
federal government appears clear: the Barrios family promised loyal support and 
the federal government, in return, allowed them a degree of regional autonomy 
and cast a blind eye to many of the details of military expenses incurred. Such a 
conclusion, however, is confounded by some of Gabriel Barrios' actions. On 10 
December 1917 the Ministry of War awarded Barrios a 'Menciön Honorifica' in 
acknowledgement of the gratitude of the Ministry for the efficient re- 
organisation of the Brigada Serrana, which had resulted in Barrios returning 
$60,000 of federal funds judged surplus to requirements. 91 Similarly, in 
September 1920, Lieutenant Colonel A. Gaxiola Jr., Jefe del Estado Major, 
received a request from Barrios to make a troop reduction of 300 men, in order 
to 'benefit the financial position of the Republic'. 92 Again in June 1924, 
President Obregön received a letter from Barrios which referred to a previous 
order allowing him to augment his troop numbers to meet the Delahuerta 
challenge in the Sierra. Barrios was pleased to announce that the Sierra was 
now under his total control and offered a troop reduction from 1000 to 609 men 
in order to aid the Republic's economic situation. Obregön was delighted to 
accept the offer and in confirming the reduction expressed his deep gratitude to 
Barrios for the 'spirit of cooperation shown by reducing the numbers of [his] 
troops [... ]'. 93 
Given that Barrios was not above the unauthorised use of military funds, 
one could be excused for making a slightly cynical analysis of these voluntary 
financial sacrifices. At a time when the Ministry of War was re-doubling its 
efforts to reduce corruption, Barrios may have been trying to divert attention 
from the extent of the fraud he was accused of perpetrating. The refund of 
$60,000 to Carranza was met with derision in some quarters, stimulating at least 
three anonymous letters indicating that if Barrios was serious about saving 
money for the nation he could end his fraudulent recruitment programme. By 
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doing so, they suggested, public security of the region would remain unaltered, 
while the savings to the nation would not be $60,000 but $160,000. The 
complaints expressed anger that Barrios had received commendation for 
defrauding the nation by $100,000.94 
If Barrios' motives in 1917 remain speculative, his ambitions three years 
later were more transparent. Barrios' offer came at a crucial time, with 
Obregön's generals deciding who would make the most effective military leader 
in the Sierra. Barrios' proposal served as a timely reminder that he remained as 
an efficient, patriotic, military leader. Regarding troop reductions in 1924, 
1000 troops was indeed an extraordinary high number for a battalion more 
accustomed to a complement of half this number. In an environment of 
uncertain loyalties, Barrios may well have assessed that the hurried recruitment 
of extra troops to meet the Delahuerta crisis had swollen the size of his forces to 
the point that he might not be able adequately to control their actions. A 
continuing high level of militarisation within his zone was undesirable as it 
served only to increase the possibility of armed resistance against the Barrios 
family's authority. In this light, such an offer can be seen as a shrewd measure 
taken to diminish possible threats to his control of the area, while enhancing his 
own reputation among military and political superiors. 
Perhaps such suspicion of Gabriel Barrios' motives is unnecessarily 
harsh. After all, there are many testimonies to Barrios' efficiency, his distaste 
of waste, and unswerving loyalty to the recognised government. This scenario 
does not exclude the possibility that Barrios was a shrewd calculator of 
circumstance: during the 1920s his military duties were increasingly augmented 
by his initiatives to attract federal funds for regional development. How much 
more easily could Barrios have obtained such funds, if he had first won the 
confidence of his superiors within the same cabinet? Barrios may well have 
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appreciated that in an environment of military rebellion, there was more than 
one road that led to government funding. To rely completely upon his prowess 
as a military leader at a time when the army was undergoing major reform may 
have appeared imprudent. By diversifying into activities that promised to 
produce results very much in line with the aims of government policy, Barrios 
hoped to underline his usefulness to the government. A clean military record 
could only serve to strengthen his hold over the Sierra. 
More than a soldier 
The regional isolation that had characterised the Sierra's history since 
conquest was, by the end of the nineteenth century, facing an unprecedented 
challenge. Yet mestizo economic migration into the region was sporadic and too 
recent to have eroded cultural barriers and ethnicity remained an important 
factor during the post-revolutionary years. In the summer of 1919, the non- 
Indian minority population of Cuetzalan issued several warnings that the 
'ignorant Indian troops' controlled by the Barrios family were targeting the 
property of 'gente de razön', and expressed fears that they were becoming the 
victims of a caste war. 95 A year later, a spate of similar complaints emanated 
from the municipalities of Chiconcuautla, Tlaola and Zacatlän from non-Indians 
who feared a war of extermination against their race. 96 A military commission 
held in 1923 recognised the overwhelming Indian character of Barrios' 
battalion, 97 while in 1930, the Puebla newspaper La Opinion reported the 
transfer of the 'well armed half-savages' to Mexico City, leaving behind a 
campesino population that still lived in caves and walked around semi-naked. 98 
Undoubtedly, Gabriel Barrios had assumed control of Lucas' military 
following, a force that was overwhelmingly Indian in character. Throughout the 
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Revolution and the years that followed, this ethnic consideration was used by 
sections of the non-Indian serrano society to attack Barrios' position in the 
Sierra. The caste war charge was, of course, absurd. A sustained campaign 
against the non-Indian population in the Sierra never occurred under Barrios and 
many of Barrios' most trusted allies were non-Indians. It is true, however, that 
the majority of the military leaders against whom Barrios fought, such as 
Marquez, Vega Bernal and Hernandez, were mestizos in charge of 
predominantly mestizo forces. Therefore, the nature of Barrios' military duties 
may have led, in some quarters, to the false conclusion that militarism in the 
Sierra was influenced by ethnic rather than political criteria. La Opinion's 
comments a decade later should be set within the broader background of federal 
government initiatives to incorporate all ethnic groups within an homogeneous 
Mexican nation. Politicians in Puebla City directly linked the alleged savagery 
of the Indian serranos to the fact that the Barrios family had blocked 
revolutionary change and kept the Sierra's communities in isolation and 
ignorance. 
In 1917, ethnicity had been a vital factor in Barrios' rise to prominence. 
He assumed military command of a region that was still largely inaccessible to 
mestizo commanders. As Lucas had done before him, Barrios was able to find 
room for manoeuvre. Lucas attracted support by providing the serranos with 
autonomy and protection from the worse excesses of external mestizo 
influences. In a changed environment, Barrios offered something even more 
precious: peace and stability. During the darkest periods of turmoil, the finer 
ideals of the Revolution became lost in the more immediate need to seek 
protection from indiscriminate violence. 
The vital difference between Lucas and Barrios was, however, that the 
role of the intermediary had become increasingly demanding. While Barrios 
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strove to maintain a traditionally based legitimacy within the serrano 
communities, political and military instability called for an ever more 
demonstrative display of loyalty to the federation. Only by firmly identifying 
himself within the federal camp was Barrios allowed to remain at the helm and 
to steer the course of serrano development. The military response of Barrios to 
this demand for loyalty was overwhelming: in every major crisis facing the 
federal government, Barrios' forces reacted swiftly and efficiently in securing 
their region for the government. 
In time, Barrios' area of jurisdiction greatly exceeded that occupied by 
Lucas in the previous century. The focal point of Barrios' influence remained in 
Cuacuila, where he was the natural leader, such as Lucas had been in 
Xochiapulco during the 1850s. Yet the more Barrios' influence extended 
beyond this base, the less he was able to rely on his prestige as Lucas' 
successor. The demands of his superiors that he should establish, and maintain, 
public security and stability throughout his region required that he employ 
different methods to satisfy these obligations. His enemies alleged that Barrios 
only succeeded in this by the use of brutal repression. His friends countered 
that his control was achieved through cooperation and progressive development 
programmes. In either case, the vital element that enabled Barrios to retain 
control over this extensive area of the Sierra de Puebla was not his use of 
regular soldiers, but the deployment of a network of trusted men who were 
directly responsible to himself: the jefes de armas. This network sheds light on 
how Barrios managed to convert his military role into a dominance that 
penetrated the entire social fabric of many serrano communities. 
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3. Public Security and Political Control: Barrios' 
local cacique network 
One of the major challenges facing the Sonorenses was to repair the 
material and social damage caused by years of civil war. Without social and 
political stability efforts at economic reconstruction were unlikely to have effect. 
By the end of the 1920s, Calles had achieved a large degree of central control, 
but when Obregön took office in 1920, this must have seemed a distant 
prospect. Regional caudillos posed a threat to federal government authority, 
while agrarian and labour groups waited impatiently for reform. Meanwhile, 
lack of international confidence in the Mexican economy overshadowed 
prospects for regeneration. At a local level, the violence of the civil war had 
brushed aside the vestiges of Porfirian authority: the jefes politicos and rurales. 
In an atmosphere of demoralisation, grief and cynicism, it would take much to 
convince Mexicans that local figures of authority deserved the respect that they 
had once enjoyed. 
This chapter investigates the degree to which the Sierra de Puebla was 
affected by the more general breakdown in law and order. By investigating the 
nature of lawlessness that accompanied and followed the Revolution, it will be 
easier to identify the sectors of society that participated in illegal actions, their 
motives, and the consequences of civil disobedience for serrano society as a 
whole. The chapter will examine the methods Barrios employed to transform 
the Sierra from its previous turmoil into a region that once again enjoyed a 
semblance of civilian normality. Such a change was not achieved solely through 
the use of force, and attention will be given to the ways in which public officials 
reasserted their authority. 
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Finally, an analysis will be made of how the cacicazgo co-ordinated the 
various components of local authority and created an atmosphere within which 
regional reconstruction, rather than banditry, was adopted as the preferred 
means of surviving the dour years that followed the Revolution. While the finer 
aspects of such development are dealt with in chapter five, the use of faenas, a 
system of voluntary labour organised for community benefits, is vital to this 
discussion. This chapter examines how the faena system was modified and 
controlled by the Barrios brothers. Their tactics in respect to faenas had social 
and political implications which determined the long-term nature of the 
cacicazgo. 
Banditry and civil disorder in the Sierra 
Although revolutionary violence provided the Barrios family with the 
opportunity to seize regional control, it would be wrong to imagine that the 
Sierra spent the years of the Revolution in a state of constant warfare. Military 
engagement in the Sierra was sporadic rather than a sustained phenomenon that 
forced a total cessation of civilian life, and not all serrano communities became 
directly involved in the military struggle. ' Nonetheless, serrano society often 
displayed signs of strain. Raids by revolutionary forces against defenceless 
communities were aggravated by the many bandit groups that freely roamed this 
mountainous region. Low public morale was manifest in the increased levels of 
petty crime, default on tax and education contributions, and the refusal to 
maintain the region's thoroughfares, so vital for the survival of social and 
economic life. 2 
Banditry was the most difficult obstacle impeding the Sierra's transition 
from war to peace. The same topographical features that made the area so 
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difficult for external revolutionary forces to control, also allowed bandits to 
operate with little fear of retribution. Isolated mountain communities linked by 
narrow, dirt tracks that meandered the steep, forested hillsides provided ideal 
conditions for ambush. While banditry had always been a factor of rural life in 
the Sierra, it greatly increased during the Revolution. In addition, the 
Revolution made it more difficult to establish the identity and motives of the 
assailants, with many revolutionary factions resorting to banditry to sustain their 
campaign. Those who charged Gabriel Barrios with the task of re-establishing 
law and order were more interested in results rather than underlying motives 
and, in fulfilling the role expected of him, Barrios employed the universal 
remedy of repression. 
It is clear that bandits made the most of the confusion caused by the 
Revolution. As a Carrancista report revealed in 1914, it was common for 
groups of bandits to raid Sierra towns claiming to be revolutionaries although 
they were not recognised by any military chief. 3 Even if such reports were 
accurate, the motives for banditry remain elusive. The very nature of the crime 
makes it difficult to ascertain whether bandits acted through greed, or whether 
they were forced to crime for other reasons: a lack of alternative means of 
subsistence; revenge; factional or inter-communal tension; a more ideological 
desire to redistribute the region's wealth away from the rich towards the 
community as a whole. 
The evidence provided by alleged victims of banditry is also suspect. In 
1913 the people of Tonalapa, Tetela, wrote to the state governor complaining of 
the havoc wreaked upon them by all sides in the conflict. After complying with 
the demands of their attackers, the villagers still felt too insecure to stray beyond 
their village for fear of attack by federal forces who might regard them as rebel 
sympathisers. The underlying purpose of their letter, however, was to argue 
73 
that economic disruption had made it impossible for them to satisfy their tax 
obligations and they appealed to the governor to waive their debt. 4 Did 
revolutionary violence really disrupt economic life in Tonalapa to the extent 
claimed, or was such disruption exaggerated in order to avoid tax payment? 
Where the victims were able to identify their attackers, could the investigating 
authorities rely on such accounts or might the plaintiffs have been influenced by 
the desire to settle old scores with local rivals? 
As will be discussed in chapter six, local interpretations of bandit activity 
in the Zacapoaxtla district were greatly influenced by factional rivalries. This 
suggests that municipal reports are unreliable as an indication of the true nature 
and motives of a particular group's activities. The question of distinguishing 
true intentions from documentary evidence is reflected in the debate about social 
banditry. 5 Evidence to support a conclusion that banditry in the Sierra 
responded to social considerations is hard to find. Until more detailed research 
has been conducted into the subject, reports of such crimes must be treated with 
caution. The Barrios family, in any case, did not reflect upon the subtle 
distinctions of the motives for banditry. Gabriel Barrios identified this form of 
violent crime as particularly undesirable and employed ruthless tactics to 
eradicate it. 6 
Although easily identifiable within the municipal archives, more limited 
forms of crime and civil disobedience remain equally difficult to classify by 
motive. Acts of murder, violence and robbery that apparently displayed 
personal or domestic characteristics may have been related to wider tensions 
between families, factions or communities. What, for example, did the non- 
payment of education contributions demonstrate? Did it indicate ethnic or 
cultural resistance to external attempts to 'civilise' the Indian? Was it a sign of 
an inability to pay caused by economic disruption, an attempt to take personal 
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advantage of the inadequacy of local authority to enforce payment, or a variable 
mix of these and other factors? 
In a similar way, Gabriel Barrios' reimposition of faenas during the 
1920s provoked a mixture of active and passive resistance. Did such opposition 
reflect a fundamental belief that faenas breached a citizen's protection under the 
Constitution? Did it mask an attempt by political opponents to undermine the 
cacique's designs on the region? Or did it demonstrate a reticence on the part of 
campesinos to accept a reintroduction of the onerous duties that revolutionary 
disorder had suspended? The available evidence defies simple analysis 
according to race or social background. Resistance to local authority was not 
limited to one district of the Sierra but was found throughout the entire region, 
while the localised nature of such resistance discounts any broader concerted 
display of civil disobedience. 
Whatever the reasons for disorder in a given serrano community, the 
transformation from more centralised authority to localised arbitrary power was 
what allowed these factors to develop. While most Mexicans desired a cessation 
to the violence and uncertainty of civil war, the militarisation of politics was 
characterised by a casual disregard for local civil authority by those holding 
greater coercive force. It would be a difficult task to convince the serranos that 
the same local authorities now represented the best chance of reviving serrano 
fortunes. Much as the serranos might have desired it otherwise, the promise of 
stability and security lay not in the law courts but where it had rested during the 
previous years; with those who retained the greatest force. Obregön's approval 
of Barrios in 1920 meant that the future stability of many serranos rested upon 
Barrios' ability to fulfil his role as the Sierra's policeman. 
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Jefes de arenas and cuerpos voluntarios 
Crime has always gone unpunished in Mexico. It follows that there is 
no justice. How often does one hear of the death penalty inflicted in 
Mexico? Next to never. Punishment is carried out not through the law 
courts [but] through violence. It was always so. Diaz merely 
continued the previous condition. It has been so all through the 
Revolution. It is so to-day. ' 
In many regions of the Republic, methods of restoring civil obedience 
were under discussion long before the violence had subsided. During the 
Carranza administration, the failure of various state governments to obtain 
approval for the creation of regional security forces was a symptom of the 
prevailing mistrust. When Puebla's governor, Alfonso Cabrera, applied for 
approval to set up such a network he was at pains to stress the absolute need for 
such forces while stressing the limited authority that each group would be given. 
Cabrera's request also provides evidence of the acute situation regarding law 
enforcement in the state capital: he reminded Carranza of the president's 
promise to send pistols for the police force in Puebla so that they could more 
effectively combat the 'plague of rats arriving from Mexico'. 8 
A state government circular issued to the municipal authorities less than a 
month later suggests that approval was granted for the formation of cuerpos 
regionales with the aim of 'protecting life and property against law-breakers and 
those called Zapatistas'. The size of the group was to be decided locally; a list 
drawn up of all members, with a nominated member to be custodian of all 
weapons. Reports were to be made every five days and, most importantly, the 
groups were to be under the sole authority of the state executive: under no 
circumstances should they be subject to the authority of the Ministry of War-9 
That Carranza allowed Cabrera to establish such groups reflects the trust that the 
Cabrera family enjoyed with the First Chief, underlined by Luis Cabrera's 
influential position within the president's cabinet. 
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The lack of evidence of widespread recruitment of cuerpos regionales in 
the Sierra de Puebla suggests that they never represented an effective response to 
the prevailing lawlessness. It should not be concluded, however, that local 
concern for regional stability had not been voiced. Indeed, the debate began in 
1913 when Demetrio Santa Fe sought to tackle the failings of local civil 
authority. 10 His solution included a reappraisal of the role previously played by 
jefes politicos which, during the Porfiriato had been orchestrated in Puebla by 
the authoritarian governor, Mucio P. Martinez. II Santa Fe suggested that a body 
of respected citizens within each community should be made responsible for 
safeguarding the rights of their neighbours. Any abuse of power by 
democratically elected representatives was to be exposed and corrected while 
disruptive, anti-social, or immoral behaviour should be eradicated. He called 
for a strict separation between local politics and the duties of jefes politicos 
who, he suggested, should act as official overseers and supporters of the local 
committees' objectives. The tone of the 'programa' implied that citizens had 
lost faith in local government and that, rather than safeguarding the 
constitutional rights of the public, local officials were suspected of using their 
positions for self-enrichment. This loss of public faith was reflected in the 
decline in tax contributions, especially towards education. 12 
In July 1917 Santa Fe still shared the disillusionment of his fellow 
serranos regarding the ravages of revolutionary turmoil. In a letter to Abraham 
Lucas, he referred to widespread corruption in the military and how formerly 
prosperous communities were being ravaged by banditry. In these 
circumstances, he suggested, people had become demoralised, their efforts to 
combat banditry having detracted from their agricultural duties to such an extent 
that production was less than half the normal amount. 13 By September 1917 
Santa Fe was calling for a co-ordinated network of civil guards and other law 
enforcement groups-14 His proposals bore many of the characteristics later 
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suggested by Governor Cabrera regarding regional security forces. These would 
comprise groups of up to twenty-five locally based armed men under the 
command of one leader. In turn, the groups would be subject to the direct 
authority of the state executive's local representatives, the municipal 
presidents. 15 Groups were to operate in strictly within the community with no 
co-ordinated actions undertaken unless specifically permitted in order to combat 
serious threats by bandits and other armed groups. Such units would also 
provide prison guards and maintain a register of all those carrying arms, 
restrictions being imposed on known drunks and unsociable elements in the 
community. Santa Fe also suggested that the personnel of these groups should 
be changed periodically to enable all respectable members of a community to 
gain experience of military service and the responsible handling of weapons. 
Like the state governor's later proposals, Santa Fe's suggestions for local 
security appear not to have materialised. In 1918, for example, only twice do 
Zacapoaxtla's local authority documents refer to the existence of jefes de arenas: 
in February, state authorities ordered the jefe de arenas to be charged for abuses 
of his position; and in November a citizen from Zacapoaxtla complained that he 
had been wrongfully imprisoned by Barrios troops who, he claimed, were 
encroaching upon the jurisdiction of the jefe de arenas of Zacapoaxtla. 16 These 
incidents suggest that in Zacapoaxtla, at least, little had changed since 1914 
when Santa Fe concluded that local authorities lacked discipline and were 
incapable of meeting their responsibilities. The incidents also provide evidence 
of a growing trend in the Sierra: increasing numbers of Barrios troops were 
assuming a policing role to compensate for the failure of local judges and 
officials to respond adequately to the demands placed upon them. '7 
Obregön's confirmation of Barrios' military position in the Sierra in 
1920 coincided with the widening of the cacique's civilian peace-keeping duties. 
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During the Revolution, although military manoeuvres had frequently taken place 
in the tierra caliente, Barrios' co-operation in questions of non-military security 
had usually been limited to the districts of Tetela and Zacatlän. During the 
1920s, however, military operations and development programmes increased the 
possibility of troop deployment to more diverse regions of the Sierra and the 
sierra caliente. '8 The fine line between rebellion and banditry increasingly 
demanded that Barrios make the restoration of public security his prime 
objective. 19 
Barrios did not meet these additional responsibilities by recruiting extra 
troops. Given the restraints on military finances this was not a viable option 
and, as outlined in the previous chapter, the Barrios family had its own reasons 
for restricting the size of its force. The solution was a hybrid of the various 
schemes that had been previously used or proposed. Garrisons of the 46th. 
Battalion were located in various regions of the Sierra and the tierra caliente, 
each supervising a network of armed security forces that were located within the 
communities lying in their military zone. These groups were under the 
command of a jefe de armas who was responsible for maintaining stability 
within his locality and for controlling the actions of the cuerpo voluntario under 
his supervision. 
Given the vague nature of military recruitment outlined in the previous 
chapter, it is probable that many members of cuerpos voluntarios were unaware 
of their military status. Many of Barrios' regular forces were, it seems, local 
armed groups under the control of jefes de armas. The demeanour of these 
groups suggests that they regarded themselves as quasi-military units. Jefes de 
arenas referred to their own armed men as 'soldiers' and 'troops', while they 
addressed Gabriel Barrios as 'mi general'. Certainly, the ill-defined nature of 
their status caused several jefes to clarify their position. In one account, the jefe 
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de armas of Jilotzingo, (Zacatlän) Felix Luna, asked Bardomiano Barrios to 
intervene in a dispute in which the soldiers accused Luna of withholding 
wages. 20 On another occasion Pedro Becerril, jefe de armas in Chilocoyo, 
(Zacatlän) wished to know if his soldiers were entitled to wages, especially in 
relation to three days service they had given in a neighbouring community. 
Bardomiano Barrios replied that he was unable to pay the men as funds were 
only available to pay soldiers in regular service. The duties of Becerril and 
officials in other communities, Barrios continued, did not meet this requirement, 
but should be viewed more as community initiatives that enabled serranos to 
defend and preserve the order of their settlements. Referring to the service 
given by Becerril's group to the community of Caxhuacan, (Zacatlän) 
Bardomiano Barrios advised Becerril that the municipal president had been 
instructed to pay Becerril and his troops for services rendered. Had this not yet 
occurred, Barrios promised to visit the area to rectify the matter. 21 
Despite Bardomiano Barrios' assertion that these groups were voluntary 
and concerned only with local law enforcement, they should more correctly be 
viewed as auxiliaries to the regular troops of the 46th. Battalion. The weapons 
that Becerril possessed had been supplied by the Ministry of War, and formed 
just one example of federal government sponsorship of the cuerpos voluntarios. 
In January 1924 General Juan A. Almazän requested that the Ministry of War 
increase the consignment of rifles to be sent to Barrios from 300 to 400.22 The 
extra weapons were to equip a badly needed voluntary force under the command 
of Jose Huidobro. Less than a month later, Barrios arranged for the 
consignment of 400 rifles to be collected from the Ministry of War. 23 Again, 
during the Serrano rebellion, the Ministry of War authorised Barrios to recruit 
250 men as 'auxiliaries' to maintain military presence in the Sierra in the event 
of the redeployment of regular troops, confirming that the wages of these extra 
troops would be paid from federal funds. 24 It seems reasonable to conclude that 
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the auxiliaries recruited were none other than the voluntary armed groups that 
Barrios had already formed within the region. Recruitment would be relatively 
swift and the auxiliaries would already be aware of the command structure and 
methods of communicating with superior officers. In addition, their knowledge 
of the local terrain would give them a considerable advantage over their 
enemies. 
One vital difference between the schemes suggested by Governor 
Cabrera and Santa Fe and the network that Barrios established was that the jefes 
de arenas were directly responsible to the Barrios family rather than to the state 
executive. As auxiliaries whose recruitment depended exclusively upon his 
influence, these groups never became formally tied to federal or state authority. 
This gave Barrios a vital margin of independence from his superiors. Such 
freedom never extended to that enjoyed by Saturnino Cedillo who, during his 
time as governor of San Luis Potosi, built up his military potential by 
ransacking the state government coffers. 25 The periodic provision of arms by 
the Ministry of War ensured that the Barrios family were never so independent 
that they could ignore the need to maintain good relations with their military and 
political superiors. Nevertheless, the fact that the Ministry of War never 
enjoyed direct links with the Sierra voluntary forces meant that, while the threat 
of rebellion justified the need for such forces, Barrios remained an essential 
intermediary in the eyes of the federal government. Moreover, given the 
political instability of the state capital during the 1920s, the federal government 
may well have preferred the Sierra to be controlled by a semi-autonomous 
'friendly' military force rather than a militia controlled by a state government 
that could not always be trusted. 26 
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Jefes de arenas: the scope and nature of the security network 
During the 1920s the Barrios cacicazgo expanded beyond its origins in 
the districts of Zacatlän and Tetela de Ocampo, engulfed the Sierra and 
eventually stretched from the altiplano town of Perote to the sierra caliente 
district of Papantla; an area that included territory lying in no less than four 
states. The extent and topography of the land incorporated within the cacicazgo 
made it vital that the Barrios family establish effective communications with its 
many local representatives. The answer lay in the telephone. 
As a direct result of Gabriel Barrios' initiative to establish a 
comprehensive network of telephones throughout the region under his control, 
the Barrios family could swiftly mobilise several thousand armed campesinos to 
counter any emergency that might arise. This ability to draw swiftly upon such 
a reserve of troops was Barrios' main value to the federal government. Yet the 
use of jefes de armas as local commanders in time of rebellion was an unusual 
occurrence, even in the turbulent political environment of the 1920s. Mostly, 
the cuerpos voluntarios were assigned peace-keeping roles within their 
neighbourhoods. The telephone network acted as an efficient means of 
conveying information to the cacicazgo's central base in Cuacuila regarding 
local disturbances and for the Barrios family to act swiftly in taking appropriate 
remedial action. 
The telephone network gives a good indication of the extent of the jefe de 
arenas network as apparatus was installed in all communities that hosted local 
cuerpos voluntarios. In an undated report presented to President Calles by the 
Ministry of War, the telephone network was described as comprising over 2000 
km of cables with a total of 500 offices; there was a telephone in almost every 
community in the sector. 27 The entire Sierra was well represented, with offices 
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throughout the municipalities of Zacatlän, Alatriste, Tetela, Huauchinango, and 
Pahuatlän in the north-west, and Zacapoaxtla, San Juan de los Llanos and 
Tlatlauquitepec in the south-east. Several offices were also located in the 
districts of Tulancingo in Hidalgo, Papantla in Veracruz, and Tlaxco and 
Huamantla in Tlaxcala. The majority of the locations beyond the Sierra were in 
communities that were a focus of attention during the 1920s, either as strategic 
positions in the fight against Delahuertistas, or due to them being situated along 
the route of major road construction projects. In both circumstances the cuerpos 
voluntarios were crucial to the success of the enterprise. Even with a 
conservative estimate that only half of the telephone offices indicated the 
presence of cuerpos voluntarios, there existed at least three thousand armed men 
deployed across five states, each group in frequent and immediate contact with 
the Barrios brothers. The network of jefes de arenas, therefore, represented a 
potentially formidable force. 28 
Barrios was careful to limit the authority of his various jefes de arenas. 
The arms and ammunition issued from the headquarters in Zacatlän were 
distributed sparingly and with considerable thought. A section of Becerril's 
letter related to his need for an increase in the five rifles and 80 bullets that had 
been issued to him the previous year. Bardomiano Barrios refused the request 
claiming that there were no extra arms available, and as Becerril's region was 
stable there was little need to seek additional ammunition. This may have 
reflected a genuine shortage yet when the need arose, Barrios had little problem 
in obtaining further weapons from the Ministry of War. More likely, it was a 
cautionary measure; by restricting arms and only providing more in the case of 
emergency, jefes de arenas were limited to responding to local disturbances. 
The danger of any group mounting a challenge would have been stunted by its 
lack of ammunition and arms. 29 
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Such precautions account only in part for the loyalty of cuerpos 
voluntarios to the cacicazgo. While it would be wrong to suggest that Barrios 
did not experience disciplinary problems with his jefes de arenas, there is no 
example of a jefe using his privileged position to mount a challenge against the 
Barrios family's control. In order to understand why Barrios was able to instil 
such loyalty over such an extensive area, it is necessary to investigate the choice 
of jefes and the nature of the control that the Barrios family held over them. 
The most idealised image of the jefe de arenas is painted by one of 
Barrios' sons. In an interview, Jose Maria Barrios described a typical jefe as a 
man whose personal qualities identified him as a natural leader within a 
community. As jefes were required to receive and understand written 
instructions and keep Barrios informed of all events, the jefe would be bilingual 
and have a basic literacy. He would be impartial in his dealings and have no 
political or commercial interests that might compromise his position of 
authority. 30 
Even allowing for an element of bias, the above description might most 
accurately be viewed as an aggregate of the characteristics of jefes as a whole, 
rather than qualities possessed by a single individual. The area under Barrios' 
control was too large and too diverse for any generalisation regarding the 
qualities of the jefes de armas. The description given by Barrios' son raises 
questions relating to the selection of legitimate community leaders. How 
important was the traditional system of village office appointments? What part 
did bilingualism and literacy play? How did commercial and factional rivalries 
impinge upon the choice of leaders? Indeed, does Jose Maria Barrios' positive 
image of the jefe de arenas merely obscure a reality of the widespread imposition 
of illegitimate thugs who menaced and abused villagers into submission? 
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A good starting point to test Jose Maria Barrios' description is to analyse 
two extremes. Of all jefes de arenas, the Galindo Salazar family of Amixtlän 
enjoyed Gabriel and Demetrio Barrios' closest confidence. Enrique Galindo was 
jefe de armas of Tepango, Zacatlän, in 1924,31 while his brother Alfredo 
Galindo became jefe of Amixtlän in 1925.32 After the 46th. Battalion's 
departure from the Sierra, Alfredo Galindo, compadre of Demetrio Barrios, was 
given power of attorney to administer legal affairs in Demetrio's absence. 33 
With another brother, Ramon Galindo, representing the Barrios family in the 
federal congress as deputy for Teziutlän, it is evident that a considerable bond of 
trust joined the two families. 34 
The memories of Ramon Galindo's daughter provide a fascinating picture 
of the social background of these most trusted jefes de arenas. The Galindo 
family already enjoyed considerable wealth by the nineteenth century with 
Ramon Galindo Abarca, the father of the brothers, owning property covering 
2,000 hectares in addition to many houses and commercial properties in 
Amixtlän. The family's agricultural interests included coffee and vanilla 
production and the rearing of cattle. Typical of their wealthy mestizo class, the 
men of the family wore the finest French cashmere suits and rode thorough-bred 
horses. The Galindo children each had their own nanny and a school was built 
in Amixtlän which provided them with 'the best education available in Mexico'. 
Whenever the ladies of the family travelled from Amixtlän to Zacatldn, they 
always took care to ride side-saddle through the villages along the road in order 
to maintain the image of their lofty social position. 35 
How does this description of the Galindo family match the model of the 
jefe de arenas as perceived by Jose Maria Barrios? In one respect, Jose Maria 
Barrios' description applies. If Barrios was in search of individuals who 
commanded respect within the community, then the Galindo family certainly 
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fulfilled the requirement. Yet the Galindo could never be viewed as 
disinterested representatives of law and order: the Galindo family controlled 
political, judicial, commercial and social life within the region and, moreover, 
such domination was reinforced by close personal ties with the Barrios family. 
The Galindo family may be an extreme but other examples, such as the Flores 
family of Cuetzalan, the Lechuga of Huauchinango, the Macip of Zacapoaxtla, 
suggest that in certain important locations, Barrios was inclined to adopt a 
pragmatic approach towards his selection of jefes de arenas. All four examples 
represented, to greater or lesser degrees, dominant factions within non-Indian 
communities. Their relative strength could not merely be brushed aside in 
preference for other, non-aligned jefes de armas. To ignore their local 
domination would have been to risk increasing the frictions and factional 
violence that the appointment of jefes de arenas sought to impede. 
Therefore, when Jose Maria Barrios refers to his father's tendency to 
seek out natural leaders, this definition should be extended to cover leadership 
through factional domination. Barrios did not hesitate to use existing 
factionalism to identify and enlist a sector of a community towards the greater 
cause. 36 For a dominant faction, the support and patronage expected to flow 
from an allegiance to the cacique would have acted as a strong incentive. For 
the Galindo, the incentive was sufficiently strong to overcome any ethnic 
reservations that non-Indian obedience to an Indian cacique might normally have 
provoked. 37 
If the social and political realities of cabeceras required that jefes de 
arenas be non-Indians, the position in many Indian communities was more likely 
to be occupied by an Indian. It is worth recalling Jose Maria Barrios' ideal for 
the jefe: natural leadership; no commercial or political interests; a native of the 
community in which he lived. When compared with the findings of 
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anthropological studies, an interesting point emerges. In their comparative 
study of the Totonac communities of Tajin and Eloxochitlän, Viqueira and 
Palerm suggest that the differing development of each community's relationships 
with the non-Indian world beyond affected social norms. 38 In Eloxochitlän, 
prestige was acquired through a cargo system designed to limit wealth: political 
leadership was explicitly separated from commercial prosperity derived from 
contact with the outside world. In the more acculturated Tajin, commercial ties 
with the non-Indian world were not excluded, although in order to be accepted 
as a legitimate community leader a person would be expected to use his 
consequential wealth to sponsor cargos. Bulcher's study of the Nahua 
community of Atempan, near Teziutlän, also identifies a hierarchical structure 
which places less emphasis upon wealth and more upon the moral ascendancy 
afforded by cargo sponsorship. 39 Although located in different regions and 
possessing distinct ethnic traditions, both Tajin and Atempan showed the ability 
to adapt hierarchical systems to external pressures. As will be developed in 
chapter six, such flexibility within traditional societies allowed the Barrios 
family sufficient room to manoeuvre their chosen jefe into position. In 
communities striving to limit external influences and the economic disparities 
that might develop, Barrios would have sought compromise with those leaders 
of a community identified by the internal hierarchical system. In these cases, 
such leaders would have little or no contact with external commercial interests 
and might more easily suit Jose Maria Barrios' ideal of impartial jefes de arrnas. 
In a community such as Tajin, however, where wealth and commercial 
relationships with external influences contributed to political prestige, 
appointment as one of Barrios' jefe de armas would provide a important option 
by which a man's outside connections could reinforce his social standing within 
a community. 
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Jose Maria Barrios' suggestion that jefes de arenas needed to be literate 
raises the more general question regarding the place of a cultural intermediary 
within serrano rural communities. It must be stated, however, that from the 
available material, only a minority of jefes de arenas ever sent written reports to 
Barrios. Of these, the standard of the written word varied from the highest 
quality of Enrique Galindo to reports showing only a basic understanding of the 
Spanish language. The majority of the reports were either conveyed verbally to 
nearby garrisons and then related to headquarters in Zacatlän, or telephoned 
directly to Cuacuila. Such messages could, of course, be conveyed in nahuatl. 
Leaders of Indian communities were not, therefore, excluded from the Barrios 
cacicazgo. However, low literacy in serrano communities does provide an 
additional motive for Barrios' initiatives to develop a telephone network and 
rapidly to expand the number of rural schools. 
Between the two extremes of non-Indian wealthy men of influence, such 
as the Galindo, and the traditional leaders of Indian communities, there was a 
large middle territory occupied by jefes de arenas recruited for convenience or 
through more haphazard procedures. An example of such recruitment is 
revealed in correspondence between Captain Leandro Amaro, commander of the 
garrison in Huauchinango, and Demetrio Barrios in February 1925. Amaro 
reported that several cases had recently occurred where individuals had handed 
over their weapons and had sought permission to become leaders of their 
community's voluntary forces to combat local banditry and lawlessness. It 
appears that some were already fulfilling this role, while at least one of the 
volunteers had previously been a colonel in the forces of General Lindoro 
Hernandez. Amaro also made reference to routine security reports sent by jefes 
de arenas and drew particular attention to reports that bandits in the 
Tlaxcalantongo area were robbing and hanging innocent people. The municipal 
president of Tlaxcalantongo had asked Amaro either to send a detachment of 
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troops to combat the bandits, or to allow the local authorities to conduct their 
own armed defence. In his reply, Demetrio Barrios ordered Amaro to ensure 
that the volunteers restricted their men's actions to those necessary to maintain 
law and order in their localities and to keep Amaro informed of bandit activities 
in order to facilitate a co-ordinated response. Barrios also authorised 
Tlaxcalantongo residents of 'reputable character' to arm themselves with the sole 
objective of protecting their community. 40 
Such recruitment suggests that the fine criteria described by Jose Maria 
Barrios more often gave way to expediency. The need to combat banditry and 
the shortage of police to accomplish the task, forced the Barrios family to use 
less meticulous methods of recruitment. The above example, while confirming 
that banditry was still a major concern in 1925, also indicates that the Barrios 
family was recognised by local community leaders as the entity from which all 
legitimacy flowed. In surrendering their arms and placing themselves at 
Barrios' disposal, these local figures were effectively pledging their loyalty to, 
and obtaining a measure of protection from, the cacique. The cautionary 
remarks of Demetrio Barrios regarding the choice of men, their future conduct 
and their limited terms of reference reflect the more general requirement that the 
Barrios family made upon their jefes de arenas. 
The job of appointing and monitoring the system of jefes fell to 
Bardomiano Barrios and, after his death, to his brother Demetrio. Upon 
appointment each jefe received a verbal or written description of his duties. 
Those sent to Ricardo M. Ramirez of Tetzitzilica, Pue. and Arnulfo Sanchez of 
el Rancho de la Palma, Tlaxco, Tlax. on 21 January 1921 are typical: 
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On behalf of General Gabriel Barrios and in agreement with the 
headquarters, you have been chosen to become jefe de los voluntarios 
of your locality on the understanding that you always conduct yourself 
in an honourable manner and that you afford full guarantees to all law- 
abiding men so that they may dedicate themselves to lawful business. 
You are also expected to maintain good public order. 41 
Other appointments in 1923 carried a reminder that the new jefes should set a 
good example and, in one case, permission was given to disarm the population 
to preserve the good order and morality of the community. 42 Most evidence 
confirms that the Barrios family appointed jefes to fulfil a role which was 
entirely connected with public security, the control of arms and the suppression 
of bandits. They were not given licence to act in place, or in contempt of 
existing local civil authority. 43 
On several occasions, orders were issued from the cacicazgo's 
headquarters in response to complaints against jefes de arenas. Their tone is 
consistent with the line adopted upon appointment: 
[... ] It has been brought to my attention that some of the soldiers under 
your command are committing abuses against people and property and 
have regularly been seen drunk. As you appear to tolerate such abuses, 
I have a duty to warn you of the serious consequences should such a 
state of affairs be allowed to continue. I am strong' y against such 
behaviour and this letter should be considered as the only warning that 
you will receive. Such abuses must be stopped completely as they 
bring discredit not only upon commanders but also the Government. 
Acknowledge receipt of this letter and take steps to comply with the 
duties expected of you. ' 
Despite the Barrios family's attempts to restrict the actions of the jefes de 
arenas, there would always be some who exceeded their powers. Whether 
complaints against jefes de arenas represented a more generalised grievance 
concerning the arbitrary imposition of armed guards within a community or 
were simply a reaction to a particular jefe is more difficult to ascertain. The 
relatively low number of complaints against jefes de arenas can not be taken as 
an indication of a general satisfaction with their deployment. The complaints 
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that were made suggest that non-Indians were more likely to appeal. Phrases 
used and grammatical proficiency suggest the authors were educated and, 
although claiming to be writing on behalf of a community suffering under 
tyranny, the possibility of self-interest, or factional and political intrigue can not 
be ruled out. Conversely, the practical difficulties for illiterate serranos to make 
formal complaints means that the true level of discontent among the majority 
Indian and poor mestizo population is hard to detect. In addition, in an 
atmosphere of repression, opportunities for plaintiffs to make their feelings 
known to outsiders would have been severely restricted. as 
If any pattern can be detected from the complaints made against the jefes 
de armas, it is that the majority of them were made during the earlier, less 
secure, phase of the cacicazgo: a time when disorder was likely to be at its 
highest. Following years of civil war, former rebels were still at large in the 
Sierra representing a continued threat to regional peace. Within this 
environment of social disruption and uncertainty, Gabriel Barrios faced the task 
of marshalling his growing band of cuerpos voluntarios in a crusade to convert 
the Sierra into the tranquil region envisaged by his superiors. 
The return to law and order in the Sierra 
By entrusting Gabriel Barrios with the task of pacifying the Sierra, the 
Sonorense administration was acknowledging that civilian police authority was 
extremely limited and that if coercive measures had to be employed to attain 
stability, then Barrios was the most appropriate agent. As already suggested, 
the coercive power that Barrios held was sparingly devolved to his jefes. It 
appears that he was, at least theoretically, concerned with controlling the abuses 
of his local representatives of law enforcement. As the above communiques 
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suggest, jefes de arenas had a prime responsibility for maintaining law and order 
and for behaving in a manner befitting their positions of responsibility. This 
implies that law-abiding citizens within the Sierra need not fear that the 
cacicazgo's considerable influence would infringe upon their constitutional 
rights. Only those who failed to make the swift adjustment from wartime 
disruption to peacetime responsibilities had cause for anxiety. At its most 
extreme, this category included rebels, murderers and bandits who hampered 
efforts to establish peace. Yet the legendary harsh system of justice that Barrios 
imposed touched all: from murderers and cattle rustlers to chicken thieves, tax 
dodgers and even women of ill-repute. 46 
At first, before a more comprehensive system of jefes de armas had been 
established, serious challenges to law and order were met by the deployment of 
federal troops. 47 The request for assistance made by the municipal president of 
Ahuacatlän to the municipal president of Zacatlän in July 1920 is typical. The 
Ahuacatlän official reported that the community's sole police officer was unable 
to cope with the high incident of crime, much of which was being caused by 
criminals who had escaped from the local jail. The municipal president of 
Zacatlän responded by asking Bardomiano Barrios to deploy troops to re- 
establish order in the town. 48 However, as the correspondence between 
Demetrio Barrios and Captain Amaro in Huauchinango shows, jefes de arenas 
increasingly assumed the task of lending support to local policing. 
The harsh punishments that Gabriel Barrios inflicted on bandits still 
evokes memories among those who lived in the Sierra during the 1920s. The 
most common view of Barrios' methods is that he was ruthless but effective in 
combating violent crime. The municipal president of Tlaxcalantongo's 
description of the indiscriminate killings perpetrated by bandits provides an 
example of the extremes that such crimes reached. Anecdotal and circumstantial 
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evidence suggests that Barrios was equal to the challenge. Frequently the search 
for bandits would culminate in a violent exchange producing the deaths of gang 
leaders and followers. 49 Even those bandits taken alive could not be certain of 
surviving to face civil proceedings. Captain Amaro seemed particularly 
susceptible to attempted escapes by prisoners. On 1 May 1925, Amaro reported 
that the captured gang leader, Juan Jimenez, wanted for a range of crimes, tried 
to overpower his escort and was killed in the ensuing struggle. 50 Such arbitrary 
justice attracted the attention of Gruening, who commented on the execution by 
Barrios men of four suspects in Tuxpan, Veracruz, despite having successfully 
secured an amparo from the federal judge. 51 
Evidence of summary justice is strengthened by popular memory. 
Barrios' son, Arnulfo, remembers overhearing a conversation between two 
itinerant horse traders from Jalisco who were passing through Tetela de 
Ocampo. The men had seen three men hanged from the bough of a tree as a 
punishment for stealing chickens. 52 People in Tonalapa still point to the tree 
from which those found guilty of serious crimes and robbery were hung. 53 
Similar testimonies can be found regarding the actions of jefes de arenas as far 
afield as Libres. 54 Indeed, serranos throughout the Sierra confirm that the 
Barrios family imposed a strict regime of discipline and law enforcement. Yet, 
it is also clear that Barrios' methods included the threat of brutal force as much 
as its actual use. 55 Thus, intimidation was a vital weapon in Barrios' efforts to 
control the Sierra. Banditry decreased partly because the risks began to 
outweigh the benefits. The comparative protection of geographical isolation 
diminished in the face of a localised network of informants and policemen in 
regular contact with the regional cacique. Banditry may have also diminished 
due to a material improvement in the lives of the serranos. As will be argued in 
chapter five, if such economic improvements did have such an effect, the 
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catalyst for such a change was the regional cacique who possessed the capacity 
to control by force or patronage in equal measure. 
In addition to the use of violent sanctions, Barrios employed a more 
pragmatic form of justice. As the son of one jefe de arenas suggested, although 
Barrios killed many people, his control of the Sierra was achieved by a delicate 
balance of force, intimidation and co-operation. 56 Certainly, a more aggressive 
policy was pursued against bandits, rebels and, as will be argued in the next 
chapter, political enemies. Yet beyond these major challenges to public order 
lay the wider task of repairing the social fabric of communities and encouraging 
the serranos to resume their responsibilities as vecinos. In this respect, the jefes 
de armas play a role every bit as vital as that performed in combating banditry. 
It is worth returning to the terms of reference that Barrios gave his jefes de 
arenas and the men under their control - their duties were to maintain public 
order and to protect their neighbours from molestation. While this might lead to 
clashes with bandits, it more frequently meant that jefes de arenas would, for 
instance, oversee community fiestas to ensure that the festivities did not get out 
of hand, or take steps to curb the boisterous actions of immoral citizens, drunks 
and rowdies. 57 
The most common complaints against jefes de armas related to one 
particular aspect of the cacicazgo's efforts to re-establish a measure of public 
responsibility within communities. A rapidly expanding dimension of the 
Barrios cacicazgo throughout the 1920s was the promotion of regional 
development, particularly in the areas of transport and education. Such 
initiatives needed the active co-operation of the serranos, and jefes de arenas 
were charged with ensuring that local authorities produced a positive response. 
In some cases, jefes were used to collect educational contributions, but by far 
the most onerous obligation placed upon serranos was the re-establishment of 
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faenas. 58 In the absence of adequate civil officials, the ultimate responsibility 
for ensuring that serranos satisfied these obligations fell upon the jefes de arenas. 
Non-attendance would be followed by an early morning call by the members of 
the cuerpo voluntario and, if persuasion proved ineffective, force would be used 
to ensure compliance. 
Complaints of excessive force used by Barrios troops and jefes de armas 
in enforcing faena attendance have sharpened the image of Barrios as a ruthless 
cacique who used rough justice and intimidation to get his way. Yet the 
evidence suggests that Barrios took a practical approach in disciplining 
recalcitrant faeneros. Despite popular belief, serranos were rarely killed for not 
attending faenas and neither were they commonly fined. More often, such 
individuals would be confined to prison, not to languish but to be forced to 
attend faenas by day and to be returned to jail by night. 
This trend of practical punishment appears to have been extended to law- 
breakers in general. The so-called ley de cajones is still remembered and brings 
awry , smile to many serrano faces. Those found guilty of petty crimes and non- 
compliance with faenas were brought before Gabriel Barrios in Cuacuila. Their 
punishment was to carry baskets laden with stones through the streets of 
Zacatlän or Tetela de Ocampo, the stones being used to pave the very streets 
through which the culprit walked. The punishment blended physical toil with 
public humiliation: a particularly potent formula for the more affluent members 
of society that might be tempted to break the law. By the same token, both 
cabeceras could boast paved streets long before many other communities, 
including areas of Puebla City. 
The imaginative, sometimes humorous, sense of justice combined with 
the more menacing aspect of Barrios' domination to create stability in the 
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Sierra. 59 As described in the previous chapter, despite the many charges 
levelled at Barrios and his methods, neither civilian nor military investigations 
found him guilty of any specific case. Barrios sought to control the actions of 
jefes de armas by making them accountable to nearby federal garrisons. 
Complaints received against jefes were referred for investigation. It was not 
uncommon for Barrios to send copies of the subsequent reports to his superior 
officers in Puebla City. On no occasion is there evidence to suggest that Barrios 
was forced by his superiors to remove or punish any of his jefes de arenas. 
And, on only one occasion was Barrios ordered to replace one of his officers. 60 
In reality, punitive action against Barrios and his men rarely occurred, 
not because they were innocent of all the charges made against them, but 
because Barrios enjoyed a regional monopoly of force and used his position to 
produce general stability. The clear message sent to his superiors in Mexico 
City was that, above all else, Barrios was capable of converting the Sierra into a 
tranquil area where travellers and merchants could feel safe to use the region's 
network of roads without fear of attack. 61 A great deal of the success of 
Barrios' campaign against lawlessness was due to his use of federal troops and 
cuerpos voluntarios. Yet such a widespread reversion to peaceful coexistence 
could not be achieved by force and intimidation alone: such a transition suggests 
that Barrios was successful in obtaining co-operation from the serrano 
communities. Indeed, the very nature of the jefe de arenas' job demanded that 
he liaise with other figures of authority within his community. In turn, these 
officials provided Barrios with independent source of information concerning the 
actions of the jefes de arenas. The network of public security that Barrios 
developed depended upon no single individual. To place too much authority in 
the hands of one person may have created potential rivals. Barrios' success 
relied on the pervasive nature of his control at the local level. This control was 
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based upon the existence of several independent supporters within a community, 
each directly responsible to him. 
Local political appointments 
Frequent dispatches from the Ministry of War reminding generals that 
they were forbidden from participating in politics only perpetuated the myth of 
political rectitude characterised by E. J. Palacios' ordinances for local 
government for the state of Puebla. 62 At the municipal level, democracy was 
ensured through annual elections for members of the ayuntamiento. In turn, the 
ayuntamiento was directly responsible to the state executive: the Governor. The 
secretary, tax collector and a municipal judge were externally nominated and not 
subject to periodic re-election by the community. In the pueblos, juntas 
auxiliares comprising a mayor, aldermen and trustees, joined forces with a civil 
registrar and his assistant in upholding local civil authority. It was the local 
authority's responsibility to employ police and guards for the local prison. 
As Palacios' summary indicates, certain key positions within local 
government were outside the local democratic process. The position of 
secretary, for example, was not subject to election and therefore an individual 
could, in theory, retain this position for much of his life. Potentially, this 
placed the secretary in a position of considerable local influence. A good 
secretary might provide stability to a local administration that otherwise saw 
important positions of authority alternate between officials with short-term 
interests. A bad secretary, conversely, might use his secure tenure to 
systematically abuse his position. In any case, the appointment of influential 
offices, such as that of secretary, made the appointees indebted to those whose 
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continued support was vital for the retention of their posts. Such circumstances 
provided the optimum environment for patronage to thrive. 
In 1927, the undersecretary for Education, Moises Saenz, conducted a 
tour of inspection in the Sierra de Puebla. The report of his findings reached 
beyond his brief of commenting on educational affairs to include a number of 
observations on serrano life, including an assessment of local government. 
Saenz prefaced his comments with an outline of the historical precedents, where 
local jefes politicos were named by Lucas or Mendez who in turn nominated 
their secretaries as administrators of justice and, frequently, of education. Saenz 
added that the secretary was often the only gerate de razön; the only 'civilising 
element' within a community. 63 
Referring to the situation under the 'patriarch' Gabriel Barrios, Saenz 
observed that municipal presidents were found in all pueblos and ranchos, and 
assistant judges in all barrios. Within the communities that he encountered, all 
these officials were Indians, very few spoke Spanish, and Indians made up the 
town council. Importantly, he suggested that the past custom of secretaries 
being appointed from outside the community was still a common occurrence. 
The Barrios family nominated all secretaries who continued to be seen as the 
main government agents within a community. The secretaries no longer played 
a major role in education but remained pivotal figures in the political and 
administrative relationship between the community and external authorities. 
Finally, referring to the survival of a form of democracy, Saenz 
suggested that all important decisions continued to be brought before the official 
symbol of power, respect and order: the local authorities. However, he added 
that all serranos were aware that true power lay with the secretary and that the 
source of his influence was directly linked to his subordination to the Barrios 
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family. Saenz mused over who delude whom in this charade of local 
democracy. The Indians conducted local government with an air of democracy 
although Saenz believed that they were fully aware of the true situation, while 
the non-Indian created the pretence of democracy in order to retain control. 
Yet, by recognising and acting within the pretence, Saenz wondered whether the 
Indians had nonetheless found the most effective way of preserving the remnants 
of racial dignity. A more independent stance might only have served to 
encourage actions by those with true political power which would have further 
shattered the illusion of Indian self-determination. 
The substance of Saenz's observations regarding the position of the 
secretary in the Sierra de Puebla was accurate. As early as 1920, Barrios 
influenced the appointment of local officials. In a letter from the authorities of 
Xochitlaxco, (Tepetzintla) an appeal was made to the municipal president of 
Zacatlän to use any means at his disposal to stop the replacement of their local 
president by a man 'recommended' by the Barrios family. The vecinos were 
satisfied with the incumbent president and asked the Zacatlän authorities to assist 
in blocking the change and to remove from office the present secretary, a 
personal friend of the proposed president. 64 In another case, a letter from 
Bardomiano Barrios to Fernando Sosa in San Mateo, provides conclusive 
evidence of direct involvement: 
My apologies for the inconvenience, but as it has been necessary to 
transfer the present secretary, Manuel Hernandez, to another pueblo, 
this leaves a vacancy in San Mateo. I should appreciate it if you could 
talk to the municipal president and the aldermen and persuade them to 
allow Senor Francisco Arroyo, a competent and diligent individual, to 
fill the vacancy. I trust that the local authority will agree to my 
proposal and that Senor Arroyo will soon receive news of his 
appointment. In the meantime, if I can be of any assistance, do not 
hesitate to contact me. 65 
Between the lines of this letter, it is possible to perceive a little of the 
pretence that Saenz would sense a few years later. By leaving the formality of 
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the secretary's appointment to the ayuntamiento, Bardomiano Barrios kept the 
facade of local democracy alive. Whether or not the last paragraph of the letter 
conveys an element of menace is open to interpretation, but there remains little 
doubt that all officials in the Sierra knew where ultimate power lay. Any 
complaints against the abuses of secretaries would have little effect unless a 
good case could be made before the Barrios family. Evidence of the family's 
control over secretarial appointments is exemplified by a brief glance at 
correspondence emanating from Cuacuila. In one example, Demetrio Barrios 
was asked to 'find' a position for the father of a friend. 66 On another occasion, 
a former secretary asked if Barrios could help him resolve a personal 
predicament: 
My main purpose in writing is to ask if you would be able to find me 
employment in Zacatlän or elsewhere in the Sierra as I am considering 
returning to the region shortly. Although I presently hold the position 
as tax collector here in Papantla, my income is not sufficient for my 
expenses. As you know, I have a large family and with the prices of 
even essential commodities being very expensive here, I find my 
outgoings rising daily. I remember that you, and your late brother 
Bardomiano, have always been good people who have tried to help 
those, like myself, that have needed to approach you. 
You will remember that we got to know each other quite well during 
my time as secretary in San Andres de Tlayehualancingo, and that 
during the elections, I worked to helped you in every way I could. I 
am thinking of returning to the Sierra in October, and it is for this 
reason that I am contacting you now in order that I will not have 
difficulties in finding work upon my return. Here in Papantla, the 
climate is very hot and unhealthy, there is a great deal of sickness and I 
find it impossible to continue living in such conditions. Since we 
arrived here I and my family have suffered constant sickness. Not 
wishing to take up any more of your time, I hope that you will be able 
to respond favourably to my request. 67 
This is a clear illustration of how the Barrios system of patronage 
functioned. Meza y Mora called upon past connections with the Barrios family, 
notably his co-operation in electoral matters, as a means of lending weight to his 
request. It is clear that the Barrios family were considered to hold the key for 
resolving personal problems. Equally common, however, were requests from 
entire communities or groups asking for a resolution to problems ranging from 
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abuses of position to land disputes with neighbouring villages. 68 The majority 
of complaints regarding the improper use of power by secretaries were not sent, 
as should have happened, to the state governor but were directed to Barrios 
himself. 69 
Barrios' influence over local appointments clearly went beyond the 
selection of secretaries. Tax inspectors, teachers and directors of schools 
frequently benefited from the favour shown by the Barrios family. This 
suggests that the family's influence went far beyond that identified even by 
Saenz. There is no doubt that the brothers directly interfered in the local 
democratic process, in some communities placing aldermen, and in others, 
municipal presidents, into ayuntamientos in order to guarantee compliance with 
the family's policies. Simon Torres, jefe de arenas in Tlapacoya, asked 
Demetrio Barrios to endorse a list of candidates for the community's next 
ayuntamiento. 70 Artemio Gonzalez of Villa Juarez did likewise: 
I have the pleasure of enclosing with this letter a list of candidates that 
we have jointly assessed and approved to take part in the impending 
local elections in Villa Juarez. All the candidates share your own 
ideals and each would work for the benefit of the people. 7' 
Prior vetting of candidates provided an alternative method of obtaining a 
compliant ayuntamiento and negated the need for more blatant interference. In 
other cases, however, Barrios is accused of more direct manipulation: of 
imposing ayuntamiento members in the cabeceras of Tlatlauquitepec and other 
municipalities. 72 On a different occasion, the jefe de arenas of Caxhuacän 
sought guidance from Barrios following an attempt by local people to replace the 
municipal president with an unsuitable alternative. 73 
Throughout the Sierra de Puebla the Barrios family made its influence 
felt in most areas of public life. It does not follow, however, that the cacicazgo 
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became involved in the administrative affairs of all serrano communities to the 
extent demonstrated above. Indeed, given the size of the region under his 
control and the number of years that he retained command, Gabriel Barrios only 
interfered directly in the minority of local communities. What was more 
pervasive was the feeling among serranos that Barrios had the potential to 
interfere if he saw fit, and that few external authorities could stop him from 
doing so. As Saenz suggested, many communities were participating in a 
deception in which local officials were allowed to perpetuate the image of 
democracy within strictly limited parameters. It is almost as if the serranos, in 
exercising constitutional rights to elect their representatives, were adding a 
clause to the Constitution, 'provided those elected meet with the approval of 
Gabriel Barrios'. This would leave space, for example, for an Indian 
community to stand firm in its determination to refuse the imposition of non- 
Indian secretaries. In communities where ethnic resistance was strong, Barrios 
would rarely ignore local feeling. As long as the secretary chosen satisfied 
Barrios' more general requirements, the will of the people could appear to have 
been satisfied. As in the case of jefes de arenas, Barrios sought leaders who 
enjoyed influence within a community. The main proviso that Barrios imposed 
was that these individuals should demonstrate by their actions that they 
recognised that ultimate power lay with the cacique. 
For those communities that did resent Barrios' interference, the options 
of protest were limited. Given that Barrios enjoyed such control of public 
security in the Sierra, any hint of armed resistance could incur the wrath of 
cuerpos voluntarios and/or federal troop detachments. More limited displays of 
violent displeasure fared little better. In April 1928 150 men presented 
themselves at the municipal offices in Hueytlalpan and assaulted the secretary 
and the school teacher. They later threw the secretary, judges and other public 
employees into jail. Barrios sent a detachment of troops to investigate the 
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problem. The officer in charge, Amador Uribe, reported that while some of the 
crowd had simply followed the orders of others, a core group of protesters had 
complained that the secretary had imposed excessive faenas and increased 
charges for drinking water. The school teacher was accused of trying to force 
children to work in an orchard against the wishes of their parents. Uribe's 
investigations concluded that the charges were unfounded, the secretary and 
others were released, and Demetrio Barrios ordered the conspirators to be 
escorted to Zacatlän to 'clarify' their grievances. Their fate remains unclear. 74 
If violent forms of opposition proved fruitless, the official appeal 
procedure promised little better. Complaints to cabecera authorities against the 
Barrios family were futile given that most of the cabeceras were controlled by 
Barrios supporters. Any complaints were automatically referred to the family 
who would send troops or cuerpos voluntarios to investigate the problem. The 
only peaceful alternatives open to local authorities were to by-pass the cabecera 
and appeal directly to the governor or the president of the Republic. As will be 
argued in the chapter four, the state governor was rarely able to influence 
Barrios' actions and could do little more than appeal to the Ministry of War. 
Likewise, complaints to the president were, more often than not, referred to the 
Ministry of War or to the state governor. While Barrios was seen by the federal 
government as a crucial element in the pacification of the Sierra, it was unlikely 
that any complaints against him would provoke the government to remove him 
from the region. There is little evidence that any significant pressure was placed 
on Barrios to refrain from meddling in local politics. This remained the case 
until the final years of the cacicazgo by which time the external political climate 
had considerably changed. 
Even where evidence does exist of restraint being placed on Barrios, an 
air of farce surrounded the proceedings. In July 1927 Lieutenant Colonel 
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Vicente Escobedo, Jefe de Operaciones Militares in Puebla, informed Barrios 
that the governor of Puebla had complained about the political interference of 
Barrios' troops in Teziutlän. Escobedo ordered Barrios to instruction his troops 
to desist from mixing in politics. Less than a month later, Escobedo's brother- 
in-law was appointed tax inspector for Zacapoaxtla and Escobedo asked Barrios 
to use his influence to make his relation's term of office in Zacapoaxtla as 
smooth as possible. 75 Here one sees the options open to the governor: the 
official method of complaint against a military officer was to inform his superior 
officer. Yet while Escobedo reminded Barrios of the limits of his jurisdiction, 
when theory turned into practice, Escobedo was as keen as anyone to make use 
of the informal power that Barrios held. 
Redfield's study of Tepoztlän provides an interesting contemporary 
comparison with Saenz's observations on the social and political structure of the 
Sierra de Puebla. 76 Indeed, Redfield provides an additional perspective for 
viewing the situation in many Serrano villages. While Tepoztlän's annual 
election of the municipal council resembled the situation in the Sierra de Puebla, 
Redfield suggests that the council members were infact chosen by the state 
government in Cuernavaca on the basis of their recognised loyalty to the state 
government. Redfield adds that the municipal council held little real power, less 
prestige, and merely functioned as a local administrative body of the state 
government. Aldermen invariably came from the less educated sector of 
society, 'los locos' as they were known locally. Due to the relative impotence 
of local politics in Tepoztlän, Redfield concludes that politics fell into the same 
category as the organisation of religious fiestas; a form of play enjoyed by the 
less influential sector of the community. Despite the solemnity and internal 
respect associated with the performance of such duties, local politics in 
Tepoztlän was a trivial pastime for the masses while the important decisions 
were made elsewhere. The more educated sector of Tepoztlän society, Redfield 
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suggests, viewed local politics with some distain and found that a more effective 
method of introducing progressive reform into the community lay in their 
personal and commercial connections with the state capital. 
Yet, in the Sierra de Puebla, something fundamentally different was 
occurring. A distinction should be made between the power struggle in the 
cabeceras and in the pueblos. In the ayuntamientos of Sierra cabeceras, it was 
not the 'locos', but the 'gente de razön' who were contesting control of the 
municipal councils. These same ayuntamientos were the political battleground 
for factions aligned to the state governor and those loyal to Barrios. The degree 
to which Barrios could retain control of cabecera politics acts as an indicator of 
his changing fortunes in the Sierra as a whole. Moreover, even if the high 
degree of Indian involvement in local politics of the pueblos matches Redfield's 
conclusions on political life in Tepoztlän, one important difference existed. 
Those non-Indians among the community who concluded that real influence lay 
in establishing ties beyond the sphere of local politics, did not find these links in 
the state capital, but in the remote mountain village of Cuacuila. Imposition of 
the councils did take place, yet unlike Tepoztlän, it was not the state government 
but the Barrios family who was the intervening force. 
Indian participation in bogus democratic politics has received attention in 
other recent anthropological studies of the Sierra de Puebla. The studies of 
Viqueira and Palerm, and of Buchler, demonstrate the ability of communities to 
modify their social structures to adapt to external pressures that threaten the 
status quo. It is clear that Sierra communities could not avoid external influence 
merely by retreating into a cultural shell. In her study of the Nahua community 
of Zacatipan (Cuetzalan), Lourdes-Arizpe observed that ceremonial and civil 
cargo performance played important roles in an Indian community's struggle to 
balance traditional values and external influences. It is clear, for example, that 
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the community tried to limit outside interference by insisting that the pivotal 
position of secretary be occupied by an Indian. Although posts were offered for 
annual election, in reality the appointments of municipal president and aldermen 
were made by dominant factions within the community. Yet, Lourdes-Arizpe 
noted that the economic and commercial factors that bound the community to its 
cabecera, introduced an element of bias into the community in favour of certain 
political figures in Cuetzalan. Zacatipan outwardly appeared to be sustaining a 
hierarchical system that produced legitimate leaders in accordance with tradition 
while keeping the outside world at a distance. Behind the scenes, however, 
essential connections with non-Indian society fundamentally undermined 
Zacatipan's autonomy. 
These studies create a picture of a region in transition. While this 
process may have been moving at differing speeds, the facade of local 
democracy identified in all communities acted as a face-saving device allowing 
the holders of traditional prestige credibility both within the community and in 
their dealings with the outside world. To most Sierra communities, the external 
influence of the 1920s was personified by Gabriel Barrios. As in the case of 
military recruitment, Barrios' retention of an Indian cultural identity helped to 
soothe the potentially fraught relationships between community and cacique. 
The patron in Cuacuila held the power to resolve most, if not all, of their 
problems. They could converse with Barrios in their own language and be 
reasonably confident that they were speaking to someone who understood the 
Sierra and its particular challenges. Faced with the options of appealing, in 
Spanish, to the state governor or president of the Republic, with little hope of 
redress, or reasoning with Barrios in nahuatl, most serranos opted for the latter. 
Patronage of a more direct kind underscored Barrios' placement of 
favoured individuals into positions of local authority. Although it has already 
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been shown that jefes de arenas could not expect to earn a wage, the mere fact 
that such figures were recognised as possessing the support of the cacicazgo 
would have brought more tangible benefits. The projected accounts of Tetela de 
Ocampo's ayuntamiento illustrate the benefits to be gained from being granted a 
position of authority by Barrios. 
Annual Expenditure on salaries for 192077 
Municipal President $912.50 
Secretary $730.00 
Correctional Judge $365.00 
Secretary to the Correctional Judge $547.50 
Director of the Ocampo school $912.50 
Assistant director $638.75 
Keeper of the public clock $ 60.00 
Given that the average earnings in the Sierra was little more than a peso 
a day, the value of obtaining a post in local government was considerable. 78 Of 
particular interest is that at a time when funding for education was generally 
scarce, the director of the largest school in Tetela de Ocampo received a salary 
equal to that of the municipal president. Barrios increasingly assumed control of 
education in the Sierra, both nominating and funding the payment of directors 
and their assistants. Particularly in cabeceras like Tetela de Ocampo, directors 
were not professional appointments but were found from within the 
commercially dominant, non-Indian sectors of society. Such lucrative 
appointments helped Barrios to extend his network of patronage into sectors of 
non-Indian serrano society. 
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In return for favours bestowed, Barrios naturally expected to receive the 
allegiance of the beneficiaries. Loyalty took many forms but, in a mountainous 
region such as the Sierra de Puebla, perhaps its most valuable manifestation was 
the provision of the independent intelligence that each and every appointee could 
provide. With several individuals within one community separately owing their 
allegiances to Barrios, each acted as a means of countering the excesses of the 
others. In this way, Barrios quickly learned of abuses by secretaries, municipal 
presidents, or of any relationships developing between jefes de arenas and other 
holders of local power that threatened public order and/or might lead to a 
challenge to his own supremacy. 
Faenas: a practical application of the cacicazgo network 
While the Barrios family may have been interested in limiting the 
development of dangerous alliances among influential local figures, the more 
universal objective of instilling public order in the Sierra depended on co- 
operation between these individuals. As has already been suggested, solutions 
to more violent criminal acts of banditry and rebellion were beyond the limited 
means of the local police. Many communities had neither a police force nor 
prison guards and frequently called upon Demetrio Barrios to release troops 
based in Zacatldn to perform routine policing duties. Liaison between the civil 
local authorities and Barrios' men, both federal troops and cuerpos voluntarios, 
was essential for the system to function. Overall control, however, was firmly 
in the hands of the Barrios family. Whether it was a judge needing men to 
arrest or escort a criminal, or a municipal president wanting a jefe de arenas to 
police a fiesta or collect overdue taxes, all applications were directed towards 
the family. 
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The successful re-establishment of public order in the Sierra stemmed 
from the harsh punishment inflicted on persistent, violent criminals as well as 
lesser felons. Years of civil war had traumatised the nation, the atrocities 
carried out by Mexicans against their compatriots had produced a violent, 
arbitrary system of justice. Faced with the stemming such barbarity in the 
Sierra, there is little doubt that Gabriel Barrios elected to solve the problem not 
by appealing for restraint but by meeting violence with even greater violence: he 
coerced bandits into submission. However, the vital difference between the 
form of violence that Barrios produced and that previously experienced in the 
Sierra, was that the aggression assumed a more controlled form. This is not to 
say that it fell within legally defined limits, but the spectre of anarchical 
violence committed by all sides subsided. While those who opposed the Barrios 
family could expect little mercy, the chances of being the innocent victim of 
random crime diminished. Travelling merchants, for example, could feel more 
confident using the thoroughfares of the Sierra, while those who attempted to 
attack them ran the risk of brutal treatment if caught. It is somewhat ironic that 
law and order was achieved by a regime that showed little or no respect for legal 
proceedings. 
Yet the restoration of stability in the Sierra was only partially achieved 
by tackling the more violent perpetrators of crime. Gabriel Barrios was not 
content to let the serranos sink back into a form of pre-revolutionary slumber. 
The past had no place in the Sierra of the 1920s and the need to renew a sense 
of individual commitment to the community was identified and developed to 
unprecedented levels. The most obvious manifestation of this was the 
reimposition of faenas. 
Since pre-Columbian times, faenas had been used in the Sierra de Puebla 
to coordinate efforts towards tasks of community benefit: such as the clearing of 
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water channels and the construction and maintenance of inter-communal paths. 
The Revolution had disrupted such efforts and as the damage from each year's 
rains failed to be repaired, so worsened the already arduous task of travelling 
through the region. 79 
Gabriel Barrios regarded the reintroduction of faenas as essential for the 
regeneration of the Sierra. His projects, however, were more ambitious than 
any previously contemplated. He planned to develop a system of 
communications that would link the most remote comers of the Sierra to the 
economic and social benefits of the outside world. In the absence of sufficient 
federal funds, the demand for faenas greatly exceeded those of the past, and for 
a region that had become accustomed to life without faenas, their reimposition 
on a more onerous scale was bound to cause tension. Although these 
development projects will be more fully investigated in chapter five, the 
administration of faenas reveals much concerning the local power structure 
within the region. 
Throughout the Revolution, many serrano communities had, albeit in a 
haphazard fashion, continued to keep local paths in reasonable condition. With 
the economic life of a community depending upon its products being sold at a 
local market, it was in everyone's interest to keep the paths open. Only in 
communities where local authority had broken down or was failing to convince 
its people either to continue such practices or to provide additional co-operation, 
does one find evidence of intervention. 
The overall responsibility for organising and ensuring attendance of 
faenas fell upon the local ayuntamiento. Lists of all eligible individuals were 
taken from the electoral registers and the local judge was made responsible for 
ensuring attendance on the day of the faena. 80 While locally-based faenas raised 
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comparatively little objection, when communities or individuals resisted calls to 
work in more distant locations, for example, on the construction of national 
highways, the response of Barrios' men left little doubt where power lay. 81 
Even before the Barrios family had firmly established control over the 
Sierra, Gabriel Barrios did not hesitate to remind local authorities of their 
obligations to maintain good communication links. 82 The ambiguity concerning 
a person's constitutional protection against forced labour and his moral 
obligations to co-operate with works that ensured revolutionary progress, paved 
the way for faenas to be portrayed less as a voluntary gesture and more as a 
legal obligation. Local authorities were held responsible for enforcing 
compliance with this obligation, despite the fact that few authorities had either 
the respect or the human resources to do so. Faced with such pressure, 
authorities frequently asked Barrios to release federal troops or cuerpos 
voluntarios to add strength to the judge's calls for attendance. As in other 
aspects of local government, the channels of communication and influence were 
vertical rather than lateral: the judge or municipal president might benefit from 
the co-operation given to him by the local jefe de arenas, but all requests and 
permission had to be channelled through Barrios. 
Barrios' use of jefes de arenas and federal troops to enforce faena 
attendance provides a rich seam of anecdotal evidence to support his image as a 
brutal cacique. As has already been argued, it is unlikely that the reputed harsh 
treatment of objectors to faenas was widespread; in general a more constructive, 
if extra-legal, approach to such individuals was adopted. This is not to say that 
the presence of guards to watch over the faeneros was not greatly resented, nor 
that jefes de arenas and federal troops were above using disproportionate force to 
make vecinos attend. The widespread hanging of objectors, however, was not a 
policy that Barrios favoured. 83 
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The appropriate balance between coercion and cooperation was the vital 
element that characterised Gabriel Barrios' philosophy, not only in the operation 
of faenas but in the administration of the cacicazgo in general. Powerful though 
Barrios was, it is unlikely that many communities felt the influence of the 
Barrios family on a regular basis. Despite greatly improved communications, 
the topography of the Sierra favoured a degree of autonomy in daily life. In 
practice, this would have allowed each community freedom to choose the most 
appropriate way in which to comply with the periodic demands made upon it. 
Only when individual or community resistance occurred was the machinery of 
the cacicazgo swiftly deployed to eradicate potential threats. Any number of 
people within a vicinity would have the incentive to inform Barrios of 
developments liable to cause concern. Barrios' judicious intervention in local 
politics ensured that the number of cases of resistance was low. In the few 
situations where local patronage and persuasion proved insufficient, Barrios 
could always deploy a cuerpo voluntario or a federal troop unit. 
In certain respects, the manner in which Gabriel Barrios controlled the 
Sierra during the 1920s resembles methods used by Porfirio Diaz on a national 
scale in the nineteenth century, in that both leaders used a varying combination 
of coercion and patronage to ensure overall control. The important military role 
that Gabriel Barrios occupied during the post-revolutionary years provided him 
with the opportunity of expanding the deployment of force. Each garrison of 
the 46th. Battalion assumed responsibility for the stability of its area of 
operations. If such garrison are likened to Diaz's network of state governors, 
then the jefes de arenas resemble the jefes politicos as the executive's 
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representatives at the local level, ensuring that stability was maintained and that 
development projects progressed unopposed. 
Where the Barrios model departs from its predecessor, however, is in the 
degree of control exercised by the centre. Barrios' garrisons were regimented 
by a military discipline that forbade officers the freedom of actions which Diaz 
had been obliged to concede to his governors. Barrios' officers were, infact, 
frequently members of his own family and this enabled Barrios to invest a 
measure of trust in his representatives to monitor the actions of jefe de arenas. 
In addition, Barrios' representation at the most local level was far more 
complete than Diaz had been able to achieve. Barrios' local officials were 
municipal presidents, school teachers, and secretaries as often as jefes de armas 
and, in this sense, Barrios' control of the Sierra was more complete that Diaz's 
control of the Republic. 
Greater control bred greater confidence and provided Barrios with more 
scope to adopt a flexible approach in resolving problems. Patronage could be 
given a chance to work before coercion need be considered. Whereas the 
Porfirian peace had often been marred by local rebellion, Barrios' control was 
more complete. The major violent challenges to the Barrios family in the Sierra 
were local versions of national problems: the Delahuertista, Gomista and 
Cristero uprisings. More accurately, however, these violent factional clashes 
reflected a local version of a broader struggle for regional supremacy between 
Barrios and the state governor. In facing this particular challenge, Barrios had 
two major advantages: federal approval and security of tenure. 
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4. Power and Politics in the Sierra: 
Broader implications 
Although military factions periodically challenged the Sonorenses during 
the 1920s, the cessation of more widespread violence and the military support 
lent to the Sonorenses by regional caudillos heralded a period of relative stability 
in federal politics. Such stability, however, eluded the state of Puebla. 
Following the fall of the Carrancista governor, Alfonso Cabrera, in May 1920, 
the governorship changed hands no less than fifteen times in eight years, 
highlighting the inability of either state or federal powers to control the diverse 
local interests. In conservative Puebla City, it would -take some years for 
lingering Carrancismo to fade into obscurity. Meanwhile, Puebla's agrarian 
leaders fought to retain a share of the political power against a fast-emerging 
laborista movement. 
The differing political sympathies of Obregön, Calles and De la Huerta 
further complicated federal government initiatives to impose its authority on 
Puebla politics. Combined with the changing fortunes and divisions between 
local political factions, a stalemate was reached: federal government had no 
influential representative in Puebla to implement its policies, yet nor could the 
various political factions in local government unite sufficiently to sustain a 
credible defence of state autonomy against federal subjugation. Consequently, 
poblano politics drifted in a state of limbo, temporarily affected but rarely 
controlled by the latest political initiative. Within a state where political 
initiatives were as short-lived as the occupancy of the governor's seat, the 
Barrios cacicazgo in the Sierra provided a conspicuous example of stability .' 
In the 1920s, agrarian caudillos on the plains of Puebla drifted in and out 
of political prominence: the Barrios family represented a pillar of strength and 
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stability that proved more resistant. Only when a tidal-wave of federal change 
broke over Puebla during the final years of the decade, was Gabriel Barrios 
swept aside in the way of many before him. This chapter addresses the manner 
in which Barrios was able to retain a position of political significance while 
remaining sufficiently aloof to avoid becoming a casualty of constant change. 
Although his military position theoretically denied him the chance of 
participating in political developments, his role as cacique made political 
involvement imperative. Attention is given to how Barrios maintained this 
delicate balance: how he reassured his military superiors that he was first and 
foremost a loyal federal officer yet was able, simultaneously, to establish a 
political dimension to his cacicazgo that reached both the state and national 
spheres. 
To establish such links was a considerable achievement, yet to maintain 
such contacts while the political convictions of so many others became 
liabilities, suggests that Barrios was either apolitical and without principles. The 
Revolution had propelled many local leaders from obscurity to public 
prominence. Many, like Barrios, had risen due to their ability to harness and 
direct the energies of their fellow campesinos into battle. Some, such as Zapata, 
Villa and Cedillo, achieved national attention: whereas Primo Tapia in 
Michoacan, Manuel Montes and Jose Maria Sanchez in Puebla, made their 
presence felt on a more regional level. All rose to power by leading campesino 
armies in an agrarian crusade, an agrarianism that would leave them stranded 
when federal policies pulled away from such radical reform. Very few of these 
revolutionary leaders retained their power; many lost their lives as well as their 
influence. 
Barrios was different. As discussed in chapter two, the historical 
peculiarities of the Sierra de Puebla provided Barrios with the means to attract a 
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popular military backing without him having to adopt a populist political 
position. Although he led a campesino army, Barrios was far from an agrarian. 
Yet neither were his years as a Carrancista an attempt to lead the Sierra back to 
a former isolation that might shield it from revolutionary change. The result of 
his initiatives in the Sierra provided the Revolution with a practical working 
model at a time when reform remained little more than political rhetoric. Yet 
this reveals the ambiguity within the man and, perhaps, within the region. 
Revolutionary theory was frequently turned into practice in the Sierra by means 
of forced labour: communication improvements that might emancipate the 
campesino from exploitation were constructed by the use of a system of labour 
which relied upon the traditional subservience of the weak. This raises 
questions regarding Barrios' ideological stance. Indeed, did Barrios have any 
guiding principles or was he merely an opportunist adept at utilising each 
political change to his own advantage? This chapter seeks to understand the 
connection between the man and the wider political system; the local and the 
national. An analysis of the relationships between the rural cacique and the 
politicians and city intellectuals will ascertain if any consistency underscored 
Barrios' actions; it will investigate how Barrios dealt with the political 
challenges that threatened his control of the Sierra, and why, after having 
survived many turbulent years, Barrios eventually fell from grace. 
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Puebla State politics in the 1920s 
In his inimitable style, Gruening summarised the malaise that beset 
Puebla politics during the 1920s: 
Since 1920 but for a brief interlude - the administration of the young intellectual Lombardo Toledano - the governorship has been going from worse to still worse: General Jose Maria Sanchez, 'author' of the 
attempted assassination of Morones in the chamber of deputies in 
November 1924, in which affray an innocent bystander of a deputy was 
killed; Froylän Manjarrez, who after looting the state joined the de la 
Huerta rebellion in search of still more loot; Alberto Guerrero, a 
drunkard; Claudio N. Tirado, who stole at least a million pesos by the 
simple device of paying no-one and keeping the state revenues, seeking 
immortality by cutting his name on every new stone erected in the state 
during his term; and General Manuel P. Montes, the agrarian agitator. 2 
Gruening's 'roll of dishonour' offers little evidence that the leaders of the state 
government in Puebla possessed the necessary qualities to convey the region 
from bloody civil war to sustained reconstruction. As in many other states, 
Puebla governments of the 1920s formed a battleground upon which local 
factions and federal authorities vied for political control. Puebla proved 
particularly prone to federal intervention. Its proximity to the national seat of 
power, the incident of rebellion occurring within, or adjacent to its state borders 
and its internal political instability frequently persuaded federal government to 
use its powers under the Constitution. (Appendix III) Given the high incident of 
armed conflict within the state of Puebla, any federal administration that judged 
Puebla to have lost local constitutional order could invoke article 76 of the 
Constitution and impose its own provisional governor. This federal appointee 
would remain in place until stability had been restored and elections could take 
place to reinstate democracy under the terms of the local Constitution. 
Following the flight of the Carrancista government of Governor Alfonso 
Cabrera and the subsequent death of Carranza in May 1920, the federal 
government used its powers to impose a series of provisional governors upon the 
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Puebla people. In July 1920, Luis Sanchez Ponton eventually assumed the task 
of steering the state towards constitutional elections later in the year. 3 The 
federal government's choice of Sanchez Ponton, a former Carrancista, may 
indicate federal uncertainty regarding local reactions to the death of Carranza. 
The subsequent election became a straight contest between two extremes: the 
many surviving Carrancistas rallied around Sanchez Pontön's favourite, Rafael 
Lara Grijales backed by the Partido Liberal Constitucionalista; while Obregön 
barely disguised his preference for the populist agrarian caudillo, Jose Maria 
Sänchez. 4 Continuing federal anxiety about the strength of their support was 
demonstrated by the nullification of the election results, thus avoiding any 
possibility of a Carrancista victory. Claudio N. Tirado was installed as interim 
governor until June 1921 when the time was judged propitious for the federal 
congress to declare Sanchez the electoral victor and constitutional governor of 
Puebla with a four year mandate. 
Obregön's judgement of how far Puebla's politicians could be pushed 
proved lacking. As it became evident that Sanchez was intent on unleashing a 
radical agrarian agenda on his fellow poblanos, those groups who judged such 
reforms to threaten their interests voiced their objections through the state 
congress: a majority of local deputies transferred congressional proceedings to 
the town of San Marcos and withdrew their recognition of Sänchez's executive 
powers. Social and political divisions within Puebla once again threatened to 
draw the region into violent conflict. In March 1922 the federal congress 
moved to impose Froylän C. Manjarrez as governor in order to diffuse the 
growing tension. 5 
In the event, the choice of a De la Huerta supporter as governor only 
compounded the problem: far from providing the basis for peace, the 
appointment of Manjarrez exported federal political disunity into a state that 
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already had enough of its own. The political fortunes of Manjarrez were 
inextricably linked to those of De la Huerta. When it became apparent that De 
la Huerta was being passed over for the presidency, Manjarrez showed little 
hesitation in pledging his support for De la Huerta in the subsequent rebellion. 
While the pre-emptive strike by the federal military commander, General Juan 
Andreu Almazän, prevented Manjarrez from converting the state capital into a 
Delahuerta stronghold, federal control of military affairs proved to be as fragile 
as its grip on Puebla politics. Despite Almazän's move, within the first 
turbulent days of December 1923 the governorship of Puebla passed from 
federal to rebel and back to federal hands as the fortunes of Almazän and rebel 
general, Fortunato Maycotte, moved first one way and then the other. 6 
With Puebla City secured, the federal government reinstated its interim 
governor, Vicente Lombardo Toledano. Toledano retained the post for six 
months, while the Delahuerta threat to the region was virtually extinguished. 
However, the situation in Puebla was far from settled. Toledano's inability to 
govern a state in conflict prompted the federal government to replace him with 
Alberto Guerrero in June 1924 until a elected governor could resume powers at 
the beginning of 1925. 
The ease with which Calles eventually swept to power as president of the 
Republic was not mirrored in the Puebla gubernatorial elections. Of three 
candidates in contention, Luis Sanchez de Cima, Lauro Camarillo and Claudio 
N. Tirado, victory was claimed by the latter two; it was left to the federal 
government eventually to accept the credentials of the Tirado administration. 
The losing candidates represented two increasingly polarised sectors of 
Puebla politics: Camarillo's support was manufactured from a rising laborista 
movement, while Sanchez de Cima's strength was rooted in agrarismo. While 
128 
Tirado strained to contain these extremes his reforms were being influenced by 
political events in Mexico City. Calles' own attempts to rei -n in the wayward, 
less predictable elements of agrarismo were reflected in measures taken by 
Tirado to regulate and decelerate the process of agrarian reform. However, the 
continued weakness of federal authority in Puebla was demonstrated by the fact 
that Tirado's initiatives became marginalised by a more vociferous local battle in 
state congress between laboristas and agraristas. Each side fought the other to a 
standstill, making it almost impossible for any structured reform measures to 
pass through congress. Politically isolated, Tirado became an easier target for 
his many political opponents. When ex-governor Toledano went before the 
federal congress accusing Tirado of unconstitutional actions, the federal 
judiciary upheld his claims and in November 1926, Tirado's removal as 
governor was proposed and accepted. 
Tirado's fall from grace produced an unexpected appointment: federal 
government appeared to revive the flagging state of Puebla's agrarismo by 
naming Manuel Montes as provisional governor.? Rogelio Sanchez Lopez 
examines various possible motives for the appointment of an agrarian leader to 
the governorship of a state where agrarismo was being trounced by laborista 
political interests. 8 He suggests that in choosing Montes, Calles may have 
recognised the fact that the agrarian caudillo enjoyed a level of prestige within 
the state of Puebla that Calles' local supporters would have found hard to 
combat. This being the case, Calles may have been prepared to expose the 
limited agenda and experience of the agraristas by allowing them to fail at 
governing the state. In addition, although Montes was linked to the veracruzano 
agrarian movement that gave rise to the formation of the Liga Nacional 
Campesina, Calles may have perceived him as less committed to the 
organisation than other possible gubernatorial contenders, such as Crisöforo 
Ibanez who had frequently defended the Liga's position. 
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A further point might be added to the motives for choosing Montes. In 
July 1926 Calles began to promulgate reforms designed to limit further the 
power of the Catholic Church. Montes' appointment as governor coincided with 
the first sustained outbreak of violent opposition to these reforms by groups 
loyal to the Church. Given the instability already caused by Obregön's intention 
to seek re-election, and the uncertain reaction of regional caudillos to political 
and religious issues, Calles may have chosen Montes as a military precaution. 
By favouring Montes, Calles might gain the support of his agrarian army if the 
need arose, rather than risk make an enemy who might lend strength to any 
Church-led rebellion. 9 
Whatever the motives for placing Montes as governor, hindsight 
strengthens Sanchez Lopez's thesis. Montes did not display an ability to extend 
beyond his limited agrarian agenda. Indeed, had he possessed such qualities it is 
highly unlikely that an increasingly laborista local government would have 
allowed the agrarian governor the freedom to pursue his policies. By July 1927, 
with the Cristero rebellion largely contained and the state government in 
turmoil, the federal government once again intervened and replaced Montes with 
General Bravo Izquierdo. Bravo Izquierdo retained the post until Leonides 
Andreu Almazän was elected governor in November 1928. It was under 
Almazän's governorship that the Calles-led federal government declared war on 
military caciquismo. In Leonides Andreu Almazan, federal government found a 
governor willing to join forces in the battle to rid Puebla of the local versions of 
what Calles viewed as a national malaise. Barrios' days as military leader of the 
Sierra de Puebla were numbered. 
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Barrios as Carrancista, Barrios as Obregonista 
Although Barrios never held a civilian post, the nature of his rule and 
development projects ensured that he became the focus of attention for those 
with political aspirations in the Sierra. 10 Those serranos with political ambitions 
were faced with two options: either to associate with the cacique and ride 
towards political influence on his coat-tails; or to oppose him, denounce him as 
a cacique and criticise the brutal methods he employed to achieve his objectives. 
Few could afford to ignore the soldier who appeared to shun the political arena. 
As with many other military leaders of the Revolution, Barrios' first 
delicate political manoeuvre was to extricate himself from his position as a 
faithful Carrancista officer and present himself as a dependable supporter of the 
new regime. As discussed in chapter two, the dilemma was made all the more 
acute by the inopportune arrival of the Carranza party on his doorstep. In 
hindsight, Barrios' stance of neutrality, perhaps more accurately described as a 
stance of invisibility, helped to secure his future as an Obregonista. As a result 
of the successful tying up of loose ends in Tlaxcalantongo, Barrios' involuntary 
part in the drama portrayed him as a significant character in the last phase of the 
Aguaprietistas' road to supremacy. 
Barrios' move towards Obregön could be viewed either as the logical 
action of a patriot or an unprincipled opportunist. Yet the complexity of his 
political dilemma was considerably deepened by the personal ties which had 
linked him to the Carrancista cause. As Barrios rose to military prominence in 
the western Sierra, so his prestige in Zacatlän grew. He began to buy property; 
indeed, one of the Barrios residences subsequently became the headquarters of 
the 46th. Battalion. The adjacent block to the headquarters was owned by the 
Cabrera Lobato family, the most prestigious family in Zacatlän. Ties between 
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the two families went beyond neighbourliness as Luis Cabrera and Gabriel 
Barrios were personally bound by compadrazgo. " With Luis Cabrera having 
been Carranza's right hand man since 1914, and his brother, Alfonso, occupying 
the state governorship, from the very beginning of his rise to regional power 
Gabriel Barrios enjoyed personal links with officials in the highest positions in 
both federal and state governments. While Carranza remained in power, these 
connections helped provide the necessary arms and funds for Barrios to establish 
the foundations of a formidable military power base in the Sierra. 
Conversely, when Carranza fell, such close ties with the previous regime 
were a liability. Whether Barrios could ever truly abandon the Carrancista 
cause stimulated considerable speculation. Indeed, if one should believe 
newspaper reports, on 3 May 1920 El Monitor reported the withdrawal of 
Alfonso Cabrera's state government to Zacatlän, where it was said to be 
enjoying the protection of Barrios' men. 12 A week later, the Universal de 
Puebla alleged that Carranza himself was receiving Barrios' protection in the 
Sierra and that the federal administration had supplied the Brigada Serrana with 
'large quantities of arms and ammunition that had been deposited in the 
Sierra' . 13 Even after it became clear that Barrios had sworn allegiance to the 
Obregön administration, suspicion concerning Barrios' true political affiliation 
remained. During the nervous months that preceded Sanchez Pontön's 
governorship, speculation focussed upon the possibility of a Cabrera-led 
rebellion in the Sierra, with Barrios providing the military backing. 
Given such uncertainty, it is all the more curious that Obregön was 
willing to trust Barrios and allow him not only to retain his troops but also to 
remain on his home ground. Certainly, to harness Barrios' knowledge of the 
Sierra, its geography and people would have been a considerable coup for 
Obreg6n. Equally, as suggested by Obregön's military investigator, General 
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Viqueras, these same qualities represented a considerable threat. Yet if Barrios 
were to make a stand, surely the most logical time to do so was when Carranza 
sought his protection. If it was not propitious to defend Carranza then, surely 
the situation would have less favourable after Carranza's death. 
Barrios may have benefited from the pervading uncertainty of the times. 
A strong motive for naming Sanchez Ponton, a former Carrancista, as governor 
was to diffuse Carrancista emotions rather than to represent Obregön's policies. 
So too Barrios may have been chosen to command the Sierra military zone 
because the federal government could not foresee how Barrios and his fellow 
serranos might react if he received orders to disband or withdraw from the 
region. Any violent reaction from Barrios in the Sierra would have been greeted 
positively by Carrancista sympathisers in Puebla City who were predicting and 
waiting for such a move. Conversely, Barrios' public statements had contained 
nothing to suggest to Obregön that his intentions were anything other than to 
lead the Sierra towards a peaceful, progressive future. Obregön had a choice 
between possible stability and the threat of rebellion. An inescapable fact of 
revolutionary life continued to have relevance beyond the death of Carranza: 
military power was inseparable from political might. 
Barrios fortifies his cacicazgo 
Barrios' political significance went beyond purely military 
considerations. The attack against the Marquez brothers in 1917 had eliminated 
their stake in any political debate in the western Sierra. The only surviving 
civilian political interests in the Zacatlän/Tetela area during the Carrancista 
years belonged to those individuals who were in former times incorporated into 
the Lucas cacicazgo. Both Demetrio Santa Fe and Ricardo Marquez Galindo 
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had been faithful supporters of Lucas, and both purveyed the brand of liberal 
ideology for which the Sierra had become famous. 
Upon Lucas' death his son, Abraham, chose to resume a political rather 
than military career, and together with Santa Fe and Marquez Galindo, worked 
closely with Barrios as a representative of the local Partido Liberal. 14 In the 
election campaign following Carranza's death, Lucas and Santa Fe were elected 
as state deputy and suplente for Tetela respectively, for the Partido Liberal 
Independiente which had officially backed the candidacy of Jose Maria Sanchez 
for governor. The party published a programme that stressed loyalty to the 
federal government, a desire to promote regional peace and stability and to 
encourage economic and educational developments within the Sierra. 15 
The links between Barrios' political friends, the Partido Liberal, and the 
party's backing for the candidacy of Jose Maria Sanchez for governor, suggest 
that Barrios acknowledged the realities of political life. The Partido Liberal's 
policies might have corresponded closely to Barrios' vision for the Sierra but 
there is no evidence at this early stage in the cacicazgo that Barrios' political 
interests extended beyond his personal affinity to certain members of the Party. 
Equally, it is hard to believe that Barrios was enthusiastic in the Party's 
endorsement of the candidacy of Sanchez. Certainly, Obregön's candidate, 
Sanchez, an agrarian caudillo from the Llanos, held little political relevance to 
the Sierra, an area free from significant agrarian conflict. There is no evidence 
to suggest that political support for Sanchez was anything more than pragmatic: 
Sanchez and Barrios did not even enjoy any formal dialogue until some months 
after Sänchez's election. 16 In recognising Sanchez, Barrios and the Sierra 
Liberals were not supporting agrarismo, rather they were indicating their 
acceptance of Obregön's authority as legitimate leader of the Revolution. 
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Barrios' constant denials of involvement in suspected plots against the 
federal government appear to be vindicated by his political alignment. Had 
Barrios retained any ideas of reviving Carranza sympathies in the Sierra, one 
would have expected evidence of such a stance through closer political ties with 
Sanchez Ponton and his candidate for the governorship, Lara Grajales. 1' Yet in 
all his actions Barrios demonstrated a loyalty to the federation; an association 
which confirms his pragmatism and opportunism. It should be remembered that 
Barrios' military career hung in the balance, and following recommendations 
made by Brigadier General Viqueras the prospects looked decidedly bleak. It 
was at this delicate moment that Barrios issued personal denials of the 
newspaper articles that claimed links between himself and a suspected Cabrera- 
led plot. This was also the time when Barrios offered Obregön a reduction of 
his forces in order to 'save money for the nation'. Within weeks of making this 
offer, Barrios' political friends in the Sierra swore allegiance to the federal 
government and endorsed its choice of governor. A month later, Barrios 
received confirmation of Obregön's decision to keep him in charge of military 
operations in the Sierra and was promoted to the rank of brigadier general. '8 
The astuteness for which Barrios is commonly remembered was already well 
developed during the early days of his cacicazgo. 
While the Ministry of War was sufficiently convinced of Barrios' 
loyalty, not all observers believed that Barrios could completely abandon a 
Carrancista cause that had become so closely identified with his compadres, the 
Cabrera brothers. Despite Ministry of War assurances, newspaper reports 
continued to speculate that Barrios was on the verge of rebellion. 19 Rather than 
indicating Barrios' importance in determining national political events, these 
doubts more accurately reflected the tension borne from political instability that 
pervaded Puebla City . In more concrete terms, this uncertainty was manifest 
in 
the decision to transfer the state congress to the town of San Marcos and the 
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subsequent refusal of many local deputies to recognise Jose Maria Sanchez as 
governor. 
Among those who opposed Sdnchez's agrarismo, there were many who 
watched in vain for Barrios to make a move in the Sierra. 20 While they may 
have been encouraged by speculation that the former Carrancista commander, 
General Antonio Medina, was poised to rebel in Zacapoaxtla in an attempt to 
arouse the sympathies of other ex-Carrancistas, there is little to suggest that 
Barrios could be counted among their number. Medina, having failed in 
political campaigns, may have felt that he risked little by opposing those in 
power. Unlike his former military commander, however, Barrios had not only 
been able skilfully to make the transition from Carrancista to Obregonista, but 
had also risen to control much of the Sierra with a mandate that Medina must 
have envied. 
Barrios had everything to lose from rebelling against local and federal 
politicians. He could only gain from capitalising on his confirmed position as 
head of military operations in the Sierra. It was now that Barrios began to 
establish the structure for a cacicazgo that would endure for a decade. Many of 
Barrios' jefes de arras were recruited during this period, while the Barrios 
family's hold on municipal politics grew tighter through the expanding network 
of reciprocal arrangements with local officials. It was also a time when Barrios 
began to develop his political connections beyond the Sierra by projecting his 
image as the promoter of revolutionary progress. When Barrios appealed to 
Calles for federal help in the economic reconstruction of the Sierra, he struck a 
chord that reverberated beyond those in the Ministry of War who might 
appreciate the strategic considerations of such improvements. Barrios' approach 
appealed to a wide range of politicians and intellectuals who had talked of 
revolutionary change, but lacked the finance and the social stability to fulfil their 
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dreams. Barrios offered a practical example of the Revolution at work; reform 
that could bring, in theory at least, the benefits of the Revolution to all serranos 
irrespective of colour or creed. 21 
Enemies from within: Political opposition in the Sierra 
Just as rebels such as Salvador Vega Bernal continued to be a thorn in 
the side of Barrios' military supremacy of the Sierra, so opponents mounted a 
spirited challenge to his increasing influence in regional politics. The most 
immediate opposition came from the region which the cacicazgo would later 
consider to be its home territory. Following the death of Juan Francisco Lucas, 
rivalry between Barrios and Tranquilino Quintero, the mestizo officer from 
Cuautempan, polarised into a struggle for overall command of the Brigada 
Serrana. Quintero never did recover from the Ministry of War's preference for 
Barrios as commander and, following a short spell in charge of Carrancista 
troops in Teziutlän, he announced his resignation and intention to follow a 
political career. 
In June 1922 Quintero ran as the Club Independiente "Ignacio Zaragoza" 
candidate for deputy in Tetela. Days later the same club accused Barrios of 
interfering in political affairs to the detriment of opposition candidates. 22 
Quintero was supported by an influential ally, Miguel Lucas, son of Juan 
Francisco. The Lucas brothers obviously perceived the events that followed 
their father's death very differently. Neither was chosen to inherit their father's 
military position, and while Abraham not only accepted the situation but gave 
his political backing to Barrios, Miguel's opposition took the form of lending his 
support to Quintero's military and political ambitions. Ultimately, however, the 
only serious threat to Barrios' rising supremacy in the western Sierra ended with 
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Quintero's death at the hands of Delahuertistas in March 1924.23 Miguel Lucas 
never again overtly displayed his personal objections to Barrios' rise to power. 
Barrios' ambitions, however, stretched beyond the horizons of Tetela and 
Zacatlän. Expansion of the cacicazgo into less familiar territories inevitably 
produced new challenges, and nowhere was this stronger than in the eastern 
Sierra district of Zacapoaxtla. Little is known of the social and economic 
background of Claudio Nabor Tirado, but by 1920 he had obtained sufficient 
prestige in the district to become its federal deputy, the most prominent political 
representative of a Zacapoaxtla faction led by the brothers, Wenceslao and 
Ignacio Macip and their close ally, Rufino A. Landero. At the most local level, 
opposing sides in the ensuing struggle fell into pre-existing bitter divisions 
between families and communities. (The details of this conflict forms the 
subject material for the case study considered in chapter six. ) On a broader 
level, however, these factions were skirmishes in a clash of giants. The 
expansion of Barrios' cacicazgo into the region previously controlled by Tirado 
began a power struggle which had regional and national repercussions. 
Referring to the July 1922 electoral campaign, Tirado sent a letter to the 
Jefe de Operaciones Militares, Puebla, citing a number of instances in which he 
alleged that Barrios and his men had intimidated his political supporters. He 
went on to underline the detrimental effects of Barrios' presence in the Sierra: 
Relating to my political tour of the Central and Southern regions of the 
State, I cannot find sufficient words to praise the conduct of the forces 
commanded by General Elizondo. Unfortunately the same can not be 
said of the North. Here, I felt as though I were entering enemy 
territory in which neither the authority of the President of the Republic 
nor the State governor were recognised. In their place, one finds 
'Gabriel No. 1', the 'senor of Cuacuila' as he is commonly known 
within the region. In voting for candidates of the Cooperatistas, who 
oppose Barrios, the serranos have demonstrated their opposition to his 
tyranny. 
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My purpose for drawing this affair to your attention is purely to satisfy 
my duty to report such irregularities. At the same time I take the 
opportunity of repeating my request to afford the people of the Sierra 
the guarantees that they presently lack. This can only be achieved by 
the replacement of Barrios troops with more honourable federal forces. 
Barrios' irregular army constitutes nothing less than an armed political 
party that, by its very nature, gives it an unfair advantage over all those 
political parties in opposition to their policies. 24 
In a dismissive reply, Barrios suggested to the Jefatura that Tirado's charges 
were completely false and were motivated by his desire to acquire total political 
domination of the region. Barrios challenged Tirado to name a single victim of 
alleged abuses, and in declaring himself to be free from political ambitions 
invited the Ministry of War to send a commission to the Sierra to ascertain the 
true nature of the situation. 25 
This depth of tension between Barrios and Tirado contradicts previously 
held views that the two men sustained a considerable measure of co-operation 
during this period. 26 That a true rivalry did indeed exist is made clear from the 
findings of a Ministry of War investigation in May 1923 which addressed the 
allegations made by Tirado and others. 27 After extensive enquiries, the military 
commission found no substantial evidence to support the complaints lodged by 
the plaintiffs. In his conclusion, General Almazän drew specific attention to the 
labours of the main accusers, deputies Gonzalez and Macip; 
[... ] who had tried particularly hard to collect every account and 
rumour they could find in order to criticise Barrios (even those of co- 
madres). Hearsay was presented as firm evidence without any 
investigation of the origins or the validity of the claims. 28 
In a more detailed section of the report that investigated claims lodged by 
deputy Macip and Rufino Landero, the municipal president of Zacapoaxtla, 
Almazän concluded that none of the charges could be proved. They were based, 
he observed, on a local factional dispute in which Barrios was seen to support a 
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group who dared to challenge the 'political hegemony' enjoyed in Zacapoaxtla 
by the Macip family and their patron, senator Claudio N. Tirado. 29 
If Almazän's assessment is accurate, it is not plausible that only a year 
after this enquiry, Macip and Landero could be construed as Barrios' 
representatives in Congress helping to support Tirado's govemorship. 30 This 
scenario becomes more dubious when one considers the evidence of a bitter 
dispute between Tirado and Barrios only months after the former's appointment 
as governor. In July 1925 Barrios' allies in the Tirado stronghold of 
Zacapoaxtla began sending petitions to the president reporting the destructive 
tactics employed by their political enemies in Zacapoaxtla 'who now occupy 
positions of authority in the state government and are using their power to 
interrupt the road construction project'. 31 
The continuing friction between the two men reached new heights in 
August 1925 when Tirado used his executive powers to replace the ayuntamiento 
of Cuetzalan. Tirado stated that the previous municipal president, Felipe Ortiz, 
had fraudulently taken possession of the ayuntamiento with the help of Jose 
Maria Flores, the local cacique, and Gabriel Barrios. Ortiz, for his part, had 
earlier appealed against Tirado's attempts to replace him, alleging that as 
sanchistas had come to power in the state capital, they were seeking revenge on 
those who had previously opposed them. 32 
Certainly, Flores was fully committed to impeding Tirado's efforts to 
retain his grip on the region. In a letter to Demetrio Barrios in August 1925, 
Flores relayed details of the attacks he and his friends had been launching 
against Tirado in the federal congress. Flores added that a short-list of 
candidates to replace Tirado had already been drawn up, only to be delayed by a 
disagreement between the president and [Gilberto] Valenzuela. 33 In the 
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following months Flores and Ricardo Marquez Galindo continually lobbied the 
president and federal government in order to provoke a favourable response 
regarding the dispute with Tirado. 34 
In August 1926 with Governor Tirado fighting for his political life and 
Barrios proving to be a dangerous enemy, Tirado unleashed one final assault. 
Tirado forwarded to Calles a list of seventeen incidents in which he claimed that 
there was proof of abuses by Barrios against serranos. Tirado accused Barrios 
and his forces of issuing death threats to less compliant local officials and of 
being 'in open rebellion against the State government'. He concluded that since 
the Sierra de Puebla, from Teziutlän to Huauchinango, was under the military 
control of Barrios, the entire region was in danger of following the example of 
Cuetzalan, Zacatlän and Ahuacatlän by turning against the state government. 35 
So extreme were the accusations made against Barrios, that Calles 
ordered an immediate investigation which was conducted by Francisco Heredia 
only a week later. Heredia's report was a damning corroboration of Tirado's 
charges. While some cases were unproved, in relation to the more serious 
charges of violent intimidation of local officials in Zacatlän and Cuetzalan, 
Heredia confirmed that Barrios' men had encouraged a political battle between 
'groups of armed Indians' (obviously referring to the cuerpos voluntarios) and 
groups loyal to the state government. The report concluded: 
It is logical to suppose that, in common with many towns in the 
Republic, the incidents investigated originate from the ambitions of 
different groups within each community who are trying to gain control 
of political and administrative affairs; one formed by the authorities 
that are in harmony with the state government, and the other 
comprising those loyal to General Gabriel Barrios. This individual, 
due to being a native serrano, his military rank and the forces that he 
has at his command, exercises a singular influence throughout the 
Sierra, and it follows that his friends, who can count on his support or 
at least his tolerance, commit abuses when their wishes are not satisfied 
by the civil authorities. 
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This arrangement is the inevitable consequence of a situation in which 
General Gabriel Barrios, a serrano who has controlled his native region 
for many years, has contracted many political and social commitments. 
A compensatory factor for all that which such a state of affairs has 
produced, is that, with the exception of the incidents highlighted by the 
governor of the State of Puebla, the whole of the Sierra enjoys a 
situation of total peace, with complete security for all those using the 
roads within the region. 36 
The report drew particular attention to the recent federal elections, 
suggesting that the tension between the distinct groups had been escalated by 
Barrios' apparent condoning of abuses against authorities loyal to the governor. 
As General Viqueras had commented several years earlier, there were inherent 
dangers in allowing a native serrano to control his home territory for any 
extended period. Heredia suggested that the social and political compromises 
that existed between prominent serranos and Barrios were an inevitable 
consequence of such a situation. Yet Heredia's overall conclusion that the 
majority of the Sierra enjoyed a state of peace and security may have been the 
treasured prize that persuaded both Obregön and Calles to ignore successive 
warnings of the consequences of leaving Barrios in control of the Sierra. 
As a post-script to Heredia's report, Barrios' military commander, 
General Amaya forwarded a covering letter to Calles enclosing Barrios' reply to 
Tirado's charges. Amaya was fully supportive of Barrios and suggested that the 
recent difficulties had been accentuated by the governor's decision to remove 
democratically elected local authorities and replace them with provisional 
municipal councils. Amaya judged this move to be a tactic by Tirado in 
preparation for the forthcoming state elections. In conclusion, Amaya expressed 
his conviction that, 'if all your supporters worked with the loyalty and sincerity 
that senor Tirado displays, then your Supreme Government would be lost and 
the Revolution would fall into the most sorrowful collapse. 37 37 
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Amaya's comments reveal an interesting aspect of the differences 
between Barrios and Tirado. The various skirmishes had the effect of revealing 
those individuals upon whom Barrios could depend. Clearly, Barrios could 
count on successive commanders in Puebla: Almazän had been fully supportive 
of Barrios in the 1923 military investigation; Amaya proved equally resolute in 
the face of Tirado's attack three years later. Beyond the military, Jose Maria 
Flores was in frequent contact with those with political influence in Mexico City 
in his capacity as chief overseer of the federal road building project in 
Zacapoaxtla. The widespread federal encouragement for such schemes and the 
progress that had been achieved made federal officials well-disposed towards 
personal approaches from Flores. 
Within the federal congress, Barrios could rely on another crucial source 
of support. During the height of Barrios' defence against Tirado's charges, 
Constantino Molina, a serrano deputy, expressed his sympathies pledging, 'to 
defend the peacemaking, progressive and patriotic labours of Barrios from their 
mutual enemies in the Sierra'. Constantino Molina, a member of the 
Zacapoaxtla faction that opposed the local Tirado clique, suggested that up to 
fifteen other Puebla deputies were willing to support Barrios in his battle against 
Tirado and were pressing for the setting up of a formal commission that would 
prove Barrios' innocence of Tirado's charges. Molina assured his patron that no 
opportunity to expose the intrigues and political ambitions of Tirado would be 
missed. Molina added that efforts were being made to attract favourable press 
coverage and that a propaganda campaign had already been launched to enable 
the true nature of progress and development in the Sierra to reach a wider 
audience. 38 
As Molina's letter demonstrates, by 1926 Barrios' network of supporters 
had extended far beyond the Sierra. Yet it would be mistaken to draw broader 
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conclusions of Barrios' ambitions from the impressive array of political weapons 
that he possessed. The status of his opponent forced Barrios into employing all 
the means at his disposal to ensure Tirado's fall; Barrios' case against Tirado 
was helped considerably by his allies in the Ministry of War, state and federal 
congresses. It should not be assumed, however, that the strength and intensity 
of Barrios' attack reflected any grand ambition to dominate Puebla state politics. 
Tirado became an enemy, not because Barrios wanted to become governor of 
Puebla, but because Tirado was an obstacle to Barrios' ambitions in the Sierra. 
Similarly, the increased incidence of alleged political interference by Barrios' 
men at elections, merely highlighted his need to be represented in the local 
congress. Whichever group was in power in Puebla City, it could not be 
allowed to jeopardise Barrios' designs on the Sierra. 
Because Barrios demanded absolute control, it was essential that he 
secured his support at the most local level. Ayuntamientos could not be allowed 
to show loyalty towards a state governor whose agenda might contradict Barrios' 
ambitions. This lack of tolerance was most commonly exposed during local 
elections. As has already been established, a system of reciprocity ensured that 
at crucial times Barrios could rely on the obedience of those with influence in 
the serrano communities. As Heredia observed, groups of armed Indians were 
commonly at hand to coerce potentially troublesome local authorities into towing 
the line. Force remained an option for all those who could not be peacefully 
persuaded to pledge loyalty to Barrios. As Tirado complained, those public 
employees who performed their constitutional duties towards the state executive 
were often forced to leave their posts and communities. 
A closer inspection of the details of Tirado's accusations reveals another 
interesting fact. The cases that Tirado produced concerned alleged abuses of 
officials in Villa Juarez, Zacatlän, Zacapoaxtla and Cuetzalan. These abuses 
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related to the battle for control of important regional cabeceras. Serrano 
cabeceras frequently harboured bitter divisions as different factions fought for 
political and economic control. While such conflict identified the dominant 
group with which Barrios might do business, opposing factors represented a 
focal point around which political opposition to the Barrios cacicazgo might 
rally. In a cabecera such as Zacapoaxtla, such opposition found a patron in a 
figure like Tirado; in others settlements, protection lay in the more theoretical, 
and less reliable, guarantees provided under the state Constitution. The regional 
importance of these cabeceras made control of their ayuntamientos vital, and if 
the imposition of secretaries and other officials was insufficient to ensure 
obedience, then the nearby presence of federal troop garrisons was a constant 
reminder of Barrios' ability to use coercion. Yet the use of force was not a 
widespread phenomenon, even in cabeceras. As Heredia underlined, most of 
the Sierra remained peaceful under Barrios. Such stability suggests that Barrios 
had already secured the loyalty of many communities within the region. 
A clear example of the direct connection between local politics and the 
power struggle at state level, is provided by a letter sent to Barrios in October 
1926 from Miguel Manzano, municipal president of Tetela de Ocampo. 
Manzano referred to the cool response that he had received from his efforts to 
establish friendly co-operation with Barrios, and presumed that this was because 
Barrios thought him to be a Tirado supporter. Manzano assured Barrios that 
while he had a constitutional responsibility towards the governor, this did not 
mean that he was an unconditional supporter of Tirado. Indeed, he added, he 
had always spoken in support of Barrios when the occasion arose. 39 
The dilemma for more diligent public officials becomes apparent. While 
Manzano's loyalty lay to the governor in distant Puebla City, his safest option 
was to defer to the cacique who lived at the top of the hill overlooking his town. 
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Some officials in remote settlements far from Barrios' garrisons, or in larger 
towns might opt for loyalty to their governor. Yet given recent precedents, the 
majority of local officials in the Sierra would have judged Barrios more likely to 
survive any given governor. Manzano's loyalty towards Tirado was of little 
comfort, given that Tirado's departure as governor was only weeks away. In 
the light of political changes in Puebla City, Manzano's letter to Barrios is both 
understandable, and provides a clear image of the realities of political life in the 
Sierra under Barrios. 
Broader political considerations 
While Barrios appeared to have won the battle against Tirado, the 
injuries sustained weakened his position in a much broader war. Tirado's 
political connections widened the implications of the dispute to a degree that far 
exceeded the prize at stake. In fighting for strictly limited geographical 
supremacy, Barrios was forced to implicate not only state politicians but federal 
and presidential officials. In attacking Tirado, Barrios had to go to great lengths 
to reassure the president that he was not also challenging federal authority. The 
explicit nature of Tirado's claims that Barrios was declaring a rebellion against 
Puebla's government would have sent alarm bells ringing through the corridors 
of power in Mexico City. The Delahuerta, and later the Serrano, rebellions had 
already made federal authorities highly sensitive to the antics of their military 
officers. It is little wonder, therefore, that Calles reacted so quickly to Tirado's 
charges by sending Heredia to investigate the claims. 
The fact that Heredia largely substantiated Tirado's claims had several 
implications. While the argument that Tirado was an ineffective governor may 
eventually have been accepted, Calles would have noted Barrios' expansionist 
policy in the Sierra with some anxiety. Barrios had rarely been free from 
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controversy, but in Heredia's report, Calles was presented with the first 
independent report confirming the extent of the military cacicazgo in the Sierra 
de Puebla. In addition, Heredia largely contradicted the defence of Barrios 
given by General Amaya, the Jefe de Operaciones Militares in Puebla City. 
Such contradictions must have raised suspicions of the motives of the region's 
most senior federal officer. Finally, in drawing upon all his reserves in Mexico 
City to defeat Tirado, Barrios would have exposed the full extent of his 
network: up to fifteen deputies in congress, favourable national and regional 
press coverage, the support of intellectuals such as Vicente Lombardo Toledano, 
and the backing of the Ministry of War's most senior officer in Puebla. In 
1926, the display of such an armoury may not have caused immediate alarm in 
the Presidency. But the exercise may have marked Barrios' card for future 
consideration. In making his strength count, Barrios may have defeated a lesser 
rival only to create greater enemies in the future. 
Overcoming the Tirado challenge was obviously a major theme during 
the formative years of Barrios' cacicazgo, and the repercussions of the conflict 
in the Sierra reached state and national capitals. Similarly, the political conflicts 
at national and state level were to have effects in the Sierra de Puebla. Barrios' 
ability to respond positively to each had a significant bearing on the strength of 
his tenure as military leader in the Sierra. 
It has already been suggested that Barrios was given the freedom to 
establish his cacicazgo largely due to his unswerving loyalty to the federal 
government during the period of widespread political and military uncertainty 
following the fall of Carranza. The Delahuerta rebellion once again undermined 
the stability of central government and forced military commanders throughout 
the Republic to redefine their loyalties. Generals like Fortunato Maycotte, who 
had enjoyed a position of trust and seniority within the federal army, were found 
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wanting in their adherence to the president; others such as Barrios, about whom 
there persisted significant doubts, showed a loyalty that proved vital. 
Barrios' decision to remain loyal, and the fact that in doing so he found 
himself among the victors, had both military and political implications. During 
the months of the campaign, Barrios and his representative, Ricardo Marquez 
Galindo, maintained frequent contact with both Obregön and Calles. As 
Barrios' loyalty became increasingly apparent at a time when others were 
defecting, the subsequent trust and goodwill that Barrios gained was of 
considerable help in the future. When, for example, accusations of disloyalty 
were made against Barrios' men, their loyalty against Delahuertistas could be 
cited to discredit such claims. The credit that Barrios had earned in the past 
provided him with a period of relative autonomy in his actions in the Sierra, free 
from the scrutiny of his military and political superiors. 
The Delahuerta campaign forged an equally crucial relationship of 
mutual understanding between Barrios and his military superior, General 
Almazän. Barrios had already received strong support from his new superior 
when, in May 1923, Almazän sent a detailed report to Calles exonerating 
Barrios from suspicion regarding charges of abuse and political interference. 4° 
Subsequent correspondence reveals that a friendship quickly developed between 
the two men. The support of the Jefe de Operaciones Militares was a valuable 
acquisition as Almazän acted as a filter to protect Barrios against the attacks of 
others. Any charge presented to the president, the Ministry of War or the 
governor, would eventually be relayed back to the Jefatura in Puebla for further 
investigation. The friendship between Almazän and Barrios, sealed by their 
mutual fight against Delahuertistas, considerably reduced the chances of 
Almazän sending a critical report on Barrios' conduct back to his superiors in 
Mexico City. 
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A letter from Barrios to Ricardo Marquez Galindo, during the height of 
Barrios' fight with Tirado, makes it clear that Barrios regarded Almazän as one 
of his most valuable military and political allies: 
[... ] there is a persistent, widespread rumour that Deputy Enrique 
Hernandez is going to take the place of Tirado. Come what may, it is 
vital that you, and all well-intentioned revolutionary elements, work to 
ensure that the President does not appoint Hernandez. All of us realise 
that if Hernandez were to become governor it would be a disaster for 
the state as he is incapable of uniting the various worthy factions. 
Furthermore, neither he nor his brother, Lindoro, have ever shown 
themselves to be faithful to any cause other than to enrich themselves. 
In this aspect, they are no different from others like Reyes Marquez, 
Francisco Hernandez, Bautista etc.; they are only interested in feeding 
their insatiable ambitions and, consequentially, their influence would be 
even worse than that of Tirado. 
This being the case, it is vital that we find a responsible figure who has 
the capability of governing in unison with the efforts of the sincere 
elements within the state, who can unite the different groups in order to 
reduce the risk of future instability. Suitable candidates include 
generals Bravo Izquierdo, Almazän, Cruz, and civilian politicians such 
as Abraham Lucas, Rue etc.. Any one of these men would be capable 
of providing a leadership upon which both the state and federal 
governments could depend. 41 
This letter reveals Barrios' political consciousness and who he counted among 
his friends and foes. His fears regarding an unsuitable replacement for Tirado 
were not completely unfounded. Sanchez Lopez suggests that Bautista was 
using all his influence to have Enrique Hernandez installed as interim 
governor. 42 Barrios had every reason to stop Hernandez reaching the 
governorship. The Hernandez family, based in Huauchinango, had long been 
military enemies of Barrios, most recently during the Delahuerta rebellion. 
Barrios would justifiably interpret any ascendancy of members of the Hernandez 
family as a threat to his position in the Sierra. Having subdued one threat to his 
authority in the eastern Sierra, he did not wish to see another emerge in the 
North. 
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It is significant too, that Barrios' list of suitable candidates did not 
include the eventual choice, Manuel Montes. This may have reflected his stated 
concern that the appointee should be capable of uniting the various factions 
within Puebla politics. As Montes' period as governor was to demonstrate, 
Barrios might have correctly dismissed Montes as lacking such qualities. A 
further, important factor in Barrios overlooking Montes was the agrarian 
background of the caudillo. Like Bautista, Montes represented a significant 
sector of an agrarian block in state politics pushing for an acceleration of 
agrarian reform. 43 Barrios shared few of the aspirations of the agrarista cause. 
While he may have acted in some ways to improve the prospects of the serrano 
campesino, he did not feel that the granting of individual land plots was the best 
way to achieve such improvements. 
Among Barrios' preferences for the job of governor, previous friendship 
and political cooperation between Barrios and Abraham Lucas made Lucas an 
obvious candidate. Among the military options, General Roberto Cruz is 
interesting: Cruz had taken over from Almazän as the commander of military 
operations in 1924. Barrios obviously had not wasted any time in establishing 
good relations with Cruz; so much so that in November 1924, Cruz was happy 
to confirm to Obregön that he considered Barrios a good friend and an officer 
who had always carried out his duties in a loyal and obedient manner. 44 
Details of Barrios' political links with Bravo Izquierdo are sparse, but it 
is clear that Tirado viewed Bravo Izquierdo as one of his political enemies. 45 
During 1926 Bravo Izquierdo was based at the Ministry of War as head of 
Infantry. He would, therefore, have been in regular contact with Barrios' 
headquarters in Zacatlän and with Ricardo Marquez Galindo who, during these 
years, played a multiple role as political lobbyist, politician and military 
requisitions officer. 46 Certainly by June 1926, Bravo Izquierdo regarded both 
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Barrios and Marquez Galindo as close friends upon whom he could rely to help 
him with the most trivial of personal dilemmas. 4'' 
Beyond indicating his preferences for the governorship, Barrios' letter to 
Marquez Galindo provides a more general impression of how he viewed his own 
political position. While the appointment of a governor other than from his list 
indicated the limits of his political influence, Barrios' letter reveals a deep 
concern for state politics and the belief that he and his political allies were in a 
position to influence the outcome. The letter twice refers to Barrios' desire to 
unite like-minded revolutionary poblanos in the interests of progress. If one 
takes into account the fact that this was a confidential letter between trusted 
friends, then Barrios' expressed desires can not be dismissed as mere rhetoric. 
Yet it is clear from his attitude towards campesinos that his vision of 
revolutionary progress did not encompass the agrarian ideals of Zapata and 
Montes. Barrios was primarily interested in communication and educational 
developments: projects which Tirado's supporters in Zacapoaxtla had tried to 
hamper. 48 Barrios' political drive, therefore, was geared towards ensuring that 
those with influence in Puebla were supportive of his attempts to improve 
communications in the Sierra. At face value, few politicians could have 
afforded to criticise such projects. However, when larger issues were at stake, 
as was the case with Tirado, ways might be found to criticise the impulse and 
manner of such reform while still being seen to be pro-development. Barrios 
was therefore concerned that Tirado was not replaced by someone of the same 
mould. 
Barrios' progressive policies placed him in the contradictory role of 
enlightened cacique. This ambiguity must have forced many to question 
whether the shared desire to bring progress to the Sierra could justify the risk of 
being deemed to support caciquismo. Those such as Abraham Lucas had few 
151 
apparent problems in lending support to Barrios and, indeed, could benefit from 
mutual reciprocation of such support. Before his father's death, Lucas had 
known and liaised with Barrios. Unlike his brother Miguel, Abraham Lucas 
was prepared to yield his father's military influence to Barrios and concentrate 
on his own political future. Together with Marquez Galindo and Demetrio 
Santa Fe, Lucas provided faithful political representation for Barrios throughout 
the 1920s and, as La Opinion pointed out, was by Barrios' side until the final 
moments of the cacicazgo. 49 During these years, Abraham Lucas constantly 
occupied a representative position in state or federal politics, most frequently 
fighting under the banner of Marquez Galindo's Liga Revolucionaria de Puebla. 
During the Carranza years, Lucas clearly identified with the strong liberal 
tendencies in the Sierra. In 1926 Barrios provided financial support for Lucas' 
senatorial campaign, a candidacy endorsed by the Partido Laborista del Estado 
and the federal and state Alianzas de Partidos Socialistas. so 
Such are the convolutions of political alliances, that left-wing politicians 
and regional caciques could be seen to support the same candidate. At various 
points during the 1920s, the political environment forced such accommodations 
for the attainment of common goals. While such an environment existed, 
Barrios attracted the attentions of unlikely bed-fellows; none more so than of the 
revered left-wing intellectual, one of the 'siete sabidos' of the Revolution, and 
one-time governor of Puebla, Vicente Lombardo Toledano. 51 
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The Cacique and the Intellectual 
The paths of Gabriel Barrios and Vicente Lombardo Toledano did not 
cross as a result of any deep seated ideological affinity; rather a coincidence in 
time and space led them into an unlikely alliance which lasted several years 
before their natural differences brought the inevitable rupture. Apart from their 
serrano origins, it is hard to find much in common between the two men: 
Barrios the Indian soldier who chose to live in rural obscurity; Toledano, the 
mestizo intellectual who forsook his native Teziutlän for the stimulating 
environment of the national capital. Sanchez Lopez records Toledano's own 
admission of the inappropriate nature of his governorship of Puebla in December 
1923. While Rome, or to be more exact, parts of Puebla burned, Toledano and 
his intellectual friends set about redirecting the government's energies towards 
educational facilities. This may have saved him from the sharp edge of 
Gruening's pen but, as Toledano later reflected, the poblanos viewed him and 
his government, 'as rare animals, not a government but a Greek tragedy, 
nothing more than intellectuals' . 
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If these reflections suggest that the realities of political life had, albeit 
belatedly, dawned upon the intellectual, the man of letters was a quick learner. 
A further harsh truth was that in order to obtain a political post in the Sierra 
one's chances were greatly enhanced by recognising and employing the 
influence held by Gabriel Barrios. Any distain that Toledano might have felt in 
rubbing shoulders with the Indian general might have been compensated by 
Barrios' proclaimed interest in regional development; a common desire that 
bridged class and culture. Having failed as state governor, intellect and 
ideology could provide little to bolster Toledano's attempts to become federal 
deputy in his home town of Teziutlän in June 1924. Governor Guerrero had 
already replaced all the ayuntamientos named by Toledano with individuals 
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regarded by Toledano as ex-Delahuertistas. Guerrero continued his opposition 
by backing Manuel Villavicencio Toscana to contend the position of deputy in 
Teziutlän, a man described by Toledano as 'an impostor, unknown within the 
state and a political turncoat'. Toledano sought Obregön's protection against a 
travesty of political rights allegedly committed by the opposition, while his 
supporters had 'no weapons for the fight except honour, clarity of ideas and 
hopes for a brighter future for the Republic'. 53 Two weeks after Toledano's 
plea, his defenceless theorists learned that in the tough world of Mexican politics 
during the 1920s there was no substitute for muscle. Obregön began to receive 
correspondence of a different nature: 
Intervention of Barrios forces permitted abuses by laborista elements. 
Stop. Collecting officer pleads protection if forces in excess of those 
needed for peace keeping are not withdrawn. Stop. Forces constitute 
threat to civil liberties. Stop. Ministry [of War] has been contacted, 
request that you do likewise. Stop. Manuel Villavicencio. 54 
While Toledano's appeal to the president, and Barrios' subsequent actions might 
not have been connected, it would not have been beyond the considerable 
intellectual capacity of Toledano to recognise the substantive help that brawn 
could give to brain. According to press reports, the subsequent elections in 
Teziutlän recorded a clear majority in favour of the governor's candidate. The 
report in Excelsior accused Barrios forces of issuing illegal documentation in 
favour of Toledano even though the municipal president had already issued 
credentials to Villavicencio in accordance with the law. 55 
On this occasion, Barrios was unable to get his man elected. Toledano 
accepted a post as an alderman of the ayuntamiento of his preferred 
surroundings of Mexico City. Yet correspondence demonstrates a warm 
friendship between Toledano and Barrios and an acknowledgement by Toledano 
of the usefulness of Barrios' influence in the Sierra. 56 While in Mexico City, 
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Toledano was in regular contact with Barrios' deputies in the federal congress 
and by October 1925, deputy Ricardo Marquez Galindo was pleased to report to 
Demetrio Barrios that the parliamentary block had resolved 'the case of 
Toledano' in a favourable manner and that Toledano would shortly enter the 
chamber. 57 The letter suggests that Barrios' political representatives in the 
federal congress were working for the installation of Toledano within the same, 
a feat which was achieved by the end of 1925. 
The co-operation between Barrios and Toledano reveals a tangled web of 
political intrigue. Barrios may have extended his help to Toledano in 
recognition of their shared desire for progress in the Sierra. 58 Alternatively, 
Barrios' support may have been a move to help Toledano to a position of 
influence in order to strike another vital blow against Claudio Tirado. It would 
appear that Barrios was not the only political enemy within Tirado's sights. On 
more than one occasion, Tirado had complained to Obregön that Toledano had 
instigated a malicious campaign of lies in the national press regarding events in 
Teziutlän. The Sierra town became the battleground in a war of words: Tirado 
was accused of illegal interference in local affairs and obstructing the right of 
unions to organise, while Toledano was, allegedly, mounting a systematic attack 
on state authorities which threatened to disrupt public order. 59 Tirado's 
subsequent move to impose his own ayuntamiento in Teziutlän led to Toledano's 
call for a federal enquiry which, Sanchez Lopez suggests, played a vital part in 
the eventual downfall of the Tirado administration. With Toledano's appeal for 
a federal enquiry fortified by his position as deputy, he had cause to be grateful 
to Barrios' representatives in the federal congress who had helped secure his 
position. For Barrios, the unlikely alliance with the intellectual had provided 
yet another weapon in the armoury against Tirado. 
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The battle against Tirado having been won, a rift emerged between 
Toledano and Barrios. In late 1926, at the climax of the political tussle with 
Tirado, Toledano refuted General Amaya's allegations of military involvement 
in the political affairs of Teziutlän. 60 In 1928, however, Toledano's changing 
sympathies were reflected in an article in La Revista Teziutlän: 
Neither land disputes, commercial competition, interchange of 
products, mass exodus nor frequent individual travel occur in this 
region. Life revolves around the family hut and, as a consequence, the 
horizon of all anxieties lies at the ridge of the nearest hill. Such a land 
will only defeat caciquismo and the perpetuation of barbarism if it 
embraces intellectual and physical stimuli. I 
Months later, Toledano asked the central committee of the Partido Laborista 
Mexicano to lodge complaints before the president and the Ministry of War of 
the victimisation of laborista supporters in Teziutlän by Barrios forces. 62 
Toledano was reflecting a more general change in the political tide. He 
might still advocate the reforms that had previously aligned him with Barrios, 
but had transformed the debate to argue that only by continued reform could the 
caciquismo of people like Barrios be destroyed. Toledano was pursuing a form 
of progress in the Sierra that would afford protection for the campesino and the 
worker: unionisation would stop the exploitative ways of the past and provide 
the fruits of the Revolution to all. Toledano's themes were, of course, echoes 
of a more common trend within the state of Puebla. Montes' gubernatorial 
experiment had failed and Governor Bravo Izquierdo presided over the rising 
prominence of poblano laboristas. 
The political split between Barrios and Toledano was seen most clearly 
by the decision of Marquez Galindo's Liga Revolucionaria to promote its own 
candidate to contest the post of deputy in Teziutlän against Toledano. 63 What is 
less clear is the difference that existed between the Liga's policies and those of 
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its former ally, the laborista Toledano. 'La Voz de la Sierra', the Liga's 
propaganda magazine, graphically portrayed the Liga's doctrine: 
Onboard a transatlantic liner three gentlemen conversed: 
'Without capital, one cannot produce anything', stated the capitalist. 
'Without an army, there is neither respect nor order', added the 
military officer. 
'Without religion, there is no morality', said the priest. 
A passenger in the third class listened to the conversation, smiled and 
regretted that he was not allowed to join in. 
During the night the ship capsized in a terrible storm. The four men 
survived and reached the shores of a deserted island. They cut wood, 
made a fire, built a shelter, gathered fruit and hunted animals. And 
while eating by the fireside, exhausted from the exertions of the day, 
they felt content and looked forward to resting on the pile of dried 
leaves that they had gathered to form a bed. 
Then the third class passenger summarised in five words, what he had 
wanted to say to his companions during their conversation aboard the 
ship: 
'Without work, there is nothing. '64 
The laboristas would have wholly endorsed such sentiments and many 
others professed by the Liga: strict application of constitutional articles 
concerning public/private land ownership, agrarian and labour reform, access to 
public appointments for the lower and middle classes, improved education and 
communications and, above all, respect for civil liberty as the basis of a truly 
effective form of suffrage. Indeed even the Liga's public support for the re- 
election of Obregön was insufficient to alienate the laboristas. With the defeat 
of the Serrano rebellion, Obregön's re-election was a formality. For laboristas 
to retain any semblance of political influence, they too were forced to seek an 
accommodation with Obregön. 
The split between Toledano and Barrios, therefore, was not based on 
major contradictions in stated policies. Toledano abandoned his former patron 
very much for the reasons that he had previously sought an understanding with 
him: political survival. Toledano's ambitions could no longer be served by 
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being seen to endorse the cacique of the Sierra de Puebla. Laborista political 
fortunes reflected the watershed in Mexican politics caused by the assassination 
of Obregön in July 1928. The shock waves of this political earthquake took less 
than two years to reach the Sierra de Puebla and shake the foundations of the 
Barrios cacicazgo. 
The Federal assault on military caciquismo 
In July 1928 Obregön was assassinated. Amid strong suspicion that the 
CROM was implicated in the crime, Morones and other laborista colleagues 
resigned from the Calles administration. Calles himself had become 
increasingly sensitive to the charge that he was a 'bolshevik' president and 
during the previous year had been distancing himself from the laborista 
movement in order to assume a more moderate stance. 65 With the agrarista and 
laborista movements involved in an acrimonious struggle to capture any scrap of 
political influence that remained, Calles began the definitive push towards the 
concentration of political power, a move that would eventually lead to the 
formation of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR). 
This transformation in national politics had an immediate impact in 
Puebla City. General Bravo Izquierdo's long period as governor probably 
reflected the need for a military governor during the Serrano rebellion. But 
Bravo Izquierdo's laborista sympathies made him a useful tool for increasing 
federal control in the state. As Sanchez Lopez points out, Bravo Izquierdo 
struck a fatal blow against the independent spirits of the poblano agraristas: 
Montes was killed and land reform virtually ended. Reflecting the ascendancy 
of laboristas in Puebla, and actively backed by Morones and Calles, Bravo 
Izquierdo encouraged the development of the newly formed Confederaciön 
Sindicato de Obreros y Campesinos del Estado de Puebla. However, when 
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Calles moved to distance himself from laborista policies, the laborista 
movement in Puebla was forced to react. This had serious military and political 
implications for the Barrios cacicazgo in the Sierra. 
A noticeable feature of the June 1928 federal elections in the Sierra was 
the response to complaints regarding Barrios troops' political intimidation in 
support of Liga Revolucionaria candidates. Even though the governorship was 
occupied by Bravo Izquierdo, both the governor and the Jefe de Operaciones 
Militares, General Almada, regularly warned Barrios to keep his troops out of 
politics. 66 A change had taken place at the Jefatura in Puebla, who normally 
would have defended their commander in the Sierra. Barrios increasingly 
received orders instructing him to desist from actions likely to cause complaint. 
Almada's contrasting attitude to those of past military chiefs, reflected a new 
political climate: a climate in which efforts to bring the army under central 
government control were beginning to work. Although the October 1927 
Serrano rebellion had reminded central government that the task was not yet 
complete, the failure of the rebellion to attract greater support confirmed that the 
reforms were moving in the right direction. 
Although Barrios had always been ostensibly centralist in his loyalties to 
the federal government, developments were now taking place to call Barrios' 
bluff. Barrios began to face demands of loyalty that encroached upon his 
limited autonomy. Even before Obregön's assassination, the underlying trend 
towards centralisation had forced Barrios to show his true colours and make a 
more independent political stand. This scenario explains the rumour which 
circulated in the Sierra during the Spring of 1928 that Barrios was likely to bid 
for the governorship later that year. Speculation in the national press provoked 
a letter of encouragement from Miguel Andreu Almazän, who sent Barrios his 
congratulations and pledged his support in the forthcoming campaign. 67 
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(Presumably the possibility of his brother, Leonides, also standing for the 
governorship had not yet emerged. ) The widespread nature of the rumour and 
the absence of any swift denial by Barrios, suggests Barrios was testing the 
water in order to judge the strength of support. In the event, Barrios' chances 
of success were few: his development initiatives might attract considerable 
encouragement within the Sierra, but he would fmd it hard to obtain significant 
support beyond the region. Additionally, correspondence and the Liga's own 
propaganda firmly identified Barrios as a re-electionist. Obregön's assassination 
in July 1928 left Barrios isolated in a political arena once again occupied by 
Calles. Rather than risk public humiliation, Barrios decided to mask his 
political stance by putting Ricardo Marquez Galindo forward as his 
gubernatorial candidate. 
Barrios' political isolation became evident in September 1928 in Calles' 
speech before the federal congress. Ostensibly aimed at destroying speculation 
that he might retain the presidency, Calles used the opportunity to publicise to 
the nation the government's determination to rid the country of rule by local 
caudillos. In Puebla, this policy had already resulted in the deaths of both 
Montes and Barbosa: attention was now focussed on the cacique of the Sierra. 68 
Post-revolutionary caudillismo thrived upon the weakness of central 
authority. Barrios' cacicazgo in the Sierra was not unique. Where it does 
demand attention, however, is in the disproportionate degree of autonomy that 
Barrios possessed. In other states, Barrios might have expected his control of 
the Sierra to be dependent upon loyalty to a regional caudillo; someone like 
Cedillo who eventually assumed the executive powers of San Luis Potosi. Yet 
the unusual political circumstances in Puebla City helped to fashion the nature of 
Barrios' cacicazgo. Puebla was unlike Tlaxcala, where the federal government 
dominated local policies. Nor was it like other states where regional caudillos 
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had sufficient authority to impose their political will upon local caciques. The 
political vacuum in Puebla City provided Barrios with the freedom to arrange 
serrano politics in a manner most likely to favour his broader objectives. Yet 
with his political ambitions limited to the Sierra, Barrios was never able to 
benefit from the independent source of finances available to those regional 
caudillos who controlled the state government. Barrios' principal restraint, 
therefore, was the need to demonstrate loyalty to his military superiors in 
Mexico City. Their continued patronage was vital in providing Barrios with the 
financial and material support needed to match his political ambitions in the 
Sierra. 
Although Gabriel Barrios never displayed a strong interest in taking 
control of the state government, the direct relationship between his autonomy in 
the Sierra and the power vacuum in Puebla City made it imperative that he take 
a keen interest in the local congress. In this respect, the governorship of 
Claudio Tirado posed a threat that the neither Jose Maria Sanchez and Manuel 
Montes presented. While the military capacity of the agrarian caudillos was 
greater than anything Tirado could muster, their objectives were concentrated 
upon agrarian issues on the altiplano. Tirades sphere of political influence, 
however, clashed directly with Barrios' designs on the Sierra. Strengthened by 
his position as governor, Tirado was encouraged to do what no other politician 
had yet attempted; to take on the cacique from Cuacuila. In repelling Tirado's 
initiative and pushing state political authority back to the altiplano, Barrios was 
obliged to draw upon his considerable federal connections. 
Political circumstances in Puebla City contrived to present Gabriel 
Barrios with the opportunity of dealing directly with his political superiors in 
Mexico City. This gained him access to a quality of federal connections rarely 
enjoyed by local caciques who, more often than not, were subject to the 
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authority of regional caudillos. These links enabled Barrios and his political 
representatives more effectively to promote and defend the policies that he 
sought to adopt in the Sierra. While such a visible stance eventually made 
Barrios an obvious target when the vacuum in Puebla politics had been filled, 
while the period of uncertainty remained, his high profile enabled Barrios to 
broaden his appeal to the federal government. He was not only a loyal military 
officer, but a regional leader of considerable political value. The extent of his 
non-military utility to the Revolution is considered in the following chapter. 
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The Puebla paper reported on the struggle for power in Zacapoaxtla between an 
ayuntamiento imposed by governor Tirado, and one previously installed by the interim 
governor, Toledano. Wenceslao Macip clarified his own position in the dispute and 
stated that Barrios was continuing his antics of old by using his troops to interfere in 
political affairs. These are hardly the words of a Barrios supporter. 
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Flores' claim was supported by a telegramme set to Barrios from Teodoro Rosas, 
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Report dated 1 Sept. 1926 from Francisco Heredia to Calles. 
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Memorandum dated 2 Sept. 1926 from Amaya to Calles. 
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General Juan Andr6u Almazän took over as Jefe de Operaciones Militares, Puebla on 1 
Jan. 1923. 
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167 
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In answer to an enquiry sent to Cruz, provoked by complaints that Barrios was 
impeding agrarian reform, Cruz replied to Calles that Barrios was not involved in a 
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vecinos of Teziutlän claiming political interference by Barrios' troops. Barrios was 
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AGN, O-C, 427-B-1. 
On 24 Feb. 1928 representatives of the Partidos "Plutarco Elias Calles" and the 
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Confederaciön was Jos6 Maria Sanchez, agrarista and ex-governor of Puebla. ) 
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Elpidio Barrios (Barrios' half-brother) attempting forcibly to install an electoral 
commission that would confirm the selection of Barrios candidates. The ayuntamiento 
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5. Enlightened Cacique or Political Opportunist? 
Cuacuila, the natal village of the Barrios brothers, enjoys commanding 
views in all directions of wooded mountain slopes. Only infrequently is this 
scene interrupted by the rising smoke of fires, revealing the existence of other 
small settlements lost within the Sierra. These are connected to Cuacuila, and 
Cuacuila with yet more villages beyond, by the same tracks that serranos have 
used for centuries to make journeys to the weekly markets of Tetela or Zacatlän. 
A more recently forged road makes it possible for robust vehicles to reach 
Cuacuila in good weather. Frequent heavy rainfall, however, causes landslides 
which wrest Cuacuila, and a hundred other Sierra villages, back to a former way 
of life; a life that could have almost existed during the days of the Revolution 
when Gabriel Barrios began his rise to regional supremacy. 
Almost, but not quite: telegraph lines follow the contours of mountain 
slopes, connecting Cuacuila to the outside world. Just below the small clearing 
that serves as Cuacuila's public square, a school provides board and education 
for hundreds of children from the surrounding communities. Below, in the 
valleys that dissect this region of mountains, the rains no longer impede the 
passage of time. The federal government's Solidaridad campaign ensures a 
weekly supply of voluntary labour to maintain the drainage and irrigation 
channels which regulate erratic rainfall and ensure decent land for cultivation. 
Transport links allow local crops to reach a wider market than in the past. From 
the valley-head town of Tetela de Ocampo, a paved road leads to Chignahuapan, 
Zacatlän and beyond, allowing both produce and economic migrants to make the 
four hour trip to regional and national capitals with unprecedented ease. The 
stimulus behind this and other projects which opened large areas of the Sierra to 
the twentieth century, lay with one man; Gabriel Barrios, the 'indito' from the 
small village on the hill. 
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As in other aspects, the issue of regional development again provokes 
comparison between Gabriel Barrios and his predecessor, Juan Francisco Lucas. 
As a prominent local businessman, Lucas was keen to develop communication 
links within the region and actively encouraged the construction of bridges, 
paths and schools, particularly in his native municipality of Xochiapulco. 
Ambitious plans to link the altiplano to the sierra caliente were drawn up but 
came to nothing. Lack of government investment, compounded by the 
inadequacy of private and municipal funds meant that many proposals remained 
on the drawing board. In sharing and elaborating his predecessor's interests in 
economic development, Gabriel Barrios acted in harmony with the prevailing 
political environment. During the 1920s, but particularly under the presidency 
of Calles, the federal government created and funded various agencies designed 
to repair and improve the economic infrastructure of the nation. By pre-empting 
such federal initiatives, Barrios was in a strong position to argue the case for 
federal support when competition for limited government resources became 
intense. His success in attracting such funds facilitated the extension of his 
network of clients, as it was he who decided which municipal authorities would 
be favoured with federal resources. 
In the cabeceras, the commercial bourgeoisie was particularly sensitive to 
any plans that the cacique might propose. Their anxiety was not related merely 
to the consequences of such projects to their trade. For Barrios to bring major 
construction projects to fruition, he needed access to the labour force every bit 
as complete as he had enjoyed in relation to military recruitment. In certain 
areas, particularly the district of Zacapoaxtla, local elites who had traditionally 
controlled access to labour, viewed such projects as yet another example of 
Barrios' attempts to determine every aspect of serrano life. As will be argued in 
the following chapter, this aspect of the development programme went to the 
heart of regional power broking and fostered bitter conflict. Community leaders 
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were forced to decide whether their future interests were best served by co- 
operating or opposing Barrios' latest foray into spheres of influence previously 
monopolised by themselves. 
For a while, Barrios' developmental initiatives made him something of a 
local revolutionary hero. Yet the enduring image of Barrios is that of a 
tyrannical cacique who abused his position to favour his family and friends. 
Certainly, there is no shortage of accusations to confirm this view of Barrios, 
yet is this picture accurate or distorted by political expediency? The efficiency 
and sustained energy that Barrios displayed in bringing his projects to fruition, 
suggests that he genuinely wished to improve the life of the campesino. This 
chapter explores the motives behind Barrios' interest in progress. Was there any 
correlation between Barrios' reform and broader political considerations? How 
was progress perceived and how can it be measured? In this predominantly 
Indian region, was the vision of progress of the city reformer shared by Nahua 
and Totonac campesinos? 
An analysis of the motives and methods of Barrios' development policies 
in the Sierra reveals much about his cacicazgo: the nature and scope of its 
relationship with powers beyond the Sierra; how the cacicazgo developed the 
resources both to retain firm control and to extend its influence; how these 
projects fostered opposition from groups with diverse interests, whose only 
common ground was their shared determination to stop the Barrios family's 
relentless quest for regional domination. 
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Distributing spoils in post-revolutionary Mexico 
Calls for national reconciliation and reconstruction were nothing new in 
revolutionary Mexico. Successive dominant factions hoped that their tenure in 
power would lead to a normalisation of national politics and enable them to 
model society in the form they thought best. Alvaro Obregön was no exception: 
In consideration of the fact that the armed struggle to free the country 
from the most ignominious of impositions has triumphed, and the 
director having been brought before the law, in order swiftly to 
establish law and order, it is a priority that all those countrymen who 
so spontaneously offered their services to the struggle should return to 
their peacetime activities. Included in their numbers should be the 
Defensas Sociales, who have given a great example of morality and 
patriotism by their unswerving loyalty to the cause. In recognition of 
which, military commanders and forces under their command will 
receive orders to issue certificates to each patriot so that he might 
forever possess a reminder of his honourable role in satisfying his 
rights and duties. ' 
Yet it would take more than a certificate on the wall to satisfy the raised 
expectations of the Mexican people. As Obregön's message highlights, success 
in meeting these aspirations depended upon establishing peace and stability. 
Economic necessity and suspicions regarding the fidelity of military leaders 
provoked a massive federal programme of military demobilisation. Yet, far 
from being a solution, demobilisation threatened to leave many loose cannons 
free to roll on deck. Vanquished and victors alike needed to be reassured as 
they laid down their arms. Moreover, the Constitution made many promises: 
land to those who needed it; protection and rights for industrial workers and a 
host of individual guarantees under a system of government which would be, in 
all aspects, democratic. To convince Mexicans that the Revolution had not 
deserted them, the federal government placed great emphasis on reaching and 
shaping the minds of the ordinary people. Propaganda and education were 
employed to foster a sense of national pride and to announce the dawning of a 
new era for a country that had suffered so much in the past. 2 
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Turning rhetoric into tangible results proved to be beyond the purse of 
both federal and state governments. In 1920, Mexico's foreign debt had risen to 
1000 million pesos and the economy had become increasingly reliant upon U. S. 
markets and loans from U. S. banks. 3 With the economic infrastructure of many 
regions severely damaged and surviving transport routes open to widespread 
banditry, Mexico was in a poor condition to create the wealth needed to sustain 
national redevelopment. Although the boom in oil prices did much to rescue the 
Mexican economy from total collapse, the U. S. government's refusal to 
recognise Obregön's administration, the danger of U. S. intervention, and the 
need to begin repaying the foreign debt, all combined to ensure that budgetary 
policy was moderate and prudent. 4 As a result, although the government 
recognised the need to rebuild the economic infrastructure, much needed 
projects were left still-born or stunted through inadequate investment. 
Even when projects were implemented, there remained the thorny issue 
of overall authority. Federal road projects might link national centres of 
economic importance, but unless the state government could accompany such 
constructions with funding for tributary communications, the majority of 
Mexicans would remain marginalised. Overt pressure from the federal 
government upon the states to co-operate in such projects risked the accusation 
of federal encroachment upon state sovereignty. Similarly, federal education, 
one of the areas of real progress during the Obregön administration, followed a 
path across the same minefield. Mary Kay Vaughan shows how the primary 
responsibility for education fell upon individual states. Yet if federal finances 
had reduced to a trickle, in many cases state resources had long run dry. Aware 
of state sensibilities, Jose Vasconcelos, as head of the newly created Secretaria 
de Educaciön Püblica, was called upon to use all his persuasive powers to 
convince state governments that the Ministry was not seeking to eclipse their 
educative role 5 
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National reconstruction, therefore, was fraught with local implications: 
measures to improve the economic infrastructure were tied by social and 
political considerations. Projects of national importance called for unity and co- 
ordination. In Puebla, where an absence of local political direction was 
aggravated by friction between federal and state administrations, the impulse for 
progress was, at best, sporadic and more commonly non-existent. A measure of 
what could be achieved, however, was found in the Sierra where the region's 
inhabitants enjoyed the political and social stability absent elsewhere. This very 
stability enabled the Sierra to witness a regional development programme 
unrivalled in the rest of the state. 
The Aftermath of the Revolution in the Sierra 
Topography has always been a deterrent to modem communications in 
the Sierra. 6 While it was technically simple to run rail and road routes across 
the plains, once they reached the foothills of the Sierra, the flow of 
communications suffered stenosis. Around the edges of the Sierra, at Honey, 
Beristain, Zaragoza and Chignahuapan, rail-tracks reached the end of the line. 
Similarly, federal roads connecting Mexico City and Puebla City to 
Chignahuapan petered out as the routes began to penetrate the Sierra. Mules 
replaced trucks and railway wagons as the means of transport and during the 
Revolution, using the narrow mountain tracks often exposed travellers to 
banditry. Telegraph lines that linked cabeceras and other important 
communities fell victim to repeated acts of sabotage, as opposing revolutionary 
forces sought to neutralise the tactical advantages that communications 
provided. 7 
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Semblances of normal life did continue throughout the Revolution, 
though not without difficulty. Cabeceras experienced great problems collecting 
local taxes from recalcitrant communities, an indication of the lack of respect 
for local authority fostered by the disruption of civil war. In the district of 
Tetela, lack of community co-operation was apparent in various ways. While 
the local authorities had managed to keep almost all of its schools open during 
the Revolution, the fact that only 788 out of a total of 2547 registered school 
children attended these schools in 1919, indicated considerable resistance on the 
part of parents. Equally, the poor state of repair of the municipality's 
thoroughfares suggested a breakdown in community consensus. The municipal 
president reported that vecinos refused to resume the practice of faenas, arguing 
that the Constitution now protected them from performing such duties. With no 
funds to pay for either materials or labour, he warned that local authorities were 
struggling to keep thoroughfares open. 8 
Local authorities throughout the Sierra experienced similar difficulties in 
gaining the co-operation of vecinos in projects of common benefit. 9 As the 
municipal president of Tetela de Ocampo reported, resistance came from a 
population which had been fed on a political diet of civil liberties and equality 
before the law. Many had made personal sacrifices in a struggle which, they 
were told, aimed to uphold and respect their rights under the Constitution. Once 
the Revolution was over, objections arose concerning the reimposition of 
onerous tasks that impinged upon these constitutional guarantees. Such 
sentiments may have been a symptom of the frustration felt by a serrano 
population finding it difficult to accept a post-revolutionary reality in which little 
material change had occurred and where paths still needed to be maintained. 
This dilemma was exacerbated by a lack of state finance. In December 
1919, the Cabrera administration in Puebla City issued a circular to all local 
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authorities urging them to improve communications deemed essential to regional 
economic recovery. To encourage the initiative, the state appointed an Inspector 
of Roads to collate data regarding the condition of Puebla's roads and 
thoroughfares. Days after the circular had been issued, the Tetela authorities 
received a letter from the state government expressing regret that, due to lack of 
funds, construction of a path linking Tetela to Totutla would have to be 
postponed. Until the financial situation improved, the municipal president was 
urged to encourage the vecinos of his area to lend their voluntary support 
towards the maintenance of paths. 10 
If friction existed between serrano citizens, particularly over the issue of 
faenas, the region was generally blessed by peace with regards to the labour and 
agrarian conflict. Pastor Rouaix noted in 1920: 
[... ] The Sierra Norte del Estado finds itself in exceptional 
circumstances: there is no agrarian problem within the region and the 
conditions of the workers differ completely from those of the rest of the 
State since one can observe a large measure of economic independence 
[... ]. ii 
Apart from small-scale mining operations in Tetela and Teziutlän, there were no 
other industrial activities, while the basis of the economic independence among 
campesinos was explained by Miguel Lucas: 
In this municipality and, perhaps, throughout the Sierra Norte de 
Puebla, the agrarian problem which has served as a revolutionary 
banner for the people of other regions, does not exist. Here, there are 
no large estates, there are no enemies of the small holder, this is 
because in the past, whenever possible, the land has been divided and 
granted to serranos in small plots. Here in the Sierra, virtually all 
heads of families own their own plot of land which, if they tend it 
carefully, will provide them with sufficient for the needs of themselves 
and their families. If they are poor it is because they produce no more 
than is strictly necessary to survive. 12 
While Barrios remained within the Sierra, he was never forced to take 
sides on the agrarian issue. The situation changed when the cacicazgo outgrew 
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its region of origin and pushed out onto the altiplano. Barrios' own response to 
the agrarian issue and the degree to which he was implicated in pre-existing 
local agrarian frictions will be analysed later in the chapter. At this point, it is 
important merely to indicate that no matter what other hurdles Barrios had to 
confront, he was unlikely to be distracted by any appreciable agrarian conflict. 
Communication improvements in the Sierra 
Given the extent of the financial problems and the prevailing lack of 
respect for civil authority, 1920 was not a propitious time to launch an 
ambitious programme of regional regeneration in the Sierra. Yet it was at this 
precise moment that Barrios made his first move towards the establishment of a 
development programme which would earn national acclaim. 
The problems experienced by local authorities in getting vecinos to 
maintain and improve communication routes did not mean that the Sierra lacked 
men of vision who shared Barrios' desire to make the region more accessible. 
Both commercial and ideological considerations encouraged local figures to fight 
against the seeming lethargy of their fellow serranos. Yet the threat of change 
provoked opposition from a variety of sources. The most articulate in voicing 
their objections were the leaders of mestizo communities who, despite the 
revolutionary turmoil, had retained their monopoly of local trade and saw 
Barrios' plans as a direct threat. As will be discussed more fully in the next 
chapter, the elite of Zacapoaxtla had feared that a nearby federal road project 
would marginalise their town's trade. Since colonial times, Zacapoaxtla had 
flourished as a commercial intermediary between serrano communities and the 
outside world. With no economic resource of its own, a road further into the 
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Sierra threatened to rob Zacapoaxtia of its life-blood as the central Sierra's main 
market town. 
In combating such opposition, there were two main lines of attack. One 
relied upon Barrios' considerable potential to coerce reticent serranos and 
reward more pliable individuals. The second took the form of a propaganda 
crusade against the 'ignorance and isolation that had prolonged the suffering and 
exploitation of serrano campesinos'. This second line of attack was extremely 
important. All progressive revolutionary forces - politicians, intellectuals and 
academics were summoned to a war to reverse economic stagnation and 
vanquish the forces of reaction and tradition. Those who opposed Barrios would 
have to find a means of sidestepping the inevitable accusation of being counter- 
revolutionary. Once recruited, the 'good men of progress' who backed Barrios' 
initiatives lent legitimacy to his other available options; the use of coercion and 
patronage. 
From the early stages of Barrios' economic development programme in 
the Sierra, he was able to rely upon the support and counsel of his loyal friend, 
and local intellectual, Demetrio Santa Fe. Santa Fe's influence has already been 
noted: Barrios' network of jefes de armas had been modelled in part on Santa 
Fe's thoughts on the responsibilities and duties of civil guards. Santa Fe had 
expressed his deep concern regarding the lawlessness and low morale of his 
fellow serranos in a letter to Abraham Lucas in July 1917 and placed much hope 
upon the state government's promise to promote, 'agriculture, roads, schools, 
bread, trade, and liberty [from] contribution' . 
13 As projects were introduced, 
other serrano intellectuals joined Santa Fe's efforts to prevent the forces of 
progress being deflected from their mission by 'unscrupulous individuals who 
wished to prolong the exploitation of their fellow serranos'. 14 
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If there was no shortage of mestizo men of progress within the Sierra, 
the question arises why an Indian soldier with faltering Spanish succeeded where 
more eloquent intellectuals failed? Nothing in Gabriel Barrios' past had 
suggested an interest in regional development: his family were, first and 
foremost, farmers who made a living from supplying local markets with horses 
and agricultural produce. It was only during the early years of his military 
career that Barrios became concerned with communications, appreciating that an 
army with first-hand knowledge of well-maintained mountain paths could use 
them to gain a vital edge over their opponents. 15 It is this military aspect of 
communications, perhaps, which made Barrios' demands more compelling than 
the pleadings of civilians such as Santa Fe. In an atmosphere of revolutionary 
turmoil, measures to improve military efficiency proved particularly persuasive. 
The full extent of Barrios' contribution towards the Sierra's 
communications network was evident in a federal government report compiled a 
decade later. The report provided details of the results of collaboration between 
the 46th. Battalion and the Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Obras Püblicas 
(SCOP): 
1) Completion of National Highway from Mexico to Tuxpan. (via 
Tulancingo-Beristain-Huauchinango-Necaxa-Villa Jaürez-Agua Fria- 
Tuxpan) 
2) Partial completion of National Highway from Mexico to Tecolutla. 
(via Apan, Hidalgo-Atotonilco-Chignahuapan-Tenango-Huehuetla- 
Coxquihuia-El Espinal-Papantla-Tecolutla) 
3) Partial completion of National Highway from Mexico to Tecolutla. 
(via Chignahuapan-Aquixtla-Tetela de Ocampo-Huahuaxtla to Apulco, 
where it joined the Oriental to Tecolutla road) 
4) Partial completion of National Highway from Oriental to Tecolutla. 
(via Oriental-Libres-Zaragoza-Zacapoaxtla-Apulco-Papantla-Tecolutla) 
5) Partial completion of National Highway from Oriental to Nautla. 
(via Oyamales-Teziutlän-Martinez de la Torre-Jicaltepec-Nautla) 
6) Trans-Sierra State Highway from Tulancingo to Jalapa, Veracruz. 
(via Tulancingo-Zacatlän-Chiýnahuapan-Tetela de Ocampo-Huahuaxtla- 
Zaragoza-Tlatlauquitepec-Tezmtlän-Perote-Jalapa) 
7) State Highway from Aquixtla to Cuyuaco. 
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Total distance accessible by car - over 1000 km. Cost of road projects - $46,000. 
The 46th. Battalion has helped to erect over 2000 km of telephone 
lines. There are over 500 offices within the Sierra, meaning that every 
significant community in the region is in contact with the outside 
world. 16 
In understanding why Barrios was successful in attracting federal 
sponsorship, one must recall that Obregön had allowed Barrios to remain in the 
Sierra for one prime reason; to stabilise and control the region and return it to 
peaceful civilian life. As Barrios' superior officers assured the Ministry of War, 
the proposed projects were: 
[... ] Of military urgency, since the most severe disadvantages that the 
troops encountered in their recent campaign, were due to the poor state 
of the thoroug hfares, where the infantry were forced to discard their 
boots after only one day's walking and where horses were useless in all 
but the shortest reconnaissance trips. 17 
While the threat of rebellion fluctuated throughout the 1920s, the underlying 
atmosphere of instability remained a vital additional lever to prise funds from 
federal coffers. 18 Just as the Sierra's location had contributed towards its 
political significance during the nineteenth century, it was essential that this 
strategically important region of the state of Puebla should remain as stable as 
possible during the uncertain years that followed the Revolution. 
The sources of such instability were never far away. During Carranza's 
presidency, various Villista groups had threatened the government's hold over 
the Sierra and these same groups continued to cause problems under Obregön's 
administration. In many cases indistinguishable from the highway bandits that 
plagued the Sierra, Villistas-turned-Delahuertistas preyed upon commercial 
transport routes throughout the mountainous region and the tierra cdlida of 
Veracruz. By 1923 Obregön was convinced both of the merit of the security 
argument and of Barrios' fidelity. While formerly loyal officers turned to the 
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Delahuertistas, taking valuable federal supplies with them, Obregön hastened to 
send Barrios telecommunications equipment of considerable strategic value. 
Obregön could only hope that such a display of faith would bind the cacique 
even more closely to the regime. 19 
If security considerations had persuaded military authorities of the 
validity of Barrios' argument for communication improvements, unique 
economic considerations provided serrano politicians with equally compelling 
reasons for supporting such initiatives. A closer look at the plans adopted by the 
federal government reveals a common phenomenon: all five national road 
projects in the Sierra during the 1920s proposed to link the Sierra to the coast. 
More specifically, they sought to establish the most direct routes from the 
altiplano to the oil-fields on the northern Veracruz coastline. With alternative 
routes requiring lengthy detours, the economic spot-light was focussed upon the 
Sierra. The Sierra de Puebla route considerably reduced the trip between the 
most important centres of political power and economic potential. Barrios 
spared no effort in affirming the region's ability to accept and profit from its 
unique role in this task of national importance: 
The area of the Sierra Norte de Puebla [... ] is rich in all kinds of 
produce as a result of its humid climate. Given its proximity to the 
most important oil-fields in the country, the Sierra is destined to reap 
considerable commercial benefits. The roads, that are being supported 
with great local enthusiasm, will be ofogreat utility, linking the Central 
Plains to the Gulf coast via the Sierra. 2 
Once the economic importance of the Sierra road building projects had 
been recognised, this consideration fed into the broader argument regarding the 
relationship between peace-keeping and improved mobility. Given the economic 
importance of the oil-fields, they represented a vulnerable target for any group 
wishing to destabilise the federal government. The ability of Barrios' battalion 
to descend from the Sierra to provide additional protection for such instillations 
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merely strengthened the argument that Sierra communication improvements 
deserved moral and material support from the federal government. 
The prospect of an economic bonanza in the Sierra was warmly greeted 
by successive impoverished state governments. The development proposals in 
the Sierra captured the attention of regional newspapers and they were in no 
doubt where the responsibility lay for ensuring that Barrios received sufficient 
support. An editorial in El Monitor stated that if it was agreed that such projects 
would produce commercial and financial benefits for the state of Puebla, then it 
was incumbent upon those who stood to benefit most from such projects to foot 
the bill. The paper suggested that half of the costs should be found from 
government finances and the other half shared between the road user, the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Centre for Mexican Industry. 21 
There is little evidence to suggest that the state government and Puebla City 
business interests ever responded positively to such pressure. Indeed, when 
Tirado assumed the governorship, he did everything he could to impede Barrios' 
plans for the Sierra. However, Tirado was careful not to criticise the road 
building projects directly, only the manner in which Barrios and his troops 
conducted such projects. He could not afford to be cast as a politician who 
blocked the kind of initiatives that his federal patrons were keen to promote. 
Tirado's line of attack is significant in that he, and later Toledano, pointed to 
excessive faenas as a symbol of the abuses of the Barrios cacicazgo. Whether or 
not such criticisms were fair, the use of faenas was a major political issue. 
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Faenas: Forced Labour or Solidaridad? 
Even if the prospect of regional stability and economic growth were 
insufficient to convince the authorities that Barrios' plans were worthy of special 
consideration, an additional factor was almost certain to swing the decision in 
his favour. El Monitor had spoken in general terms of the widespread 
enthusiasm for such projects. Two years later, the military report that arrived 
on Obregön's desk was less ambiguous: 
Given the overwhelming enthusiasm with which the Serrano 
communities are willing to construct these roads, I judge that it would 
be necessary for the Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Obras Püblicas to 
provide nothing more than technical advice and equipment. 
Furthermore, much of this equipment already exists in the Sierra, 
having been provided for road construction projects that were 
subsequently suspended "22 
The inference of this report, and one that Barrios did much to encourage, was 
that these vitally important projects could be completed without incurring 
excessive costs. Past projects had failed, primarily, due to lack of finance. 
With minimal capital outlay, Barrios was offering to turn his mastery of 
communications for military purposes towards civil construction projects. His 
fundamental philosophy was self-help. As the economic and social benefits of 
road projects would reach all serranos, it was incumbent upon all serranos to 
work together and reap common reward from common toil. The vital elements 
of co-ordination and administration that serranos lacked, following the demise of 
state and municipal government authority, would be provided by Barrios' 
military organisation. 
The obvious counter-argument to Barrios' presumption of the enthusiasm 
of his fellow serranos, was repeatedly expressed by Tirado, and decisively stated 
by Toledano at the Puebla Labour Conference in 1928. Barrios was not 
harnessing the voluntary will of the people, they alleged, but was merely 
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manipulating the tradition of faenas to impose a system of forced labour 
throughout the Sierra. Yet, this intellectual who waxed lyrical about desecrated 
pre-Columbian traditions to a receptive Labour Conference, was the same 
Toledano who, several years earlier, had been anxious to associate with the 
cacique. Then, Toledano had acknowledged Barrios' resourcefulness and had 
heaped praise upon initiatives which, he assured, would bring benefits to all 
serranos. 
The inescapable fact was that, given the importance of the projects 
proposed, neither government nor left-wing intellectuals were too concerned 
about the minor details of labour recruitment. While labour reform may have 
been on the political agenda in the cities, in the early 1920s few questioned too 
deeply the voluntary status of the custom of faenas in the Sierra. Indeed, on 
more than one occasion, Obregön was able to take refuge in the very ambiguity 
of this ancient institution: 
According to our Constitution, no-one is obliged to give their personal 
services without fair payment; but, in my role as President, it is my 
duty to foster within people a sense in which they might wish to give 
their spontaneous co-operation, expressed through modest quotas of 
work, towards projects of public interest and collective benefit. 23 
It is clear that the attraction of low labour costs was sufficient to sap the political 
will of those who purported to uphold the spirit of the Constitution. On more 
than one occasion, Barrios was accused of defrauding the government by 
pocketing funds allocated for wages and using faenas to complete the same 
tasks. However, internal government reports show that authorities had already 
assumed the use of faenas in assessing the total costs of the developments, and 
there is no evidence to suggest that government funds expended upon the 
projects bore a significant element of labour cost. 
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The burning question, however, was how Barrios could capture the 
alleged enthusiasm for development when so many local authorities had failed? 
Certainly, many communities had continued to organise themselves in order to 
maintain local paths, but the prospect of returning to a system of regular faenas 
was greeted with mixed feelings. The number of documented cases where 
communities tried to resist Barrios' efforts to reimpose regular faenas is small. 
As will be discussed in the following chapter, the only evidence of sustained 
opposition to faenas came from the district of Zacapoaxtla, where evidence 
suggests that this was due more to political rivalries rather than community 
obstinacy. In other regions, evidence of resistance is erratic, lacking any 
discernible pattern. In May 1924, for example, local authorities in Hueytentan 
asked the municipal president in Tetela de Ocampo for advise on how to proceed 
against individuals who refused to do faenas or pay the consequent fine. 24 In 
March 1926, the local judge in Tlatempa, Zacatlän asked Demetrio Barrios to 
send five soldiers to ensure that certain vecinos honoured their faena 
commitments. 25 Resistance to faenas generally involved individuals or small 
groups rather than entire communities. 
Reasons for resisting faenas varied. Some communities, like the barrio 
of Yautetelco, Xochiapulco, complained against excessive faenas. They accused 
the local judge of demanding that each of them carry large stone the distance of 
one kilometre to the site of a bridge construction. Each person was to make five 
trips a day and unlike the customary weekly faenas, the judge insisted that these 
tasks be performed on several days of the week. 26 Others objected on 
constitutional grounds, like Rivera Marquez, an opposition candidate in local 
elections in the community of Coyutla. He was accused of having stood outside 
the municipal palace and shouted: 'I wish to help the poor people [of Coyutla] 
and they should know that faenas no longer exist as they are prohibited by the 
law. '27 Yet the evidence suggests that few communities sustained the type of 
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argument that Marquez put forward, the majority eventually recognising the 
need to maintain local paths. Many of the objections related to faenas for road 
construction projects that were located up to a day's walk from their homes. 
They argued that such projects were of no benefit to them and were constructed 
to satisfy the interests of the traders through whose towns the road would pass. 
This objection raises the largely subjective issue of the nature of benefits 
derived from regional communications development. For Barrios the issue 
seemed clear. Improved transport gave all serranos the indirect benefit of 
increased trade outlets for locally grown produce. The counter-argument was 
that the benefits from communication improvements went no further than the 
mestizo trader in the cabeceras who acted as an exploitative intermediary 
between producer and lucrative markets. Whichever argument held the most 
merit, and this depended from one locality to another, road constructions forced 
Indian communities to re-evaluate their cultural, social and economic links with 
the mestizo world beyond. 
Anthropological studies confirm that many Indian communities possessed 
the ability to adapt their culture to make allowances for the changing 
circumstances that surrounded them. In the district of Zacapoaxtla, individual 
families and entire communities strengthened their economic position by 
forming special ties, of compadrazgo for instance, with particular mestizos in 
the cabecera. 28 Given that such arrangements were possible, Barrios' argument 
that all serranos stood to gain from better communications clearly had some 
merit. New roads, through improving the commerce of a cabecera, would 
facilitate a reciprocation of benefits between mestizo and Indian. 
In other communities, such as Eloxochitlän, (Zacatlän), research reveals 
a much less harmonious reaction to perceived forces of change. Any degree of 
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external interference was seen as a threat to the very culture that helped to unite 
the community. 29 Yet there is no evidence that the vecinos of Eloxochitlän ever 
resisted faena demands, even though the national highway project from Mexico 
City to Tuxpan passed near to their village. Indeed, the low incident of 
opposition to faenas throughout the 1920s suggests that Barrios was able to 
reach some form of compromise with serrano communities which ensured faena 
compliance while not impinging upon community authority to an extent that 
might provoke a more widespread reaction. In the following chapter, evidence 
from the district of Zacapoaxtla suggests that Gabriel Barrios' Indian 
background may have provided him with the understanding needed to reach this 
compromise. 
Cultural considerations aside, the criticism that Barrios' use of faenas 
was tantamount to exploitation of the weak was clearly a sensitive issue in post- 
revolutionary Mexico. Traditionally, faenas had been an obligation placed upon 
poorer serranos, who almost inevitably tended to be Indians. The reintroduction 
of faenas produced an awkward dilemma: if such obligations were seen to be 
restricted to certain ethnic and social groups, it would be even more difficult for 
the federal government to sidestep constitutional objections. 
Partly to resolve this dilemma, Barrios took great care to demonstrate 
that faenas were the obligation of all serranos, irrespective of class or colour; an 
approach which sat more comfortably within the constitutional framework. 
Barrios accepted the logic that, given the common benefit to all serranos, it was 
only fair that all serranos should do faenas. This opinion had been expressed by 
Barrios' adviser, Demetrio Santa Fe, as early as 1913: 
Without delay, [the jefes politicos] should abolish the unjust custom of Topiles that is common in Indian villages, and force local authorities to 
replace it with a service which will incorporate all members of a 
community irrespective of race or social class 30 
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While it would be too extreme to suggest that master and servant worked 
side by side in solidarity, it does appear that a large measure of success was 
obtained in ensuring that all serranos were seen to be contributing towards the 
community effort. In the case of traders and other individuals whose businesses 
would have been harmed by faena attendance, a system of fines was imposed to 
pay a labourer to do the absentee's quota of work. Not infrequently, wealthier 
members of a community were persuaded to make additional contributions of 
money and materials to sustain the local effort. 
Faena obligations called for no wholesale inversion of the social order. 
More prominent members of a community would be assigned supervisory roles, 
while in other cases, servants would take the place of their employer. Yet even 
these demands were enough to foster resentment among local elites. Those who 
objected to the cacique's demands were frequently the same groups who counted 
among Barrios' political opponents. Added to their number were the various 
rural communities who, for one reason or another, found Barrios' demands 
unacceptable. In Zacapoaxtla, this led to an unholy alliance between Indian and 
mestizos with nothing in common but their opposition to Barrios. 
Bearing in mind the popularity of Barrios' development initiatives among 
federal and state governments, objections to his projects had to be couched in 
terms that would not be interpreted as anti-progressive. Like Tirado, opponents 
to the road projects tended to concentrate more upon the excessive brutality used 
by Barrios' forces to ensure compliance with faena duties, rather than the faenas 
themselves. Official responses to these frequent charges provide an accurate 
indicator of the varying fortunes of the cacicazgo. While Barrios remained in 
favour, accusations of abuses would fall upon deaf ears: when Barrios was 
ousted, these same allegations were used as a prime factor in his removal. 
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While the presence of Barrios' men during faenas attracted much 
criticism, the benefits outweighed such considerations. The need to ensure 
fairness and full compliance with faena duties provided Barrios with an innocent 
facade behind which he could expand his military jurisdiction. Civil 
engineering on the scale undertaken in the Sierra called for a massive 
organisation of human and physical resources. For as long as these endeavours 
were hampered by community intransigence, political agitation and the threat of 
attack by bandits, it was essential that security be provided. In the earlier days 
of the cacicazgo, and periodically throughout the 1920s, Barrios' federal forces 
were deployed to assume such duties. As the network of cuerpos voluntarios 
grew, jefes de armas assumed local responsibility for the operation of nearby 
projects. Whether by using federal troops or cuerpos voluntarios, Barrios' 
military potential was able to extend beyond the Sierra in the name of 
revolutionary progress. In this way, detachments of the 46th. Battalion operated 
in regions beyond their military jurisdiction, crossing state frontiers at will. 
Barrios was thus able to expand the cacicazgo without arousing the suspicions of 
anyone other than those local opposition groups who saw their own influence 
eclipsed. 
There was, however, a risk attached to Barrios' expansionist methods. 
As the road-building projects expanded, so Barrios became less able to control 
the cacicazgo with reliable, disciplined forces. In order to keep pace with the 
swift geographic expansion of the cacicazgo, compromises were made in the 
recruitment of cuerpos voluntarios. While road and telecommunication links 
helped Barrios keep abreast of local developments, the strict discipline that 
Barrios infused among his federal troops was more difficult to maintain further 
afield. Nonetheless, Barrios remained answerable for the actions of these 
groups and this provided a soft under-belly which political opponents could 
attack. The inevitable tension that occasionally arose as jefes de arenas strove to 
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ensure faena compliance was a rallying point for all those opposed to Barrios' 
rule. Accusations ranged from rough man-handling, false imprisonment and 
intimidation, to the widescale lynching of those who refused to comply with 
faena demands. Accounts of the hanging of intransigents are, almost certainly, 
over-stated: coercion usually took a less extreme form. Yet, the possibility 
existed that jefes de armas might commit atrocities that, for example, related to 
factional disputes rather than resistance to faenas. Rivera Marquez of Coyutla, 
who it will be remembered had sought to make political capital by declaring 
faenas to be illegal, was later arrested by local officials accompanied by 15 men 
from the local cuerpo voluntario. While being conducted to the proper 
authorities, 'he gave resistance and was killed in the resultant struggle'. 31 The 
ley fuga appeared to operate efficiently in ridding the Sierra of political rivals. 
Despite the rapid geographic expansion of communications under 
Barrios, the economic optimism with which his initiatives had been greeted 
disappeared with his removal from the region. Lacking a dominant driving 
force for change, much of the Sierra became marginalised. Under the auspices 
of the Avila Camacho family, government investment was diverted towards the 
eastern Sierra. The road link between the state capital and the Veracruz coast 
was shifted to pass through the Avila Camacho home district of Teziutlän; the 
surveyed and excavated routes that had promised so much in the past were 
allowed to deteriorate to the point of disuse. Only in more recent times have 
Barrios' roads been re-adopted by the federal government, helping to give a 
boost to places like Cuetzalan, now a prospering tourist centre. 
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Campesinos and Agrarian Reform 
Despite the rapid expansion of the road network in the 1920s, the Sierra 
failed to display the expected economic diversification. Although mining in the 
Sierra retained its historical presence, it never became a major economic 
consideration. The mines did, however, prove to have political values; 
following the 1928 disaster at La Aurora copper mine in Teziutldn which 
claimed the lives of over 100 men, the local mining unions, backed by 
Lombardo Toledano, launched strong protests against dangerous working 
conditions. Accusing Barrios of siding with the mine owners, Toledano found 
popular backing for his portrayal of Barrios as anti-union, and an exploiter of 
the serrano. 32 The prospect of renewed foreign investment in mining faded 
when a North American consortium decided that the control Barrios and 
Abraham Lucas enjoyed over the Sierra made profitable investment unlikely. 
The consortium's objections probably had as much to do with the fact that Lucas 
was a competitor in the mining industry as with the form of regional control that 
Barrios possessed. 33 Thus, the regional economy remained as it had always 
been, based upon commerce and agriculture. 
Barrios was well qualified to appreciate the needs of the serrano 
campesino. Despite his flourishing military career, he remained, first and 
foremost, an Indian ranchero with a lifetime of experience in the rearing of 
livestock and an awareness of the special challenges presented by the climate 
and soils of the Sierra. 
Guided by his philosophy of self-help, Barrios put pressure on local 
communities to organise projects that would alleviate some of the indignities of 
subsistence living. His approach was simple: road construction efforts had 
identified and stimulated the more ambitious sectors of a given community. 
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Barrios used this enthusiasm as a catalyst for continued public works, such as 
irrigation, canalisation of drinking water and the laying of sewerage pipes. 
Local neighbourhood committees were set up to co-ordinate plans, petition for 
government support, and to ensure successful completion of the projects. 
Although Barrios rarely become personally involved in these schemes, few 
committees failed to seek his moral as well as material support. As the road 
construction project passed through Libres, for example, the newly formed 
'Libres Committee for Sanitation' proposed to make Barrios honorary secretary 
in recognition of his efforts in encouraging the provision of local water supplies 
and sewerage systems. No doubt the committee's motives were partly swayed 
by the desire to harness the practical help of a man who, two years earlier, had 
been able to use his connections in the federal congress to secure $5000 for a 
similar project in the Tetela area. 34 
Not surprisingly, perhaps, the most ambitious irrigation project of its 
kind took place in the valleys below Barrios' home village, Cuacuila. As early 
as 1917, a blue-print for irrigation and the provision of drinking water had been 
adopted. As local military commander, Barrios organised the construction of an 
aqueduct to convey water from the Barranca Fria to Tetela de Ocampo and 
outlying communities. The costs of the materials were provided by Barrios, 
Demetrio Santa Fe and the Tetela local authority, while faenas were organised 
to provide labour. 35 In the years that followed, a more ambitious project was 
undertaken. During the construction of the Chignahuapan to Tetela de Ocampo 
road, Barrios set his troops to work on an irrigation canal that would eventually 
improve the agricultural potential of the whole area. 
In a truly outstanding feat of civil engineering, Barrios' federal troops 
were lowered over the side of the precipitous canyon where, suspended by 
ropes, they began the arduous task of cutting a water channel into the rock face. 
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Faeneros later took over the excavations, several losing their lives before the 
task was completed. The successful conclusion of the project transformed the 
agricultural potential of the Tetela region. Light soils, that seasonally suffered 
weather erosion, were converted into land where planned cultivation based upon 
controlled irrigation could be sustained. Campesinos obtained a measure of 
protection from the vagaries of the Sierra climate that, in the past, had caused 
true hardship. 36 
The fact that Barrios owned a considerable amount of land in these 
valleys invites the observation that such projects were personally motivated; 
measures designed to boost the value of his property. Yet, as Miguel Lucas had 
pointed in 1919, the Tetela region was characterised by small holdings. Much 
of the land formerly held by the descendants of Juan Francisco Lucas and Juan 
N. Mendez had been divided and sold to employees and neighbours; Barrios and 
his brothers were among the many purchasers. 37 Agricultural improvement for 
Barrios, meant agricultural improvement for all his neighbours. 38 
In another development, following a personal plea to Obregön, Barrios 
was able to acquire 100 ploughs from the federal government. In line with the 
revolutionary desire for all campesinos to play their part in rebuilding the 
fortunes of the Republic, the donation was given, as Obregön stated, 'as a small 
gift from the nation'. 39 A gift from the nation, perhaps, but no lucky recipient 
of a plough was in any doubt that it was Barrios who had obtained the gift and it 
was Barrios who held the final decision regarding who should benefit. Many of 
the grateful recipients were those who had seen improvements in their land as a 
result of the recent irrigation project. 
Other initiatives followed. In August 1925, Ubalde Barrios, a cousin 
and serving officer of the Barrios brothers, joined forces with the jefe de arenas 
197 
in Villa Juarez in organising a community project to convert a discarded ranch 
into a self-sufficient rural community. A junta agrIcola was formed and faenas 
were used to bring the project to a successful conclusion. 40 With the 
cooperation of the Direcciön General de Agricultura y Ganaderia, Barrios 
promoted initiatives to improve farming techniques within the Sierra and used 
his network of jefes de armas to establish forestry brigades throughout the 
region. In Libres, the local Uniön de Obreros y Campesinos was fully 
supportive of a proposal by Barrios that faenas should be used to renovate and 
repair the property of local ejidal and neighbouring farm land. 4' 
Again reflecting the federal government's desire to establish a stable 
agricultural base, Barrios launched an initiative that altered the Sierra landscape. 
Passing through the Sierra today, it is noticeable that wherever one sees a rural 
domestic property, a small orchard is rarely far away. In order to supplement 
the serrano diet, Barrios impressed upon his fellow campesinos the need to plant 
fruit trees. Excess produce was sold or bartered at local markets to provide a 
valuable addition to a family's income. Ayuntamientos took up the challenge: 
in Libres directives were issued that all households should, without fail, plant a 
minimum of five fruit trees within a period of ten days. 42 For his part, Barrios 
rarely lost the opportunity of emphasising the abundant agricultural potential of 
the Sierra. Barrios' representatives in Mexico City delivered numerous boxes of 
locally produced apples, oranges, and fruit juice to the president and senior 
military and political officers. 43 As late as 1930, just weeks before the 
battalion's removal from the Sierra, Demetrio Barrios attended local committee 
meetings near Zacatlän to develop co-operative agricultural projects that would 
raise funds for local education and the implementation of improved farming 
techniques. 44 
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In light of this range of initiatives aimed at improving the life of the 
campesino, it appears strange that Barrios should be portrayed as the 
campesino's enemy. That Barrios was aware of this image is evident from his 
instruction to Ricardo Marquez Galindo that he should go to the Comisiön 
Nacional Agraria, 'in order to dispel the bad feeling that our enemies have 
created'. 45 Despite his initiatives to help the campesino, many of the complaints 
against Barrios troops, especially in the later years of his time in the Sierra, 
were voiced by local and regional representatives of agrarian commissions. 
Barrios' support for agrarian improvement, yet apparent hostility to 
agrarian reform, leaves open the possibility that he was not the enemy of the 
campesino, only of the agrarista. Even though Barrios had personally benefited 
from the subdivision of larger estates, Jose Maria Barrios believes that his 
father's anti-agrarianism was due to a belief that such divisions left the 
campesino with an inadequate amount of poor quality land with which to support 
his family. Barrios thought that this led to a more, not less, vulnerable and 
dependent campesino population. Following this argument through, the reform 
measures promoted by Barrios could be seen as an attempt to defray some of the 
negative side-effects of well intentioned land reform; to make the serrano 
campesino as independent as possible, given that the Sierra had already been 
divided into small, poor quality plots of land. 
Barrios' sons also suggest a political motive for their father's anti- 
agrarian stance. They state that their father believed that the local agrarian 
commission, far from being the friend of the campesino, was interested solely in 
the accumulation of power and influence. With local committees wielding the 
power to grant and take away ejido land, Barrios believed that agrarian reform 
was in danger of creating a nation of local caciques whose influence depended 
upon the patronage of regional and federal agrarian commissions. In this light, 
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Barrios' anti-agrarian stance could be seen in much the same way as his clashes 
with Tirado and local rival factions: a struggle for regional domination. 
Given the pre-existing composition of land tenure in much of the Sierra, 
Barrios' views on land reform were not an immediate bone of contention. 
Beyond the Sierra, however, surviving haciendas became a focal point for local 
discontent. Inevitably, Barrios became embroiled in these localised disputes 
once his influence encroached upon the areas in question. 
Judging Barrios' actions against agraristas is complicated by the dual 
role that he was expected to play. As local military commander of a region with 
no effective civilian law enforcement, Barrios was obliged to intervene in 
agrarian friction in order to keep regional stability. On more than one occasion, 
his military superiors ordered him to take action to quell what was seen as an 
agrarian rebellion. 46 Such intervention often resulted in a compromise that 
pleased no-one and that portrayed Barrios as the main offender. Yet, on these 
occasions, it is difficult to isolate the extent to which Barrios was acting to 
further his personal ambitions of regional domination, rather than merely 
following the orders of his superiors. The possibility cannot be discounted that 
criticism against Barrios was often a case of shooting the messenger of anti- 
agrarian federal policies. 
Three prominent cases reveal the complexity of Barrios' role in such 
disputes. The first real agrarista challenge to confront Barrios occurred at the 
hacienda of Palos Caidos y La Pefluela, some twenty kilometres to the north of 
Zacatlän. As early as 1923, friction had been reported between the hacienda 
owner and local vecinos. By October 1924 the dispute had become more 
formalised, with vecinos lodging land petitions to the local agrarian 
commission. 47 In December of the same year, following claims that agraristas 
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in the area had led an armed attack against the labourers on a nearby farm, 
Barrios moved to disarm and arrest the agrarian leaders of Palos Caidos. In his 
official report on the incident, Barrios noted that although the culprits were in 
possession of land, they refused to work it and instead relied upon the 
manufacture of pulque to provide them with an income. Their idleness, Barrios 
suggested, was the source of their trouble making. 48 
Barrios' comments appear to confirm observations on his more general 
attitude towards agraristas. Jose Maria Barrios believes that his father's actions 
were swayed by a deep conviction that only by toil could an individual 
appreciate the prize at stake. Presumably refusing to recognise the agrarian 
element of the Revolution as a legitimate struggle, the perceived idleness of the 
Palos Caidos agraristas would have further strengthened Barrios in his 
conviction that land grants could never foster campesino independence. For the 
agraristas of Palos Caidos, the d', e had been cast: in future years, they accused 
Barrios' troops of periodic intimidation, eviction and of replacing their members 
with his own supporters. The latest report of such an incident was sent to the 
president in September 1933, over three years after Barrios' forces had been 
transferred to Mexico City. 49 
The practical difficulties that Barrios had in controlling his jefes de 
arenas in more remote reaches of his cacicazgo make it difficult to ascertain 
whether alleged abuses were the result of Barrios' own directives or the actions 
of undisciplined representatives. The events surrounding the death of Ramon 
Arellano in the municipality of Tepeyahualco (Libres) provide a well 
documented example. Arellano, a local trader and leader of an armed group 
said to be 'voluntarios de 46/o. Regimiento', first received broader attention in 
July 1927 when the local agrarian committee accused him of having attacked 
and killed members of a civilian peace-keeping force during a local fiesta. The 
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committee alleged that the attack was only one example of the violence to which 
Arellano had subjected the community. The committee implored both the 
Ministry of War and the Jefatura to remove Arellano from the area. In a 
subsequent military report, the 46th. Battalion's garrison in Libres absolved 
Arellano of any blame stating that the violence was caused by a group of 20 
drunks who had become uncontrollable and had attacked the police. 50 Arellano 
remained in charge of the cuerpo voluntario. 
By November 1927 the agrarian committee had placed its grievances 
before the president. Instead of suppressing rebel activity, they claimed that 
Arellano was concentrating his efforts on intimidating agraristas within the 
community. Demetrio Barrios replied to the Jefatura that the accusations were 
untrue and were politically motivated. sl In February 1928 agraristas in 
Tepeyahualco repeated their charges against Arellano before the Secretaria de 
Gobernaciön. This time they broadened their attack by suggesting that Barrios 
was personally responsible for a campaign of violence and murder against 
agraristas in their region. 52 Further accusations against Arellano appeared in 
1928, yet the next investigation was of a much different nature. In June 1929 
judicial authorities opened an enquiry into the murder of Arellano, who was 
ambushed on a road near Tepeyahualco. 53 No-one was ever convicted of the 
crime. 
Not until the removal of Barrios' troops from the Sierra did a full 
judicial enquiry investigate the wide range of accusations lodged against 
Arellano and Barrios. The findings of the enquiry are interesting: the cases 
against Barrios were not proved, while the blame for all atrocities was placed 
upon the dead, and legally unrepresented, Arellano. 54 Was Barrios still able to 
count on a certain amount of protection from federal authorities, or was he 
indeed, unable to control the actions of some of his jefe de arnws? The degree 
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to which either applies is hard to determine. What is more certain, however, is 
that as far as his jefes de arenas were concerned, discipline was an entirely 
internal matter. In private communiques Barrios might warn, even replace, his 
jefes de arenas for abuses of power, but in public, they could confidently expect 
to receive the full backing of the Barrios family. 
These hearings took place in 1932 and were indicative of a state 
government attack on Barrios' reputation following his removal from the Sierra. 
It should be remembered that a year later, Palos Caidos agraristas would claim 
continued abuses by Barrios troops. Barrios' emphatic denial of these latest 
charges and his suggestion that competent authorities set up a commission to 
investigate them, appears a little extreme given that his troops had been re- 
deployed to Mexico City three and a half years earlier. This apparent over- 
reaction, however, betrayed a man under pressure. The claims by agraristas in 
Palos Caidos came at a time when more serious allegations were being 
investigated concerning alleged atrocities by Barrios' men on the rancherias of 
El Paredön and Corral Blanco, some sixty kilometres to the south of Palos 
Caidos. 
Barrios' involvement in the area began when he rented land on El 
Paredön and Corral Blanco. Hans Werner Tobler suggests that this tenancy was 
a device through which the owner hoped to limit the damaged caused by 
agrarian reform. 55 Land on El Paredön had already been given to agraristas and 
by October 1925, local agrarian leaders were already claiming their members to 
be victims of abuses committed by the hacienda owner and troops belonging to 
Barrios. In a clear example of the strength of support that Barrios then enjoyed 
with his superiors, General Almazän responded to the complaints by ordering a 
detachment of Barrios' own forces to police the situation, arguing that these 
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were the only federal forces in the area and that he could vouch for their high 
reputation. 56 
Further land grants were made in the area in 1928, and an uneasy truce 
appears to have lasted until Barrios' removal from the Sierra in May 1930. Two 
years later, the Puebla City daily, La Opinion, reported the killing of a 
campesino on El Paredön. The murder was alleged to have been committed by 
Barrios' cousin, Dario Barrios who, far from accompanying the battalion to 
Mexico City, was reported to have occupied the ranch together with a group of 
armed men. 57 Subsequent investigations appear to have been ineffective, and 
during the following year agrarian representatives accused Barrios troops of 
similar atrocities. The tension culminated in November 1933 when, according 
to La Opinion, an armed gang belonging to Barrios carried out a massacre of 
innocent campesinos in nearby Corral Blanco. 58 Barrios informed his superiors 
that all allegations were false and that the officers accused in the article and 
subsequent allegations had 'always been garrisoned at their headquarters in San 
Joaquin, Mexico City'. It must have been quite awkward for Barrios to explain 
how a military investigation, in February 1934, encountered Lieutenant Dario 
Barrios and two sergeants still in possession of the hacienda. Dario Barrios 
insisted that he and his men had been acting under orders from the Ministry of 
War and that only recently had these orders been superseded by others recalling 
them to Mexico City. 59 
The events at Corral Blanco represented the nearest Barrios came to 
falling foul of his military superiors. If he had not directly disobeyed orders he 
had, at the very least, disguised the true details of troop deployment at El 
Paredön. A more penetrating investigation of Barrios' insubordination was 
avoided by the immediate re-deployment of the 46th. Battalion to Chiapas. 
There is no indication whether the battalion's transfer to Chiapas was directly 
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related to the controversy in Puebla. However, the fact that Barrios' transfer to 
Mexico had not neutralised his influence in the Sierra de Puebla would not have 
been lost on those who made the decision to send the battalion to five years of 
internal exile in Chiapas. 
How can one summarise Barrios' attitude towards the campesino? His 
actions appear to have been contradictory, yet Jose Maria Barrios provides one 
constant thread to help understand his father's stance. If one accepts the son's 
assessment that his father was driven by the belief that only through true toil 
could lasting reward be appreciated, then Barrios' actions take on a certain 
logic. Faenas represented the toil through which improvement of 
communications and agricultural techniques could benefit the honest campesino. 
Agraristas were placed in another category. While agraristas may have argued 
that the Revolution was all about a struggle for a land-based independence, this 
was not Barrios' experience. Whatever motives made Barrios and his campesino 
army fight during the years of civil war, land reform was certainly not the issue. 
Jose Maria Barrios suggests that the friction with agraristas in El Paredön was 
due to the fact that they were not satisfied with the land they occupied and had 
tried to seize additional land and monopolise water supplies. For Barrios, such 
indiscipline and degeneracy were inherent in a system that gave, without 
demanding the requisite personal commitment. 
As the political tide turned against Barrios, so the lasting impression of 
his rule was planted; an enemy of the campesino and a barrier impeding the 
campesino's rights under the Revolution. This image discounts the positive 
efforts that Barrios made towards raising the living standards of his fellow 
serranos, efforts that produced tangible benefits and suited the federal 
government's developmentalist philosophy. Some of his projects lapsed into 
disuse after his removal from the Sierra, yet others survived to give lasting 
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testament to the more positive aspects of what has been portrayed as a negative 
cacicazgo. Campesinos in many districts still benefit from the irrigation 
channels laid during the 1920s. Their children benefit from yet another of 
Barrios' initiatives, the most obvious evidence of which is the proliferation of 
schools and libraries which extends across the whole of the Sierra. 
Education in the Sierra 
In June 1923, the celebrated Chilean poet, Gabriela Mistral, addressed a 
select audience in the public library in Zacapoaxtla. While she extolled the 
virtues of such establishments and their potential to enrich community life, she 
would not have been aware of the person most responsible for fulfilling these 
ambitions for the serranos. 61 This was not the state government which, at the 
time that Mistral encouraged increased literacy, was struggling to sustain even 
meagre attendance at badly under-funded schools. In contrast, within a month 
of Mistral's speech, the tiny mountain village of Cuacuila took delivery of 
materials for establishing its own library, together with a supply of scholastic 
provisions sufficient to satisfy the needs of the one thousand school children that 
lived in Cuacuila and the surrounding villages. 62 As state educators struggled 
with unrealistic objectives, Barrios, capitalising upon the recent visit to Tetela of 
Secretary of Education, Jose Vasconcelos, was again converting fine words into 
actions. 63 
The personal archive that the Barrios family amassed during the 1920s is 
revealing in many aspects. Among the wealth of documents relating to military 
and public security matters, the presence of numerous school reports appears 
somewhat out of place. They indicate, however, that Barrios' commitment to 
education was not merely a matter of paying lip-service to visiting dignitaries, 
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but was a subject which commanded his special attention. The cacique received 
and kept minute details of school life; the attendance and performance of 
children, the quality and training of teachers, the recruitment and payment of 
teachers and school directors; the organisation of community contributions to 
make up for budget shortfalls. 
Certainly, the task facing Puebla's post-revolutionary educational 
authorities was formidable. The Revolution had resulted in the closure of many 
schools and those that remained open were poorly attended. It would not be 
easy to satisfy political aspirations for a swift return to civilian life. In July 
1919, reflecting Carranza's desire to regenerate rural education, the state 
government issued circulars to all ayuntamientos encouraging the organisation 
and collection of data in order to establish schools in haciendas. Yet the reality 
is more evident in messages received by Tetela authorities informing that 
schools in Huitzilan had been forced to close due to refusal of vecinos to make 
up the shortfall in teachers' wages. Across the Sierra in Cuetzalan, the 
municipal president was forced to approach wealthy coffee merchants and 
Barrios' brother Demetrio, then local military commander, for loans of 100 
pesos in order to pay the wages of school directors. 64 
Little changed following the fall of Carranza. Observing that 'the 
majority of Ayuntamientos [owed] their teachers a great deal of money', the 
Puebla state government urged all authorities to pay the teachers' salaries 
punctually. 65 Yet such encouragement appears to have had little effect. In reply 
to state government criticism that their ayuntamiento appeared lethargic in its 
promotion of education, the Zacapoaxtla authorities replied that it was not an 
absence of enthusiasm that had resulted in the closure of some of their schools, 
but an absolute lack of finances provoked by a refusal of vecinos to resume the 
financial burden of education. 
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Whether in education, maintenance of communication routes, or payment 
of local taxes, citizens throughout the Sierra were perceived by the government 
as displaying a widespread lack of respect for municipal and state authorities. In 
the absence of civilian figures of influence, the increasing power of Barrios was 
used by both federal and state governments as the catalyst for changing attitudes. 
During Carranza's presidency, Governor Alfonso Cabrera attempted to 
harness Barrios' intimate knowledge of the Tetela region to encourage towns, 
barrios and ranches to become more receptive to local educational initiatives. 67 
By the time the state government's inspector of schools, Prof. Carlos Barrios 
(unrelated), made a tour of inspection through the Sierra in September 1920, 
practical evidence of Barrios' utility was beginning to emerge. From Cuetzalan, 
the hard-pressed Zacapoaxtla authorities were informed that a new boys' school 
had been opened on the Rancheria de Reyes-Ogpan as a result of Barrios' 
initiative. Closer to home, in Aquixtla, Barrios had become personally involved 
in a stock-taking exercise of educational material in the municipality's schools, 
while in Huehuetla, he had arranged for the state government to send books and 
equipment for the local schools. 68 Yet the shallowness of the state government's 
commitment to education was still evident. In 1922, Zacatlän authorities were 
informed that the government had decided to cancel an earlier decision to grant 
local authorities a monthly amount of 200 pesos towards the costs of 
education. 69 
Despite these examples of Barrios' involvement in education, it would be 
fair to say that educational reform was a low priority in the early years of his 
cacicazgo. While he made great strides in providing a basic education for all 
soldiers and in equipping Cuacuila's schools to the highest standards, education 
in other areas of the Sierra was generally left to the vagaries of federal and state 
provision. It was only in 1927, following a tour of inspection by the federal 
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Undersecretary of Education, Prof. Moises Saenz, that Barrios displayed 
increasing enthusiasm for regional development of education. Saenz's report 
confirmed that the Sierra displayed only patchy success within a general picture 
of educative mediocrity. The report outlined the historical precedent for 
education provision in the Sierra. Until the end of the Porfiriato, the Sierra had 
enjoyed extensive education, with schools existing in all communities of 
significance. The costs of such education were found by a 50 centavos personal 
monthly contributions from all adult males. The discipline imposed by past 
caciques, such as Lucas, had ensured that the contributions were maintained and 
that education flourished. 
Saenz placed much of the blame for the current malady in education 
upon the policies of past state governments. In 1916 the governor had abolished 
the personal contribution, replacing it with a special education tax. Revenue 
from the tax was to be divided, one half being retained locally to invest in 
education, the other half going to the state government for redistribution through 
more general educational programmes. Saenz claimed the policy to have been a 
disaster. Highlighting the case of Zacatlän, he lamented that only six schools 
now operated where there had previously been eighty-three. Of the six still 
open, only two were financed by the state government. The blame for the poor 
condition of education in the Sierra was placed squarely upon the shoulders of 
'revolutionary' reform at state level. Saenz concluded that although it was not 
federal government policy to intervene in areas where state-run schools had 
previously existed, the Sierra was littered with half built and empty schools; 
testaments to the inadequate policies of successive state governments that had 
found themselves in financial and political turmoil. 
Another interesting aspect of Saenz's report is his comment upon life in 
the Indian communities of the Sierra. He suggested that despite the best efforts 
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of teachers, the educational policies being followed bore little relevance to the 
everyday needs of serrano communities. Three or four years of basic instruction 
in reading and writing were inadequate, Saenz suggested, to help the serrano 
escape his miserable cycle of subsistence farming. He called upon federal 
departments to devise educational policies to provide serranos with relevant 
practical skills. Only in this way, he argued, would Indian communities more 
fully embrace education and benefit from the civilising influence that it could 
deliver. 
Saenz's philosophy must have struck a chord with Barrios, who 
accompanied the Undersecretary on much of his tour of the Sierra. The 
sentiments in Saenz's subsequent report were almost identical to the practical 
approach that Barrios had striven to adopt in other areas of progressive 
development. Barrios began to assume the kind of responsibility for regional 
education taken on by his predecessor, Juan Francisco Lucas. Together with 
military reports, Barrios began to receive details of local education provision. 
As Barrios' interest in developing education reached a wider audience, so too, 
the requests for his help in acquiring teaching aids began to increase. 
In the rural school at Jicolapa, (Zacatlän), the teacher asked for Barrios' 
help to ensure delivery of essential teaching materials for almost one hundred 
children which had previously been promised by state authorities. 70 There is 
also evidence that the federal school in Cuacuila was receiving funds from 
Barrios in order to employ an assistant teacher. 71 Demetrio Barrios used the 
cacicazgo's representative in the federal congress, Salustio Cabrera, to obtain 
maps of Puebla for distribution in isolated Sierra schools. 72 In another 
initiative, the Barrios brothers encouraged the establishment of local education 
committees to supervise the cultivation of crops, the sale of which would help 
fund local education. In one community, Zitlala, the success of such a scheme 
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had meant that education funds could be used to extend small loans at 3% per 
month interest for vecinos who wished to improve their agricultural resources. 73 
Evidence of more fundamental education programmes also began to 
emerge during this period. An unsigned report written in 1928 entitled, Bases 
para la organizaciön, sostenimiento y vigilancia de Escuelas Rudimentarias en 
la Sierra Norte del Estado de Puebla, bears the address of Barrios' ranch in 
Zacatempan, (Chignahuapan). The report defined educational objectives in line 
with federal and state Constitutions: the reorganisation of finances, channels and 
levels of authority; regulations regarding the training, conduct and duties of 
teachers and inspectors; the establishment of a regional education committee in 
Zacatlän to monitor the quality of personnel and adherence to guide-lines; and, 
finally, a series of practical proposals for putting such plans into action, among 
which was the suggestion that regular teacher training courses be held in 
Zacatlän to rectify weaknesses identified by the school inspectorate. The report 
was sent to both federal and state governments in order to attract their support. 74 
Although there is no evidence of government responses, several of these 
teacher training courses did take place. 75 The courses appear to have 
encouraged local intellectuals and teachers to deliver papers relating to the 
peculiar problems related to education within an indigenous area such as the 
Sierra. One paper addressed the difficulties associated with teaching in Totonac 
communities. The paper encouraged all teachers experiencing such difficulties 
to take heart in the knowledge that by spreading the national language they were 
serving the patriotic cause. The teacher in Cuacuila spoke of how the 
prevalence of witchcraft in Indian societies could be used by teachers who, by 
means of positive suggestion, might assume the role of 'educative witches' in 
the minds, of Indian children. Other instructors wrote articles relating to 
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teaching methods, the responsibility of the school in spreading propaganda on 
hygiene and encouraging the role of the mother as a teacher within the home. 76 
The scope of the topics covered by these courses reflected a broader 
trend in federal education. Rural teachers were not just ambassadors of the 
national language, but were charged with representing the Revolution at a local 
level. As Mary Kay Vaughan reveals, revolutionary education stretched beyond 
the classroom and sought to influence all aspects of Mexican life. In the Sierra, 
education was seen as the civilising influence to combat traditional superstitions 
and moral weakness; a weakness that was highlighted by the widespread 
susceptibility to alcohol. 
It is unclear to what extent Barrios shared every aspect of the drive to 
'civilise' the Indian; after all, his knowledge of traditional cultures had been 
paramount in his ascent to power. It is certain, however, that he was wholly 
supportive of moves to eradicate alcoholism. Government initiatives arguing 
that alcohol destroyed a man's self-respect and left him incapable of providing 
for his family, neatly coincided with Barrios' own philosophy regarding the 
need for every serrano to realise his full potential. 
Pre-empting a federal government campaign against alcoholism, Barrios 
issued broad restrictions on the number of outlets and quantities of alcohol sold 
in various Sierra towns. Aguardiente, Barrios argued, fundamentally weakened 
the resolve of the independent serrano. As early as July 1928, various 
municipalities in the Sierra had adopted Barrios' lead on the restriction of pulque 
sales in order to create, 'the improvement of our people and the implementation 
of healthy practices which will serve as an example for generations to come' ." 
During subsequent months, Barrios instructed his network of jefes de arenas to 
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co-operate with municipalities in Libres and Chignahuapan in their efforts to 
discourage alcohol sales. 
Barrios outlined his views on the anti-alcohol issue in a letter to a hostile 
state government concerned about a reduction in its revenues derived from taxes 
on alcohol sales. He explained that the municipalities had decided to restrict 
sales on Sundays and holidays: 
[... ] To avoid scandals and consequential lawlessness, so that the 
humble classes and workers might abandon the habit of heavy drinking 
in order that, as soon as possible, future generations might develop into 
a healthy, strong, moral society, with the capacity to adapt itself to its 
duties and various activities efficiently "78 
By July 1929, the state government had moved to support the federal initiative 
against alcoholism, calling upon the Ministry of War to obtain Barrios' co- 
operation in its efforts. 79 It is somewhat curious that even as Governor Almazän 
strove to destroy Barrios, he sought to use the cacique's influence to further 
state government objectives. Little wonder then, that Almazän chose to make 
his appeal through the good offices of the Ministry of War rather than deal 
directly with Barrios. 
State hijacking of the anti-alcohol campaign was only one example of a 
more systematic attempt to eclipse the influence and role that Barrios had 
enjoyed in the Sierra. Road projects, education, and local law enforcement had 
all been recovered by state authority, while the deployment of the 45th. 
Battalion signalled a similar move by the federal government to neutralise 
Barrios' military role. Barrios had become increasingly superfluous and while 
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he received grudging praise for his initiatives, he more frequently suffered 
damning criticism for his methods. 
Perhaps it would be wrong to make too many general conclusions 
regarding the motives behind the projects that Barrios promoted in the Sierra. 
His uncanny knack of anticipating government development policies suggests 
that his actions were swayed more by opportunism than any structured, global, 
approach to revolutionary change. Nonetheless, patterns do emerge from his 
actions that reveal much about the man and his ability to retain favour. The 
topics upon which he chose to concentrate were issues that the revolutionary 
government had identified as priorities. By sometimes reacting to stated federal 
government objectives, at others pre-empting them, Barrios showed himself to 
be an astute judge of political trends. Whether in road building, education, 
agricultural development schemes or, most crucially, in military loyalty, Barrios 
repeatedly affirmed the impression that he could produce what the national 
government demanded. Even his conflicts with agraristas were conducted 
during a period when there was less than whole-hearted federal government 
support for comprehensive land reform. 
Another common characteristic of his various initiatives was that in 
apparently pursuing goals that would benefit others, he was able to strengthen 
his own hand. This tactic does not exclusively refer to the embezzlement of 
government development funds, although the possibility of this motive cannot be 
ruled out. Compliance with 'revolutionary' objectives provided Barrios with a 
large degree of credit and goodwill from federal and state government. More 
practically, road construction projects allowed him to expand his network of 
armed allies. Similarly, so important was it that road projects should obtain 
local co-operation, that Barrios frequently replaced less compliant local 
municipal officials: the gratitude of subsequent appointees further extended his 
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range of clients. In his seemingly innocent desire to improve sanitation and 
hygiene standards, Barrios produced another strand in the network of patronage. 
Loyalty to Barrios became a condition for receiving the materials and funds that 
might foster such community projects. In pursuing the laudable aims of 
eradicating the curse of alcoholism from the Sierra, Barrios furthered his own 
cause by striking at the financial heart of those of his political opponents who 
owned distilleries. 80 
So was Barrios little more than a wily character who used his heightened 
appreciation of political trends to further his own cause? The facts suggest more 
than sheer opportunism. One must remember the character of the man; an 
Indian who came from humble rural backgrounds, who rose to the point at 
which he regularly conversed with presidents of the Republic, yet who spent his 
final years in the rural settings of his childhood still not having totally mastered 
the language of his superiors in Mexico City. Although he had many 
opportunities, his preferred home remained the mountainous region of his 
childhood. This demonstrates a deep affinity with the Sierra, its people and the 
ranchero way of life. 
There is a case for arguing that Barrios' initiatives were, at least in part, borne 
from a genuine desire to improve the lives of the campesinos who shared his 
beloved Sierra. This is not to suggest that he was a social revolutionary, far 
from it. Equality and social justice did not fire his enthusiasm and, in this 
respect, he would never have had much in common with the agraristas. He 
would, however, have had sympathy with those campesinos who sought his help 
to help themselves. In this role, there was no better patron than Barrios. This 
rigid philosophy closed his mind to the possibility that such objectives were 
more likely to be achieved by state support for organised collective initiatives. 
He had never personally suffered the exploitation felt by campesinos in many 
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other areas of the Republic and, therefore, was incapable of conceding that the 
agrarian cause might have been justified. It is all the more ironic, then, that his 
natural enemies fell into two main camps: those agraristas who had been the 
victims of past exploitation by landed elites; and those elites within the Sierra 
who had tried to impede his development programmes in order to preserve their 
exploitation of local campesinos. Nowhere was the struggle for control of 
serranos more hotly disputed than in the district of Zacapoaxtla. Exactly why 
this should have arisen, forms the subject of the following chapter. 
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6. The Barrios cacicazgo: A case study of the 
District of Zacapoaxtla 
To some, Gabriel Barrios was a cruel tyrant; to others, a benevolent 
patriarch. To understand how his cacicazgo penetrated communities, factions 
and even families, it is helpful to explore the interplay of these influences at the 
local level. The district of Zacapoaxtla is ideal for taking a closer look at the 
workings of the Barrios cacicazgo as it shares many of the topographical, ethnic 
and social characteristics found elsewhere within the Sierra. Its unique value as 
a case study lies in the fact that, whereas other districts displayed several typical 
features of the cacicazgo, Zacapoaxtla contained the full range of such factors 
within one district: revolutionary conflict; the proliferation of the network of 
cuerpos voluntarios; patronage and clientage of local civilian officials; a 
regional development project of profound significance; a struggle for political 
power with regional and national implications. This last point, combined with 
the fact that Zacapoaxtla has frequently proved to be a fertile ground for the 
cultivation of prominent politicians, provides the historian with the opportunity 
to move back and forth across local and regional political boundaries, making it 
easier to set local events within the broader political geography. 
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DISTRICT OF 1ACAPOAXTIA 
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An introduction to the District of Zacapoaxtla 
Given that the daily activities of this rural region of Mexico are governed 
by altitude, the steep descent of Zacapoaxtla's terrain from the heights of the 
sierra fria at 2360 m to the sierra cälida coastal plain at 200 m ensures a 
diversity of serrano life. The district can be best visualised as a thin strip of 
Gulf-facing mountain slopes, flanked on either side by the similarly shaped 
districts of Tetela and Tlatlauqui. Covering an area of 900 square km, 
Zacapoaxtla is divided into the municipalities of Zacapoaxtla, Xochitlän, 
Nauzontla and Cuetzalan del Progreso. As in much of the Sierra, local climatic 
conditions reflect the altitude; the higher the land rises from the coast, the more 
likely it is to experience blankets of persistent mist and rain. During the winter 
months, the upper reaches of the district are susceptible to frosts: the cabecera 
of Zacapoaxtla records temperatures as low as three degrees Centigrade and an 
annual rainfall of 1260 mm. 
The district's descent from the sierra fria to the Gulf coast is dissected by 
several river valleys. The journey from Zacapoaxtla to other municipalities 
within the district requires the traveller to negotiate the precipitous slopes that 
flank both sides of the Apulco valley. The journey is further hampered by the 
present course of the river, which has cut a deep gorge into the valley floor 
some twenty metres wide and eighty metres deep. Although the district's 
administrative capital since colonial times, such physical barriers have acted to 
isolate Zacapoaxtla and give its subordinate municipalities a degree of 
autonomy. Not until the twentieth century did improved communications unite 
the district. 
Regional isolation raises an important ethnic consideration. In common 
with the rest of the Sierra Norte de Puebla, the district of Zacapoaxtla is 
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populated by Indian communities, predominantly Nahuas, Totonacs and Otomis. 
Poor communications meant that for much of the colonial period the 
administrative hand of the white elite only lightly touched the relative autonomy 
of Indian communities. Physical barriers acted to accentuate a demographic 
development which saw the cabecera of Zacapoaxtla increasingly populated by 
white families while the rest of the district retained its Indian character. As 
early as the sixteenth century, the Spanish families Alcäntara and Macip are 
believed to have held land in the region. In the eighteenth century, documentary 
evidence confirms that the Alcäntara and Molina families possessed title to 
land. 1 Two hundred years later the descendants of these families figured 
prominently in the district's post-revolutionary wrangles. Yet it would be a 
mistake to overestimate colonial settlement; poor communications and the lack 
of precious metal deposits meant that the colonial presence of white serranos 
was nothing more than token. Those with land interests in the area preferred the 
relative civility offered by Tlatlauquitepec, a town with easier access to the 
centre of colonial culture in Puebla City. 
From the mid-nineteenth century, mestizo migration into the 
municipality of Zacapoaxtla had noticeably increased. Thomson suggests that 
the economic recession on the Llanos encouraged poblanos to head for the 
Sierra, where the economy suffered less from political turmoil. 2 By the 1860s 
Zacapoaxtla was portrayed as the stalwart of liberal patriotism. It was in 
Zacapoaxtla, during the spring of 1864, that the famous j er Batallön de 
Zacapoaxtla mustered before descending to the Llanos to earn a place in history 
for its part in the victorious battle on the fifth of May. 3 In recognition of its 
defence of national sovereignty, on 5 December 1864, Zacapoaxtla was 
simultaneously granted ciudad status and temporarily became the capital of the 
state of Puebla. 
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The portrayal of Zacapoaxtia as a symbolic centre of liberal resistance to 
foreign rule highlights an ambiguity inherent in Mexican liberalism. While 
liberalism fostered ideals of social and ethnic equality, the 'colonial' values of 
those who held power in Zacapoaxtla and, perhaps, in many other areas of the 
Republic ensured that a sense of ethnic superiority coloured the brand of 
liberalism offered. From its foundation, the cabecera of Zacapoaxtla saw itself 
as an island of white racial purity within a sea of Indian 'ninos con barbas'. 
For the topographical reasons mentioned above, this precious self-image was 
accentuated through the inability and, perhaps, unwillingness of zacapoaxtecos 
to communicate effectively with the neighbouring municipalities and districts. 
It is no coincidence that a Nahua Indian, rather than a white serrano from 
Zacapoaxtla, became a spokesman for the region's Indian communities. Juan 
Francisco Lucas' prestige provided him with a quality of authority that no 
member of the Zacapoaxtla elite could attain. Those who sought the fighting 
capacity of the Indian serranos during times of conflict went to Lucas, not 
Zacapoaxtla. As long as national instability created the demand for soldiers, 
Lucas could use his pivotal position to delay external forces making inroads into 
Indian autonomy. 4 
While the degree of regional stability under the Porfiriato is debatable, 
the undoubted change of emphasis from militarism towards economic 
development in the late nineteenth century left Lucas without a role. As the 
patriarch's ability to provide paternal protection diminished, Indian communities 
in the Sierra found themselves less able to resist the pressures borne through 
economic development. Although Zacapoaxtla's status as state capital was 
short-lived, the loss of political influence was replaced by economic interest 
when coffee cultivation was introduced into the municipality of Cuetzalan. 
Jesus Flores, a mestizo coffee grower from Veracruz, was the first to introduce 
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seeds into the area in the 1870s. By the end of the decade modest harvests were 
being registered. 5 Increasing mestizo migration placed new pressures upon the 
relationship between Indian and non-Indian societies. While early mestizo 
demands for land were satisfied by renting Indian community property, 
desamortizaciön led to the gradual erosion of the customary economic and 
political autonomy of Indian communities in the coffee zone. 
The rebellion led by the Indian leader, Francisco Agustin Dieguillo, 
represented the most violent attempt to resist the erosion of relative Indian 
autonomy by mestizo coffee cultivators. 6 Dieguillo, however, was fighting a 
losing battle against a mestizo onslaught fuelled by the prospect of a lucrative 
coffee trade. By the turn of the century, the Flores, together with other mestizo 
families, Huidobro and Calderon, had broken Indian resistance in the 
municipality of Cuetzalan. 7 As the price of coffee rose, so Indian communities 
substituted the cultivation of staple foods for the more lucrative cash crop. 
Lured ever deeper into the mestizo world, Indian communities soon found their 
economic independence disappear and their political influence curtailed. Non- 
Indians gained control of the town's administration, forcing Indian families 
either to accept the changed situation or to seek seclusion in more remote 
reaches of the district. 8 
Demographic and economic changes in Cuetzalan reflected a trend 
affecting the whole district. The municipality of Zacapoaxtla received so great a 
wave of mestizo migration during the Porfiriato that by 1910 the population of 
the cabecera was one of densest in the state of Puebla. 9 This influx of mestizo 
blood into the cabecera challenged the previous hegemony enjoyed by the local 
white elite. Former ethnic relations had been characterised by the continuation 
of the white, colonial domination of their Indian neighbours; the Indian worked 
the land of the white elite and the produce from Indian communities was traded 
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in a Zacapoaxtla market controlled by the same white families. Later mestizo 
immigration added a new factor into the local economic and ethnic equation as 
newcomers competed for the influence previously enjoyed by the established 
elite. Simultaneously, as the size of the elite grew, the district's limited 
resources inevitably meant that some sections of these extended families fared 
better than others. Such differences within Zacapoaxtla's non-Indian society 
caused tensions that would have considerable political significance in the 
decades that followed. 
These strains were not only evident within single communities, but 
between the various communities of the district. Cuetzalan's economic 
marginality had previously meant that Zacapoaxtla authorities need not be 
unduly concerned with the difficulties that poor communications posed for 
administrative control. In common with other municipalities in the district, the 
absence of tax-paying settlers meant that fiscal relations between Zacapoaxtla 
and Cuetzalan were primarily limited to the former's role as a regional market 
for Indian produce, and Cuetzalan's function as a source of tribute and 
contribuciones personales. Zacapoaxteco treatment of Cuetzalan's Indian 
population as racially and economically inferior persisted beyond the arrival of 
the Flores family and other mestizos. 10 Yet coffee production altered both the 
ethnic composition of Cuetzalan and the town's economic relationship with 
Zacapoaxtla. As Cuetzalan developed a degree of economic prosperity, so 
Zacapoaxtla authorities were keen to ensure that cuetzaltecos honoured their 
fiscal responsibilities. As a result, pre-existing tensions were heightened. " 
Cuetzaltecos, however, were by no means united in their response to 
pressures from the district capital. As later settlers made their presence felt in 
the town's social and political life, divisions began to form within Cuetzalan's 
mestizo society. Originally from the neighbouring district of Tlatlauquitepec, 
229 
Miguel Vega and his wife, Epigmenia, moved to Cuetzalan at the turn of the 
century-12 Late-comers onto the scene, Vega Bernal was viewed as a threat to 
the recently acquired prominence of the Flores faction. The ensuing division 
within Cuetzalan's mestizo society was yet another symptom of a district in 
transition. Coffee production acted as the nucleus for changes that challenged 
existing relationships, not only between communities and ethnic groups but also 
between families and factions within individual settlements. 
As the Revolution approached, therefore, both Indian and non-Indian 
societies in the Zacapoaxtla district had already felt the winds of change. As 
each new economic or political development reached the region, it was 
accompanied by fresh jostling for position, each group seeking to gain maximum 
advantage. The Revolution, then, cannot be said to have acted as a catalyst for 
change in a previously isolated region. Half a century of changes pre-dated the 
chaos of revolutionary strife. Given the existence of such friction, it is 
important to identify the extent to which personal enmity rather than 
revolutionary ideology decided the manner in which each group reacted to the 
revolutionary call. 
Revolutionary sympathies in the district of Zacapoaxtla 
Alcäntara, Macip, Molina: such names figure prominently in the lists of 
the great and good in Zacapoaxtla's history. Bound through marriage and 
compadrazgo, these families have long dominated economic and political affairs. 
Yet, by the outbreak of the Revolution, ownership of such illustrious names was 
no longer a valid ticket to power; half the population of the cabecera could boast 
tenuous links with these families. Political and economic rivalry was as likely 
to be found between those sharing the same surnames as from other families 
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who had emerged to challenge the right of these three families to monopolise the 
heights of Zacapoaxtla society. Ironically, the name that was to have the most 
impact in the post-revolutionary years is poorly acknowledged in the poblano 
historiography. The few brief biographical details of the future state governor, 
Claudio Nabor Tirado, state little more about his early life other than the fact 
that he was born in Zacapoaxtla. 13 The absence of the name from the annals of 
Zacapoaxtla's colonial history, however, suggests that Tirado did not belong to 
the established landed elite. 14 More certain, however, is that by 1920 Claudio 
Tirado had obtained sufficient prestige within Zacapoaxtla society to attain the 
position of federal deputy for the district. 
Tirado's rise to political influence is not only interesting in itself. The 
ways in which the white elite of Zacapoaxtla reacted to such a rise helps to 
clarify the complicated web of loyalties that existed between the more influential 
families. In the 1920s two major factions existed in Zacapoaxtla. One faction, 
which would form close ties with Tirado, was personified by the brothers, 
Wenceslao and Ignacio Macip and their close ally, Rufino A. Landero. The 
other faction was led by Carlos Macip y Alcäntara and Moises M. Macip. 
As far as it affected the Revolution in the district, this factionalism 
within zacapoaxteco society should not exaggerated. After all, both factions 
belonged to the same elite to which the prospect of social revolution held little 
attraction. It is not surprising that the list of zacapoaxtecos who heeded 
Madero's call to arms did not include members of the prominent families. 
Confirmation of their lack of revolutionary ardour is conveyed in a letter from 
Moises Macip's father, Miguel. In petitioning Constitutionalist forces for safe 
passage to his home in Zacapoaxtla, he argued that although other members of 
the Macip family were known to be Huertista sympathisers, he and his family 
were politically neutral. 15 While his deeds might have suggested neutrality, 
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Miguel Macip's anxiety concerning agrarista threats to his land suggests that he, 
together with other members of the land-owning elite, had much to lose from 
the successful conclusion of a Revolution that offered land reform. 16 Whether 
based upon land ownership and/or commerce, the continued dominance of the 
white elite in Zacapoaxtla depended upon the survival of their monopolistic 
control over the district's commerce and politics. Revolutionary rhetoric 
promising greater liberty to the Indian population was deemed a direct threat to 
a local ethnic balance based upon Indian servility. 
If, for much of its history, Zacapoaxtla had been an island of white 
'civilization', then late nineteenth century migration to Cuetzalan extended the 
boundaries of civilization into uncharted waters. The pioneering mestizo settlers 
in Cuetzalan confronted both physical and legal resistance from the Indian 
population. The tentative hold that mestizos possessed in Cuetzalan may have 
contributed to the fact that early settlers were more anxious to present a unified 
response to Indian challenges than to fight among themselves for the greater 
share of the yet to be secured spoils. The Flores, Huidobro and Calderön 
families found themselves in a similar position to that faced by the white elite of 
Zacapoaxtla two centuries earlier; a vulnerable non-Indian minority in an 
overwhelmingly Indian environment. As in Zacapoaxtla, such cultural isolation 
bound the families together and through inter-marriage, these families became a 
unified dominant force in Cuetzalan politics. By the time mestizos had gained 
the upper hand in Cuetzalan politics, Jose Maria Flores had become a prominent 
leader of the group. '? According to his son, Flores was a progressive, liberal- 
minded cacique. Yet in common with most of his kin in Cuetzalan, Jose Maria 
Flores had little time for the Indian, whom he saw as uncultured and 
uneducated. '8 
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So effectively had the Flores-led group eclipsed Indian influence in 
Cuetzalan politics, that the main revolutionary threat to its continued 
prominence came not from the Indian community, but from the mestizo 
schoolteacher, Miguel Vega, and his sons, Salvador, Victor, Gustavo, Medardo 
and Rogelio. Flores, like the land-owning elite in Zacapoaxtla, had little to gain 
from social revolution. He desired progress, but of a type that focused upon 
economic development that might foster a more favourable climate for his 
entrepreneurial initiatives. Facing an established clique unwilling to relinquish 
its newly attained prominence, the Vega Bernals were excluded from the 
Cuetzalan elite and, therefore, excluded from the economic and political 
decision-making process. Frustrated by the lack of opportunities for social and 
economic mobility, Vega Bernal's sons judged that they had little to lose from 
taking up arms and fighting for change. Whether this was for personal or more 
ideological reasons is discussed later in the chapter. Although the Vega Bernal 
brothers posed sufficient a military problem to warrant the deployment of 
Constitutionalist forces in Cuetzalan, at no time during the Revolution did they 
succeeded in gaining the upper hand in Cuetzalan. Their key strength lay in the 
sense of insecurity and uncertainty that their rebel activities created among the 
dominant families in the area. 
The deployment of Barrios' Indian forces to the district in 1919, was 
greeted with less than enthusiasm. 19 The elite in Zacapoaxtla and Cuetzalan had 
little reason to support any side in a guerrilla war which would seriously limit 
their agricultural and commercial activities. In addition, it should be 
remembered that they had little regard for their Indian neighbours. The prospect 
of military and public security affairs being controlled by an illiterate Indian by 
the name of Barrios must have provoked a frosty, if not hostile, reaction. 
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This may explain why Barrios had cause to complain to local authorities 
in Zacapoaxtla for their lack of diligence in ensuring that the municipality's 
thoroughfares were regularly maintained. The authorities had little incentive to 
improve the military capabilities of the Indian officer when their underlying 
desire was for a return to the Porfirian social order. In Cuetzalan, too, the 
distaste for Barrios' Indian army was evident. In 1919, Demetrio Barrios 
assumed command of the Constitutionalist garrison in Cuetzalan. He replaced 
Colonel Celestino Gasca, a white, progressive-minded officer who had gained 
considerable local respect for his efforts to protect normal social and economic 
life in the midst of civil war. 20 The prospect of an Indian trying to emulate the 
role of a cultured officer was too much for Cuetzalan society to bear. While 
rebel actions were obviously undermining the ability of cuetzaltecos to maintain 
normal economic and social activities, the municipal president complained to 
Governor Alfonso Cabrera that: '[... ] rebel actions were made worse still by the 
conduct of government troops led by ignorant Indians who used their military 
might solely to terrorise genre de razön'. 21 
Opposition to Barrios in the district generally took the form of non- 
cooperation rather than violence. The military challenge to Barrios' forces was 
led by the Vega Bernal, a faction that gained little from the presence of Gasca's 
troops in Cuetzalan, and that remained marginalised by the ruling Flores faction. 
Evidence has not been found to indicate exactly when Salvador Vega Bernal and 
his brothers took up arms, but by February 1918 Constitutionalist forces confirm 
that they were in rebellion. 22 Nor is there any record of their motives for taking 
up the Villista cause. Salvador Vega Bernal's son claims that his father became 
a rebel in 1917 in order to stop the brutal treatment of cuetzaltecos by 
Carrancista forces. Only later, when they received arms and US dollars from 
Villista forces, did the Vega Bernals assume a revolutionary stance. 23 Baudelio 
Rivera, a soldier in Vega Bernal's battalion, corroborates this last point. Senior 
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Rivera states that when Salvador Vega Bernal decided to join the Villista cause, 
Villa authorised the delivery of a convoy of arms from his division in 
Veracruz. 24 
The bitterness and disruption of the local revolutionary struggle in the 
small town of Cuetzalan is revealed from local authority reports: 
19 January 1919 - The municipal president reports that eighty troops of 
the 35o. Batallön [Vega Bernal's forces] had occupy Cuetzalan for a 
few hours before leaving for an unknown destination. 
21 January 1919 - Revolutionary forces led by General Gaviflo Vega y Romay, including thirty cavalrymen, pass through Cuetzalan on their 
way to the coast. 
4 February 1919 - Salvador Vega Bernal's troops return to Cuetzalan 
on 2 February. They comprise 100 well-armed cavalrymen and 
infantrymen, and had recently withdrawn from the town. 
16 February 1919 - Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel Barrios arrives in Cuetzalan with 950 infantry and 150 cavalry, and later head for the 
Sierra. (All his men are armed with maussers or 30: 30 rifles. ) 
During the following three months, there are similar reports of rebel forces led 
by the Vega Bernal brothers frequently occupying and terrorising the town of 
Cuetzalan. There are also details of manoeuvres by Barrios' troops, minor 
skirmishes and casualties. 
30 June 1919 - An ultimatum is given to the municipal president from Salvador Vega Bernal, whose troops occupy the town. The demand 
calls for the wealthy families and traders to produce a sum of $1000 
within four hours or be considered as enemies of the Villista cause and 
treated accordingly. 
1 July 1919 - The municipal president of Cuetzalan cites the above demand as one of the many intolerable pressures under which the 
Cuetzalan people have suffered. He adds that the situation is being 
aggravated by the behaviour of federal forces. The municipal president 
of Tzicuilan reports that Barrios forces had broken into several homes 
and forcibly conscripted several local youths into their ranks. 
17 July 1919 - 105 rebel troops under Vega Bernal who had occupied Cuetzalan, are forced to withdraw following the arrival of 1500 - 2000 Barrios troops. 25 
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These reports portray the local realities of the Revolution. Carranza's rise to the 
presidency in 1917 was supposed to have heralded the end of the 'violent 
period' of the Revolution. Yet two years later, Cuetzalan was torn by 
factionalism. If the violence had ended, no one had informed this corner of the 
Republic. Guerrilla warfare conducted by Salvador Vega Bernal's troops 
continued to hamper efforts to bring peace to the district. 
The 30 June 1919 raid is of particular interest. Firstly, Salvador Vega 
Bernal's demands illustrate the difficulty in maintaining normal economic 
activity. While his victims were the wealthy members of society, examples 
given in earlier chapters suggest that both Indian and mestizo communities were 
vulnerable to such raids. Local authorities frequently complained that vecinos 
cited such disruptions as an excuse for not honouring their fiscal responsibilities. 
Secondly, that Vega Bernal limited his demands to the wealthier members of 
Cuetzalan society could be seen as an act of social justice; an attempt to 
redistribute wealth within an unequal society. To test this hypothesis, however, 
confronts the fundamental problem of finding reliable evidence to confirm the 
motives of such groups. Official reports on the actions of Vega Bernal's troops 
were invariably written by their opponents. Consequently, the Vega Bernals 
were portrayed as common bandits who used revolutionary titles to legitimate 
their criminal activity. Equally, Vega Bernal was hardly likely to describe his 
actions as opportunist or economically motivated, and would more likely have 
agreed with the sentiments of Baudelio Rivera who in 1993 stated that he fought 
for Vega Bernal in the name of social justice. 26 
No evidence has been found to confirm that Salvador Vega Bernal's 
demand of $1000 was met nor, if it was paid, how Vega Bernal used the money. 
Yet even if such evidence did exist, it would not help to define the motives of 
the Vega Bernals' actions. They might have justified the cash demand as a 
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necessary contribution to the continuing struggle for social justice. Yet, the 
demand could be seen as little more than an extension of a factional battle. 
Almost by definition, the targeted vecinos of Cuetzalan belonged to the Flores, 
Huidobro and Calderon families: the political enemies of the Vega Bernals. 
From this stand-point, the Vega Bernals' actions, far from being those of social 
revolutionaries, can be seen as simply those of a faction striving to gain control 
of local politics. 
An interesting contribution to this debate is added by Vega Bernal's son 
who, with much pride, recalls how his father's troops took just sixteen days to 
force the Constitutionalists out of Cuetzalan and assume administrative control. 
Within the context of the political factionalism in Cuetzalan, decisive military 
action by Salvador Vega Bernal had brought him, albeit temporarily, domination 
over Flores. If Vega Bernal's son is correct that his father had no ideological 
motive for taking up arms, it may be that a strong motive to join the Revolution 
was a mixture of a sense of local injustice and personal ambition. In how many 
other cases throughout the Republic were 'revolutionaries' moved more by 
personal rivalry and local grievances than by broader ideologies? 27 
Whatever the Vega Bernals' original motives, the decision to rebel 
against federal government forces had long-term consequences for the whole 
region. Their rebel position automatically drove the Flores family into the 
Constitutionalist camp. The convergence of personal interests with the national 
cause may not have been too difficult for the Flores family to accept in 1918, 
when the enlightened, and white, Colonel Gasca commanded the local garrison. 
It was, however, a little more difficult to swallow in 1919 when the Indian 
officer, Demetrio Barrios, took over. Ironically, Vega Bernal's rebellious 
stance eventually forced the mestizo elite of Cuetzalan society to accept that at 
least one Indian could offer them something that no non-Indian could provide - 
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local dominance and security of tenure. After all, such an accommodation 
might not last long. Once hostilities had subsided, surely the Indian troops 
would be ordered to withdraw to their mountain villages. An alliance with 
Barrios, therefore, would probably have been viewed by Flores as an expedient, 
short-term measure, to be discarded when the local situation became more 
stable. 
The Vega Bernals, however, were not totally devoid of support. They 
enjoyed personal connections with members of the Macip family in Zacapoaxtla 
and, although not strongly linked, this bond was sufficient for Ignacio Macip to 
fight alongside Salvador Vega Bernal as one of his senior officers. 28 Such a 
connection proves that at least one sector of the Macip family was in military 
combat against the Barrios brothers during the Revolution. The long-term 
political significance of this association was revealed in a 1923 military 
investigation which recognised that in the fight for regional domination against 
Barrios, Claudio Tirado counted upon the staunch support of Ignacio Macip, his 
brother, Wenceslao, and the Vega Bernal brothers. 29 This link between the 
Vega Bernals and a Zacapoaxtla faction meant that an influential sector of 
Zacapoaxtla society not only opposed the Carrancista regime but would, in the 
future, be embroiled in the local Delahuertista movement. When the Sonorense 
administration later began to receive complaints against Barrios' forces from this 
section of Zacapoaxtla society, it is little wonder that Barrios was so frequently 
given the benefit of the doubt. 
Support for the Vega Bernal rebels set Ignacio and Wenceslao Macip 
against the dominant faction in Cuetzalan politics. Meanwhile, the other faction 
in Zacapoaxtla had remained ambiguous in its support for any revolutionary 
group. Yet, faced with the unlikelihood of a return to the Mexico of 'Don 
Porfirio', people such as Carlos and Moises M. Macip probably viewed the 
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Carrancista option as the least damaging to their considerable interests. The 
psychological barrier that they and Jose Maria Flores had to confront was that 
Carrancismo in Zacapoaxtla was in the hands of 'illiterate Indians' from 
Zacatlän. 
This dilemma reinforces the need for local studies of the Revolution. 
The ways in which communities and individuals reacted to the Revolution do not 
fit simple ideological compartments. Nor can their responses be grouped by 
social or ethnic criteria. A variety of local factors contributed to Ignacio and 
Wenceslao Macip becoming political enemies of Gabriel Barrios. Similarly, 
despite the antipathy towards Indians felt by the non-Indian elites of Zacapoaxtla 
and Cuetzalan, local factors combined with broader political and military 
considerations to produce an alliance with the Indian cacique. Barrios' presence 
may have been viewed as a necessary short-term evil to counter the persistent 
challenge of the Vega Bernal, a lesser evil that would go away once the threat 
had passed. Peace, however, did not fully return to Zacapoaxtla with the death 
of Carranza. The underlying factionalism that revolutionary action had revealed 
had yet to be resolved. In this respect, the continued presence in the area of 
Vega Bernal and Gabriel Barrios prolonged the period during which groups in 
Zacapoaxtla and Cuetzalan were forced to compromise in order to retain an 
influential voice. 
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Factionalism in the aftermath of Revolution 
As far as the district of Zacapoaxtla was concerned, the most immediate 
consequence of Obregön's rise to the presidency was the withdrawal of Barrios' 
forces to Cuacuila and the assumption of peace-keeping duties by Salvador Vega 
Bernal. Several months of indecision followed as the Ministry of War reviewed 
the military sector's future requirements. During this period, Vega Bernal 
portrayed the Barrios brothers as opponents of the Obregon regime and there 
were several clashes in the district of Tetela as former enemy troops occupied 
the same space. 30 
Pacifying regions where the Revolution had merely become a facade 
behind which factional disputes could be fought was a major problem for the 
Obregön regime. Although Obregön's advisers warned of the dangers of 
renewing Barrios' licence to military rule in the Sierra, the possible backlash if 
Barrios were ordered to disband his troops was too hazardous to contemplate. 
Even when Obregön supported people like Barrios, there remained the equally 
awkward problem of placating those forced to demobilise. Obregön's treatment 
of Vega Bernal demonstrates an attempt at compromise. 
Obregön's decision to back Barrios, placed the Vega Bernal brothers in a 
vulnerable position. With Barrios now licensed to keep the peace throughout the 
entire Sierra, there was little to stop him crushing his cuetzalteco rivals once and 
for all. Perhaps in recognition of this threat and to maintain a military counter- 
balance to Barrios, Obregön did not demobilise Vega Bernal's troops but merely 
recalled them to Cuetzalan where they continued to perform a local public guard 
duty and remained on the Ministry of War pay-roll. By mid-1921, however, so 
strong were local complaints against the troops' behaviour, that the Ministry of 
War ordered Vega Bernal's 35o. Batallön to disband. 
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Vega Bernal responded to the news with two requests that can loosely be 
viewed as his price for peaceful acquiescence. He asked the Ministry of War to 
forward $43,000 for payment of outstanding wages to his troops. Secondly, 
Vega Bernal argued that he needed to retain an armed escort of forty to fifty 
men to 'protect my family and interests in the Sierra Norte de Puebla from my 
political enemies as well as to help conserve law and order within the 
municipality of Cuetzalan'. 31 The escort, he proposed, should be maintained 
from Ministry of War funds. Obregön apparently considered the price worth 
paying; Vega Bernal received an escort of twenty-four men and, although there 
is no record of a cash payment, Vega Bernal's son states that his father received 
'20,000 gold coins in recognition of the esteem in which Obregön held him'. 32 
The Sonorenses weak grip on power during this period undoubtedly 
required that Obregön conciliate rather than crush his former opponents. In 
retrospect, the defection of many officers during the Delahuerta rebellion 
suggests that Obregön was foolhardy to think he could satisfy such diverse 
interests without further bloodshed. Yet Obregön would have risked 
jeopardising the fragile peace throughout the Republic had he tried to force the 
pace of consolidation. Whether by incorporating military leaders of dubious 
loyalty within the federal army, or accepting compromises that left former rebels 
such as Vega Bernal with a degree of local influence, the path to lasting peace 
and stability was far from clearly defined. 
The need for national compromise often led to inconclusive local 
solutions. The factional struggle between Flores and the Vega Bernals 
continued, with each side gaining temporary ascendancy. While the Flores 
faction controlled the ayuntamiento, their powers were limited by the presence 
of Vega Bernal's troops. Under the patronage of governor Manjarrez, Victor 
Vega Bernal became municipal president and the family strengthened its hold on 
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local politics. The lynch-pin binding the ascendancy of the Vega Bernals and 
the governorship of Manjarrez lay in Zacapoaxtla. Wenceslao Macip was the 
state congress politician who proposed and argued strongly in favour of 
Manjarrez's appointment as provisional governor. 33 The price for Macip's 
support probably included approval of Vega Bernal's position as municipal 
president. It should be remembered that Macip and the Vega Bernals were 
closely linked, and the flow of patronage from state capital to rural municipality 
during 1923 appeared to be working efficiently. Of course, patronage demands 
a price and it is interesting to observe that the Vega Bernal family rallied swiftly 
to the Delahuertista cause following Manjarrez's decision to lead the state 
government into rebellion in 1923. 
Simmering factional friction continued in Cuetzalan throughout the Vega 
Bernal period of local authority. In April 1923, following a violent exchange of 
insults, Flores' ally, Jose Huidobro, was alleged to have attempted to kill Victor 
Vega Bernal. 34 Vega Bernal expressed great indignation that Huidobro 
remained free to walk the streets of Cuetzalan secure in the knowledge that he 
could rely on the protection of Barrios' troops. These troops had presumably 
been deployed to the town following the demobilisation of Vega Bernal's 35o. 
Batall6n. Victor Vega Bernal claimed that the soldiers were garrisoned at the 
house of Rosendo M. Calder6n for the sole purpose of protecting Flores, 
Calder6n, Huidobro and others of the Flores faction. 35 While Manjarrez 
remained in power, however, it appears that not even the presence of Barrios' 
troops was sufficient to end the Vega Bernal family's political supremacy in 
Cuetzalan. 
Yet all was not lost for the Flores faction. Flores' alliance to a man who 
enjoyed the full support of his military superiors began to bear fruit. Such 
benefits were evident in the conclusions of the military report in 1923, 
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concerning the alleged misconduct of Barrios' forces. 36 The report fully 
supported Barrios, while Ignacio Macip and the Vega Bernals were deemed to 
have been involved in a range of crimes including the murder of Indians. The 
report referred to the ruthless political ambitions of the Vega Bernal family and 
its personal vendetta against Jose Huidobro. The commission added that the 
close links between the Huidobro and Flores families were a force for regional 
progress, and that their association with Gabriel Barrios supported this ambition. 
It is clear from the report that the Jefatura in Puebla, under the command of 
General Almazän, had little sympathy for the local political affiliates of the 
acting governor, Manjarrez. Months later, the tension between Almazän and 
Manjarrez became more public when they became enemies in the Delahuertista 
uprising. 
Salvador Vega Bernal's swift decision to follow Manjarrez's state 
government into rebellion caused little surprise in the district of Zacapoaxtla. 
Even before Adolfo de la Huerta's move, several military reports suggested that 
the Vega Bernals and other ex-revolutionaries were engaged in banditry, even 
rebellion, in the tierra caliente. 37 Although Vega Bernal's right to retain an 
armed escort was withdrawn in June 1922, allegations of abuses and subversive 
activities continued. 38 In October 1922, the Jefatura in Puebla informed the 
Ministry of War that rebellion in the sierra caliente was imminent and that many 
in Cuetzalan expected that Salvador Vega Bernal was ready to join the 
uprising. 39 
Although no clear declaration was ever presented, by December 1923 
Salvador Vega Bernal was considered to have joined the Delahuerta cause. Only 
in April 1924, when the cause was all but lost, did Vega Bernal explain that he 
had only acted to protect himself from the attacks of Barrios' forces, assaults 
that were orchestrated by his personal enemy, Jose Maria Flores. 40 Less than a 
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week later, Victor Vega Bemal began to negotiate surrender terms with federal 
officers. In an audacious request, Vega Bernal demanded that surrender would 
be conditional upon his troops' safe return to Cuetzalan and payment of $10,000 
in return for weapons and ammunition. Calles refused the request outright. 
Times had changed. In March 1924 Calles was much more secure in his 
presidency than Obregön had been during 1921. The rebels returned to 
Cuetzalan without weapons and without compensation. It appeared that the 
Vega Bernal threat had finally been tamed. 4' 
Post-revolutionary reconstruction 
Factional violence and Vega Bernal's decision to join the Delahuertista 
rebellion, played into the hands of the cacique from Cuacuila. With Barrios 
now responsible for maintaining regional security, the actions of Vega Bernal's 
troops gave him a legitimate excuse to cross district and state borders in the 
pursuit of the Vega Bernals and all other miscreants who threatened stability. In 
so doing, Barrios was able to expand his control network. Similarly, violence in 
the district of Zacapoaxtla strengthened Barrios' case for improved 
communications, the cacique arguing that only through such developments could 
regional isolation be broken and an effective challenge be mounted against the 
rebelliousness and indiscipline that such isolation encouraged. Besides, those 
who helped to construct such vital links needed protection against attacks from 
the enemies of progress. Hence, 'progress' and 'order' were invoked to justify 
further military expansion. 
The conduit for improved communications in Zacapoaxtla was a road 
link to connect the railway junction at Zaragoza to the Veracruz coastal town of 
Tecolutla, passing through Zacapoaxtla and Cuetzalan. Opposition to the 
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project came from Zacapoaxtla, Cuetzalan and several Indian communities who 
argued that they would be detrimentally affected by the road. Zacapoaxtla 
opposed a project seen as threatening the cabecera's unique economic position as 
a regional market centre. 42 The road might increase markets for serrano 
produce, but it would also introduce external competition to threaten the 
Zacapoaxtla elite's trade monopoly. An important element to this argument was 
Cuetzalan's rising economic independence due to coffee cultivation. Its cooler 
climate meant that Zacapoaxtla could never become a centre of coffee 
production; the road project threatened to shift the balance of economic power 
down the slopes of the Sierra to Cuetzalan. 43 
Certainly both the pre-existing network of communications and those 
proposed by the white elite in the early 1920s, suggest that Zacapoaxtla was 
anxious to maintain its strategic economic position. Former communications in 
the district emphasised this role; a vehicular road connected Zacapoaxtla and the 
properties of the wealthy with the railway link at Zaragoza, while bridle-paths 
linked the district cabecera to other municipalities and the sierra caliente. 44 The 
suspension of faenas during the Revolution resulted in the serious deterioration 
of vehicular access between Zaragoza and Zacapoaxtla and bridle-paths were 
often impassable. 
Following the cessation of hostilities, Zacapoaxtla authorities were 
determined to reaffirm the cabecera's traditional role. In November 1920, the 
district's federal deputy, Angel Cuevas, suggested that the Zacapoaxtla 
authorities seek federal funds to repair the road between Zaragoza and 
Zacapoaxtla. 45 In 1921, the Zacapoaxtla authorities sought state government 
approval for a scheme to construct a tramway between Zacapoaxtla and 
Teziutlän, arguing that such a project would bring great commercial benefit. 46 
Months later, Barrios' future local ally, Carlos Macip, applied to the state 
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congress for a concession to construct a rail link between Zaragoza and 
Zacapoaxtla. 47 All these Zacapoaxtla initiatives aimed to improve the existing 
communications network between the Llanos, the cabecera, and the properties of 
the local elite. 
The strong bias towards projects that would reinforce Zacapoaxtla's 
economic importance adds weight to the suspicion that opposition to the 
Zaragoza/Tecolutla project was due to protectionism. However, interest in 
constructing a reliable road from Zaragoza to the tierra caliente was nothing 
new. Federal approval for such a road had been granted in 1876, and 
zacapoaxtecos had explored several possibilities of bringing such plans to 
fruition. It was even suggested that the two points might be connected by a 
railway link. 48 In many respects zacapoaxteco interest in such communication 
improvements was a logical development. While the cabecera's former position 
of economic privilege would have acted to stifle the entrepreneurial instincts of 
some, others in Zacapoaxtla must have viewed the project with optimism. After 
all, if the district's economic activities were to increase from a consequent boom 
in coffee production, then the Zacapoaxtla elite possessed the commercial 
expertise to capitalise on the region's good fortune. 
In addition, Zacapoaxtla's traditional political domination over Cuetzalan 
could not be lightly dismissed. Even though Cuetzalan showed signs of greater 
independence, there were still ways in which the Zacapoaxtla elite could make 
their influence felt. For the Vega Bernals to gain the ascendancy in Cuetzalan, 
for example, their influence was largely subject to the continued patronage of 
Ignacio and Wenceslao Macip. Without being directly involved in Cuetzalan, 
therefore, a Zacapoaxtla faction could still influence politics in the fast 
developing economy of its neighbouring municipality. 
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Two issues are raised by following this line of argument. If one of the 
factions in Zacapoaxtla had moved to control economic developments in 
Cuetzalan, then it might have been expected that the other faction, led by Carlos 
and Moises M. Macip, would have sought links with Flores and Barrios. As 
will be considered below, this logical step did not occur immediately. The other 
point to be addressed is, if economic protectionism cannot fully explain 
Zacapoaxtla's opposition to the road construction plan, what other factors were 
at play? A petition to the state governor from the municipal president of 
Cuetzalan in July 1921, provides information that might clarify both issues. 
Rosendo Calderon's letter to the governor referred to a project to link 
Zaragoza to the tierra caliente. The scheme, launched to celebrate the centenary 
of Independence in 1910, achieved great progress before the Revolution 
suspended construction. Calderon mentioned that during the occupation of 
Cuetzalan by Demetrio Barrios' forces in 1919, federal finances had been made 
available to revive the project, only for this work again to be thwarted by 
regional unrest. Calderon appealed to the governor for financial and moral 
support to bring this patriotic work to fruition. 49 Responding to the governor's 
inquiry for background information on the project, the opinions of Zacapoaxtla's 
municipal president, Moises Macip, reveal much about how this faction of the 
Zacapoaxtla elite viewed Barrios, Cuetzalan, and the issue of road construction. 
Macip asserted that the Zacapoaxtla authorities were unaware of the 
project to which Calderön referred. Although acknowledging that some plans 
had been discussed and that Demetrio Barrios had organised some construction 
work, Macip was dismissive of the progress made, suggesting that the route was 
more of a track than a road. Macip was also critical of the methods employed 
by Barrios' men to obtain the necessary labour. Barrios, he said, had made use 
of obligatory faenas and had charged every trader who used the route to 
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Zacapoaxtla. Macip recognised the great economic potential that improved 
communications would bring to the area, but warned that such a huge civil 
construction project needed government aid and, above all, the voluntary will of 
the people. Faenas were necessary, Macip argued, but could only be obtained 
through 'moderation, good sense and exquisite tact'. 50 
However, in November 1922, in his capacity as president of the 
Zacapoaxtla road construction committee, Moises Macip sent a report to 
President Obregön relating to work completed on the Zaragoza/Tecolutla road 
since the project's inception in October 1921. Macip displayed gratitude for the 
endeavours of deputies Tirado, of Zacapoaxtla and Gutierrez, of Papantla, in 
persuading the Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Obras Püblicas to support the 
scheme. He also acknowledged Jose Maria Flores' capable supervision of the 
project, and the help that Gabriel and Demetrio Barrios had furnished, both in 
terms of soldiers and federal aid. 51 
The two examples of Moises Macip's thoughts on the road project 
suggest that he was unsure of the stance that he and his faction should adopt. 
Macip's brusque denial in 1921 of any knowledge of the centennial project 
clearly contradicted the assertions of Cuetzalan's municipal president, Rosendo 
Calderon. In addition, Macip's inference that Barrios' crude methods threatened 
to jeopardise, rather than assist, the success of the project clearly implied that 
Macip felt that the organisation of labour for the project would be best left in 
safer hands. 
By November 1922, however, the political landscape had changed. The 
project had been adopted by the federal government and the fact that Jose Maria 
Flores obtained the important post of overall supervisor is indicative of the 
significant influence Barrios enjoyed in federal government circles. Had Tirado 
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held as much sway as Moises Macip's letter suggests it seems inconceivable that 
Tirado, a politician with close links to the Zacapoaxtla elite, would have allowed 
the project to fall into cuetzalteco control. By then, ties between Flores and 
Barrios had been substantially strengthened. A mutual interest in progressive 
development may have sweetened the bitter pill that Flores was forced to 
swallow by accepting the military support of an Indian in the fight against his 
local rival, Salvador Vega Bernal. 52 
Such a sweetener might not have been so effective in Zacapoaxtla, where 
factionalism had never reached the violent heights witnessed in Cuetzalan. The 
possibility remains that Moises and Carlos Macip were ambivalent about the 
road project because the inherent racialism of their society stopped them from 
giving full support to an initiative led by an Indian cacique. Macip mentioned 
Flores' capabilities yet only grudgingly acknowledged the role played by the 
Barrios brothers. This considered, what can be made of Macip's apparent 
awareness of the rights of Indian communities and the need to gain their co- 
operation through tact and sensitivity? Such apparent inconsistencies confuse 
Macip's motivations. The Zacapoaxtla faction may have been concerned by the 
prospect of an Indian controlling events, but their earlier objections may equally 
have been provoked by the fact that the project firmly placed the focal point of 
regional development into the hands of the Flores faction in Cuetzalan. 
Furthermore, in doing so, both factions within the Zacapoaxtla elite were being 
denied the traditional control that they had previously exercised over the labour 
potential existing in local Indian communities. A mixture of racism, 
neighbourly rivalry and fears of losing control of Indian labour appears to have 
influenced Macip's actions. 
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Part of Moises Macip's report to Obregön in 1922 helps to clarify his 
position. Referring to the rumour that the road would only benefit the white 
elite, Macip commented: 
Nothing is more false than the rumour disseminated by unworthy 
people. The road under construction IS NOT A PRIVATE ROAD 
NOR FOR THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF ANY COMPANY OR 
CORPORATION; from the very beginning , this project was given the name of 'ZARAGOZA - TECOLUTLA NATIONAL HIGHWAY' a 
name that clearly indicates that the highway is for 'PUBLIC' vehicular 
service and not a facility that will be monopolised by any one group. 
Unfortunately these misconceptions have found space to develop in the 
majority of communities, where, due to custom and lack of exchange in 
ideas, the people do not recognise the means by which they will 
achieve the well-being of everyone; stubborn in the love of their native 
soil, they believe that whatever form of civilisation is introduced, 
represents a direct threat to their interests. 53 
Macip depicts a district in a process of transformation. Economic and 
demographic change had already taken place before the Revolution. The 
introduction of coffee had required that Cuetzalan Indians lose some of their 
land, their political autonomy, and that many Indians turn to coffee farming in 
order to pay their contribuciones personales. The Zaragoza/Tecolutla road 
project accentuated these effects and placed considerable strain on Indian 
families by requiring them to give their free labour towards its construction. 
The road project, therefore, brought into question the established pattern 
of inter-ethnic relations in the Sierra. Many non-Indians saw the road as a 
progressive move, but was this concept of progress shared by Indian 
communities? The white elites who argued that forced faenas breached the 
campesinos' constitutional rights may have acted as paternal protectors of their 
Indian neighbours. Yet their expressed concern could equally have been a 
facade disguising opposition to change, and/or to Barrios. Furthermore, should 
one accept the view that Indian communities were static, vulnerable victims of 
mestizo progress? Leaders such as Juan Francisco Lucas and Francisco Agustin 
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Dieguillo proved themselves capable of utilising nineteenth century liberalism to 
their advantage. Surely their descendants would have inherited a similar 
political awareness and insisted on concessions in return for labour? 
Ethnic relations in a time of transition 
On 14 November 1921, President Obregön received the following 
telegramme from Feliciano Tapia, Jose Baez and other Cuetzalan Indians: 
We have the honour of informing you, Senor President, that by the 
arbitrary orders of General Gabriel Barrios, we are being forced to give 
two days of faenas each week for the construction of the national 
highway. The construction site is approximately twenty kilometres 
from our town. A list is to be taken of all those who refuse to attend 
faenas in order that the said officer can take measures against them. In 
the interests of federal justice, we strongly implore you to give our case 
the urgency it deserves so that we can enjoy the guarantees that the 
Constitution affords defenceless people, whose race continues to suffer 
the exploitation experienced by our people since the time of the 
conquest. 54 
Obregön replied that he could not intervene in 'asuntos de naturaleza', and 
added that it was the duty of all Mexicans to co-operate with the construction of 
much needed roads. 
The Zaragoza/Tecolutla road project presented the greatest challenge to 
ethnic relations in the district of Zacapoaxtla since the desamorrizacidn and the 
introduction of coffee. Either by persuasion or force, Indian communities were 
required to adopt the enthusiasm for progress that had captured the minds of the 
district's non-Indian elite. As Moises Macip's report implied, by 1922 
resistance to faenas had already become a problem. Macip believed this 
resistance to be based upon an ill-conceived notion that the road would only 
benefit the white race. Whether or not this was the case, petitions such as the 
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one sent by cuetzalteco Indians created the impression that they viewed faenas as 
a return to a form of exploitation that the Revolution had supposedly eradicated. 
The start of work on the road allowed local intellectuals the opportunity 
to display their knowledge of worldly matters. A month after the project 
commenced, Profesores Efrain Bonilla and Carlos Barrios (no relation) 
published propaganda in support of the scheme. (see Appendix IV. ) As would 
Moises Macip a year later, they emphasised the commercial opportunities that 
the road would bring for all serranos. They criticised local opponents of 
progress, likening them to those 'uneducated campesinos' in other areas who 
had used arms to stop railway tracks crossing their land. Their message was 
clear: ignorance could not be used as a barrier to progress, 'now is not the time 
for man to remain in savage isolation, but a time for reconciliation, 
understanding and civilisation'. 55 Yet there was no sign that such mutual 
understanding would be achieved through compromise on the part of the non- 
Indian. It was the Indian who was required to show flexibility. Sections of the 
white elite in Zacapoaxtla, carrying the banner of progress, had begun an assault 
upon their insularity. 
These publications failed to identify exactly who was responsible for 
spreading propaganda against the road project. It is clear from their rhetoric, 
however, that the local intelligentsia deemed the backward mentality of the 
Indian communities as a fertile ground upon which such opposition might thrive. 
Yet how could the Indian communities be persuaded to turn away from previous 
isolation? Reflecting the complaints made against Demetrio Barrios by the 
vecinos of Nauzontla, Moises Macip clearly counselled a more tactful approach 
to foster co-operation and mutual understanding. His obvious inference was that 
such an approach would be better conducted by those who had always negotiated 
issues relating to Indian labour provision; the white elite. 
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The Nauzontla vecinos typified the tenor of road-related complaints made 
by Indian communities. Demetrio Barrios was accused of forcing Indians to 
work on the road construction without wages or compensation for property that 
was damaged or destroyed. Vecinos cited a recent concession allowing a 
mestizo trader to operate a transport business along the road as confirmation of 
their suspicions that the sole benefactors of the project would be the white 
minority. Demetrio Barrios and his troops were said to have used threats to 
persuade vecinos to withdraw their complaints. 56 
Nauzontla's concerns were temporarily resolved when Demetrio Barrios' 
forces withdrew from the area a month later and Vega Bernal's troops assumed 
military control. Yet, although Barrios' methods may have been controversial, 
what alternative methods could have convinced Indian communities to co- 
operate with the construction project? In October 1920, the municipal president 
of Zacapoaxtla instructed the local authorities in Cuetzalan, Nauzontla and 
Xochitlän to organise faenas to carry out repairs to local thoroughfares. The 
authorities of Xochitlän, less than two kilometres from Nauzontla, reported 
considerable vecino resistance and asked for help to ensure compliance. Within 
a week, Vega Bernal had dispatched ten armed soldiers from Cuetzalan and the 
authorities in Xochitlän reported that repair work would shortly commence. 57 
Occasionally, the advocates of voluntary co-operation were prepared to 
use coercion, at other times a more conciliatory approach was adopted. As 
municipal president of Cuetzalan, Victor Bernal advised Moises Macip that he 
had successfully convinced those opposing faenas to change their stance. In 
return, Vega Bernal agreed that the presence of armed guards during the days of 
faenas was both unnecessary and contributed towards making faeneros feel like 
criminals. In addition, Vega Bernal reported that although the vecinos would 
give weekly faenas for the maintenance of local thoroughfares, they were only 
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prepared to give monthly faenas for the national highway project. 58 Again, the 
apparent reticence of vecinos to provide faenas that were not directly linked to 
their own region is evident, even though the national highway passed within a 
few kilometres of their communities. The extra burden was seen as another 
means by which the mestizo exploited the Indian. While the strength of the 
Indians argument cannot be denied, the labour demands for such an ambitious 
project made the offer of monthly faenas a totally inadequate response. The 
federal government adopted the project largely because it was assured that the 
serranos would give their voluntary labour towards the road's construction. If, 
however, such labour was limited to monthly faenas, the subsequent delay in 
completion would seriously jeopardise continued federal support for the scheme. 
Victor Vega Bernal' s comments suggest that he shared the sentiments 
expressed by Moises Macip: that the co-operation of the Indian communities 
could only be obtained through compromise and mutual understanding. Does 
this apparent concern for the Indian communities confirm the Vega Bernals' 
position as rebels fighting for social justice? The main evidence opposing this 
view comes from Indian complaints made against the Vega Bernal family at the 
1923 military enquiry. 59 But these examples alone cannot be used to condemn 
the Vega Bernals. It has already been suggested that the enquiry was biased 
towards Barrios. Furthermore, the majority of the complaints lacked 
corroboration and this suggests that they may have been manufactured by the 
Flores family as part of a wider campaign to undermine the Vega Bernals' 
position within the community. 
Nevertheless, one example does merit closer attention because it provides 
clues of the true nature of the Vega Bernals' relationship with local Indians. In 
October 1921, vecinos of Cuetzalan protested in the name of '13,000 Indians 
across the Sierra who had suffered four years of atrocities by Salvador Vega 
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Bernal's forces, who were acting under the guise of revolutionaries'. Vega 
Bernal's forces were accused of rape, murder and all manner of robberies. 
These abuses were contrasted with the brief respite when Barrios' forces 
controlled the area. Demetrio Barrios had organised the opening of fifteen 
schools in the area, which were later closed by the Vega Bernals. 60 
This accusation, in itself, is no different from others sent by vecinos of 
Cuetzalan, and an element of political manipulation by Flores cannot be ruled 
out. Replying to the accusations, Salvador Vega Bernal denied that any abuses 
had occurred since May 1920, but conceded that some Indians may have 
suffered during the Revolution. He argued that such were the unfortunate, but 
inevitable, consequences of war. Vega Bernal acknowledged the support that 
Barrios had enjoyed within Indian communities during the Revolution, citing 
this as the reason for treating such communities as enemies of the Villista 
cause. 61 
No matter how inadvertently, Vega Bernal's explanation of his actions 
only serves to condemn him. By acknowledging the widespread support for 
Barrios during the Revolution, credence is given to the view that Barrios was a 
positive influence in the area. Equally significant is Vega Bernal's admission 
that, in the past, his men may have committed abuses against Indian 
communities. It was somewhat naive of Vega Bernal to think that when the 
Revolution ended, he could resume a cordial relationship with the same 
communities. Obregön may have called for national reconciliation, but 
sentiments of anger and resentment could not easily be forgotten. Those who 
had suffered at the hands of the Vega Bernals would have been dismayed to 
learn that Salvador Vega Bernal had been permitted an armed escort, and that 
his brothers occupied positions of authority in Cuetzalan. In such an 
atmosphere, the Vega Bernals could hardly portray themselves as the champions 
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of the exploited Indian. Of the hundred men that Salvador Vega Bernal 
mustered during the raid on Cuetzalan in June 1919, no conclusive evidence has 
been found regarding the composition of the force. Some, like Baudelio Rivera, 
were undoubtedly employees of the family who followed the Vega Bernals into 
battle. There is also evidence that members of the white elite and mestizos from 
Zacapoaxtla joined the force. There is little evidence, however, of any 
significant support from Indian communities. 
Given Salvador Vega Bernal's antagonistic relationship with some Indian 
communities, it is plausible that his expressed concern for the exploitive nature 
of faenas was merely a screen to hide more personal motives. This does not 
mean that he was opposed to the project; indeed, as he himself pointed out, as a 
businessman he stood to gain from the increased markets that the road would 
facilitate. 62 He would have been dismayed, however, by the degree of influence 
gained by his political opponents as a result of Jose Maria Flores' central role in 
the scheme. Vega Bernal's fears were compounded by the deployment of 
federal forces to safeguard the road construction. Such a development would 
bring Barrios forces back into the district and their presence would strengthen 
the political prominence that Flores enjoyed. 
Motives did exist, therefore, for mestizos to incite Indian communities to 
reject the road project. To test this hypothesis and to gauge the degree of 
genuine Indian resistance to faenas, it is necessary to analyse more closely the 
nature of Indian opposition. Considering the large number of affected Indian 
communities in the Zacapoaxtla district, very few Indians ever objected to the 
road construction project. Of those who did, excepting the two cases from the 
nearby municipalities of Nauzontla and Xochitlän, all other complaints emanated 
from Cuetzalan. These complaints were made at times when the Vega Bernals 
held political control; either during the post-revolutionary phase that preceded 
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the Delahuerta uprising, or during the governorship of Claudio Tirado in 
1925.63 Circumstantial evidence, therefore, suggests that 'Indian' complaints 
attacking Barrios' use of faenas were, at the very least, encouraged by his non- 
Indian political opponents. 
The poverty of complaints from Indian communities regarding the road 
project may simply have been due to their inability to get their voices heard. 
Petitions called for considerable organisation and ayuntamientos who supported 
Barrios would have been unlikely to respond positively. Furthermore, the 
presence of Barrios' troops and cuerpos voluntarios may have persuaded 
communities to remain silent. 64 So complete may this intimidation have been, 
that even when the Vega Bernals were able and willing to forward such 
complaints, few communities had the courage to act. Yet the absence of any 
protests, even anonymous complaints, suggests that Indian resistance to the road 
project was not widespread. Even in 1930, when Almazän's state government 
actively encouraged serranos to register complaints against Barrios' caciquismo, 
there was no surge of complaints from the Indian communities in the 
Zacapoaxtla district. 
Faenas appear not to have been as much a source of Indian resentment as 
the Vega Bernals, Wenceslao and Ignacio Macip, and Claudio Tirado sought to 
portray. There is a strong suspicion, therefore, that Barrios' opponents 
exaggerated this resentment, using it as a weapon in a political conflict in which 
the Indian was a bystander. Given the magnitude of the Indian communities 
affected by faenas, very few refused to provide labour and even less sought to 
use their guarantees under the Constitution to argue that faenas were illegal. 
Yet neither can it be assumed that Indian communities were mere pawns in a 
mestizo political game. Thomson's work on the nineteenth century clearly 
shows that Indian communities used their potential to provide military service as 
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a means to secure local objectives. Similarly, under Gabriel Barrios, they 
expected to be shown favour in return for their loyalty. In this respect, it is 
inconceivable to imagine that in acquiescing over faenas, Indian communities 
would not have sought similar concessions. Yet the tendency for communities 
to focus their anxieties upon local issues has already been discussed, and this 
meant that the concessions that each community sought would reflect this limited 
vision of the world. The interests of a community trying to sustain cultural 
isolation, for example, were different from those communities that had accepted 
a measure of integration with the non-Indian world beyond. 
The small number of genuine Indian objections to faenas suggests that 
Barrios adopted a flexible approach in convincing various communities to co- 
operate. How did this work in practice? It will be remembered that the strength 
of the Barrios cacicazgo depended upon his ability to identify and incorporate 
more co-operative sections of a given community within his network of 
patronage. In communities where factions disposed to greater integration 
already existed, the imminent construction of the road would have encouraged 
them to become more apparent. By backing such groups, Barrios could swiftly 
influence a community's attitudes towards the road project without having to use 
coercion or direct interference in a community's internal politics. Such a tactic, 
appears to have taken place in Xochitlän where, in 1920, the vecinos had been 
hostile to demands for faenas on the national highway project. Six years later, 
however, the ayuntamiento of Xochitlän wrote a letter to Demetrio Barrios 
thanking him and his troops for their efforts to bring progress to the Sierra and 
pledging their loyalty and support for any future initiatives. 65 It is obvious that 
those who had acquired a leading position within the community had managed to 
steer the community towards co-operation rather than confrontation. 
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Detailed evidence of how Barrios transformed public opinion in 
Xochitlän has not been found, but assuming he used methods similar to those 
employed elsewhere in the Sierra, then he would have sought a faction within 
the community with whom he could do business. More recent studies in the 
community of Xalacapan confirm the vital role that factionalism played in 
serrano communities. When Cesar Espinola began his, study of Xalacapan in 
1961, he found a community in transition. Its proximity to the cabecera of 
Zacapoaxtla and to the Zaragoza/Tecolutla national highway had evidently 
exposed Xalacapan to the modernising influences of the non-Indian world. Yet 
important community decisions remained strongly influenced by tradition. 
Cesar Espinola perceived substantial resistance to any incorporation of the 
Indian culture within a homogeneous national identity. Forty years after 
Zacapoaxtla's intellectuals had called for racial integration, Xalacapan was 
holding firm. 
Torres Trueba's study on factionalism in 1968 found that the battle 
between modernity and tradition in Xalacapan had become more defined. 66 
Factions were either in defence of cultural isolation or pushing for greater 
integration into the exterior capitalist system. It appeared as though the latter 
group held the upper hand: certain individuals within Xalacapan had become 
bilingual and had developed economic and personal ties with mestizos in 
Zacapoaxtla. Such people were prepared to forsake their cultural restraints in 
exchange for the economic and social rewards that came from ties with the 
mestizo world. It is precisely this kind of division within an Indian community 
that Barrios sought to exploit. Incorporation of such groups into the cacicazgo 
placed them in a strong position to persuade their community to respond 
positively to Barrios' proposals. 
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Just as Xalacapan had undergone a period of transition with regards to its 
relations with the non-Indian world, so Barrios would have confronted other 
communities that were more hostile to outside interference. The lack of protests 
from such communities suggests that Barrios found an acceptable compromise 
that left local autonomy intact while, nonetheless, securing labour for road 
construction. During the 1960s, anthropological evidence suggests that the 
isolationist mentality that Barrios confronted forty years earlier was still a 
feature of Serrano life. Lourdes-Arizpe's study of Zacatipan reveals that strong 
suspicion existed concerning the motives for a proposal to link the community to 
the national highway. 67 Yet even in communities such as Zacatipan, underlying 
political and economic subordination to the cabecera of Cuetzalan forced 
compromises. Even though the community was essentially monolingual and 
mono-cultural, the key position of secretary was usually held by someone who 
was bilingual; someone who would best be able to protect the community's 
interests in the broader world. In addition, it was an economic imperative for 
those in Zacatipan who wished to trade in Cuetzalan to establish links with the 
cabecera's traders. With economic and political power often inextricable, for a 
Zacatipan trader to gain, for example, a licence to sell aguardiente, he had to 
pledge his political support to a certain group in Cuetzalan. Economic realities 
gave cuetzaltecos a political influence within Zacatipan without the need for 
more obvious intervention. In return, Zacatipan traders may have conceded a 
little, but did not jeopardise the community's underlying sense of cultural 
autonomy. 
The compromises made in Zacatipan in the 1960s may have been similar 
to those made by many serrano communities in the 1920s who viewed loyalty to 
Barrios as a necessary evil to reduce yet greater assaults upon their limited 
autonomy. Barrios did not attempt to dominate each and every aspect of Serrano 
life. Even had he wanted to, he lacked the resources and control network to 
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accomplish such a feat. What he did demand, however, was a certain level of 
co-operation from serrano communities. Whether to suppress banditry, build a 
school, give political support during elections, or to provide faenas for the 
national highway, such demonstrations of co-operation were the price that 
Barrios demanded for his benevolence. Providing these demands were met, 
serrano villages were allowed to retain a large degree of autonomy. In this way, 
Barrios was able to gain influence not only in communities that embraced 
greater integration, but also in those that wished to retain a measure of 
independence. 
If the argument that Indian co-operation in the construction of the 
national highway did not necessarily signify support for the scheme, then the 
difficult issue relating to cultural perceptions of 'progress' becomes obsolete. 
Minister of Education, Jose Vasconcelos, in Mexico City, newspapers and state 
government in Puebla City, and local intellectuals in Zacapoaxtla all agreed that 
the Zaragoza/Tecolutla project was an essential step in bringing progress to the 
Sierra de Puebla. Yet the term 'progress', as defined by the non-Indian 
authorities and shared by Barrios, meant greater integration within the 
mainstream culture and economy. It is clear from more recent anthropological 
studies that although Nahua and Totonac views of the world were incompatible 
with twentieth century notions of progress, nevertheless Indian communities 
have been able to come to terms with external pressures. 68 If the Zacatipan 
community is used as a model, then the attendance of faenas may have been 
seen as a means of placating an external mestizo world rather than a route to 
cultural self-destruction; a compromise designed to preserve a measure cultural 
autonomy rather than to hasten its demise. 69 
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Local skirmishes in a broader political conflict 
If Salvador Vega Bernal's military career was one of fighting a losing 
battle against ever greater odds, his subsequent political prominence suggests 
that he was a survivor. His political career continued long after Barrios' 
retirement from active military service in 1941. Ironically, Vega Bernal and 
Barrios' half-brother, Elpidio, would share the public forum during the 1951-4 
State legislature when both were deputies for Sierra districts "70 
The Vega Bernal family, however, did not emerge from the bitter 
factionalism unscathed. In October 1923, vecinos of the barrio of Xocoyolo, 
Cuetzalan, found the body of Rogelio Vega Bernal lying in a ditch. 7' He had 
been shot several times and, although a local man was accused of his murder, 
some vecinos later claimed that Barrios was behind the assassination. 72 Nor was 
Rogelio the only Vega Bernal casualty. In March 1927, Miguel Vega Bernal, 
father of the brothers, was gunned down in the streets of Zacapoaxtla. It was 
suggested that he was a victim of the on-going factional dispute in Cuetzalan, 
although no evidence of the Flores faction's involvement in the killing was ever 
produced. 73 
In the early 1920s, the Flores and Vega Bernal factions continued their 
struggle for control of the municipality of Cuetzalan. As was seen during 
Manjarrez's governorship, the Vega Bernals were at their strongest when their 
political allies in Zacapoaxtla enjoyed influence within state government. 
During the Delahuerta rebellion, the factional struggle abandoned its political 
guise and the military conflict between Salvador Vega Bernal and Barrios 
resumed. Throughout the rebellion, the Vega Bernals maintained their links 
with Wenceslao and Ignacio Macip. In the future, Flores would use this to cast 
doubt upon zacapoaxtecos' loyalty to the Sonorenses. 
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Rogelio Vega Bernal's assassination on the eve of rebellion, and 
Salvador's surrender in 1924, seemed to mark the family's final military defeat, 
thus securing Flores' domination of Cuetzalan politics. Thanks to the changing 
fortunes of state politics, however, Salvador Vega Bernal once more rose from 
the ashes. Following the two week interim governorship of Wenceslao Macip in 
February 1925, Claudio Tirado assumed the governorship of Puebla, a position 
he retained for two years. One of Tirado's first acts as governor was to appoint 
Wenceslao Macip as General Secretary of the state government and Rufino 
Landero as his Chief Clerk. The move confirms the substantial trust that Tirado 
placed in his Zacapoaxtla political allies. 74 Tirado's political hold appeared all 
the more complete as Ignacio Macip had been elected as state deputy for 
Zacapoaxtla in 1924, despite attempts by Barrios' forces to prevent him 
winning. 7s 
Barrios' failure to stop Ignacio Macip's election indicates that, when 
faced with a hostile state government, Barrios' position in the Sierra was 
noticeably weakened. Upon assuming power in Puebla, Tirado took immediate 
steps to regain some of the regional influence lost to Barrios and Flores as a 
result of their control of the national highway project. On 14 February 1925, 
Tirado's government nullified the recent municipal elections in Cuetzalan, 
claiming that the pro-Flores group had fraudulently taken control of the 
ayuntamiento. Anticipating state government intervention, Flores and others 
approached President Calles alleging that Tirado had fabricated complaints 
against the ayuntamiento as a pretext to impose a local authority servile to his 
demands. 76 
The ensuing political battle was characterised by claims and counter- 
claims of abuses by both political factions. On 30 April 1925 vecinos of 
Cuetzalan complained that Barrios troops had forced them at gun-point to give 
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faenas for the construction of the national highway. The vecinos repeated an 
earlier suspicion that the road was purely for the benefit of Flores. Flores was 
depicted as a cacique sustained by the defensa social, a group of local thugs who 
had the backing of both Barrios and General Almazän. A further letter from 
vecinos of Cuetzalan reported the return of Jose Huidobro, a man who had been 
removed from the area due to his abuses of power when leader of the same 
defensa social group. The accusation that the road project would only benefit 
Flores and his political friends was repeated. 77 
Evidence that the dispute extended beyond the municipality of Cuetzalan 
is provided in a letter sent by Mario Molina to Flores in June 1925. Molina, a 
resident of Zacapoaxtla, reminded Flores that in the recent elections he had 
campaigned hard in support of Barrios' candidate. However, since Tirado had 
become governor, Tirado's family and compadres had used their positions of 
local authority to threaten him. Molina asked Flores to obtain Barrios' 
permission to carry arms for self-defence. He added that fifty youths in 
Zacapoaxtla had expressed the desire to join Barrios' forces. Molina could 
vouch for their loyalty and asked Flores to seek Barrios' response to their 
request. 
Molina's letter to Flores sheds more light on political events in 
Zacapoaxtla. Molina warned Flores that although Barrios had helped Carlos 
Macip Jnr. to become a deputy in the past, in the recent elections Macip had co- 
operated with other Macips to ensure Tirado's victory. In addition, Molina 
warned that Ricardo Macip had recruited a local defensa social group in 
Zacapoaxtla. Molina predicted that Tirado would use the group's existence to 
argue against the need for continued deployment of federal troops to ensure 
public security. The consequential removal of Barrios' forces from the area 
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would, Molina feared, be a disaster for Barrios' influence in the region and 
would allow Tirado and the Macips to gain full control of the district. 78 
In an atmosphere of rising political tension, the Puebla press joined the 
attack against the methods used by Barrios and Flores to secure labour for road 
construction. Flores informed Calles that the press attacks were the result of 
misinformation dispersed by 'those in Zacapoaxtla who are the enemies of 
Cuetzalan and the road project and who, now that they have acquired positions 
of responsibility in the state government, are using their powers to increase their 
attacks on the forces of progress'. Less than two weeks later, Demetrio Santa 
Fe reported that Salvador Vega Bernal was spreading Delahuertista propaganda 
in Zacapoaxtla and had attracted much support among exiled cuetzaltecos by his 
promise that the first action in his military campaign would be against the hostile 
authorities in Cuetzalan. 79 
In August 1925 Tirado took decisive action. In an explanatory letter to 
President Calles, Tirado referred to the previous illegal seizure of municipal 
authority in Cuetzalan and the mounting pressure upon him to rectify the 
situation. In response, Tirado had sent a government official, accompanied by 
fifteen mounted police, to Cuetzalan with orders to remove the ayuntamiento, to 
restore law and order, and to install a legally recognised municipal authority. 
He asked Calles to order the Jefatura to ensure that Barrios' troops would 
facilitate the smooth transition of authorities. 80 
Barrios dared not risk the consequences of obstructing a military force 
with the backing of the state government. Felipe Ortiz, municipal president of 
the Flores-backed ayuntamiento, appealed to Calles against the imposition of 
what he saw as an immoral, Delahuertista ayuntamiento and reported that he, his 
ayuntamiento and 680 cuetzaltecos had withdrawn from the town and had taken 
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refuge on the Ranch of Casastepec, two kilometres from Cuetzalan. In addition, 
the mothers, wives and daughters of the Flores faction asked Calles to help 
restore the legal authorities to Cuetzalan and to order the withdrawal of the state 
mounted police. 81 
Throughout the following year, accusations and counter-accusations were 
made as both factions in Cuetzalan attempted to convince the federal authorities 
of the validity of their claims. Tirado warned that Flores' defensa social in 
Casastepec, represented a constant threat to peace. Meanwhile vecinos in 
Cuetzalan congratulated President Calles on his decision not to interfere in state 
affairs; to have done so would have seriously increased the likelihood of again 
subjecting the town to the military caciquismo of Flores. 82 Flores and the 
deposed municipal president, Ortiz, accused Tirado and his supporters of 
fabricating accusations. They repeated that friction in Cuetzalan was due to the 
political intrigues of a group in Zacapoaxtla which, together with Tirado, was 
determined to suspend the construction of the national highway project. 83 The 
Flores faction was trying hard to bind the local political dispute to factors of 
national policy. 
An interesting phase of the conflict occurred in October 1925. From 
correspondence between Flores and Barrios, it appears that Tirado was prepared 
to compromise in order to resolve the situation in Cuetzalan. He proposed a 
plebiscite which would, presumably, have let the cuetzaltecos decide their own 
future. The Barrios camp appeared to accept the suggestion, provided the state's 
mounted police be withdrawn from the town ten days before the plebiscite. As 
Flores awaited a response from Tirado, he expressed doubt whether the 
compromise would be accepted as ' [Rufino] Landero and [Wenceslao] Macip 
are opposed to it'. 84 Flores considered both men to hold such influence over 
Tirado as to veto any proposal that might have resolved the dispute in 
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Cuetzalan. That no evidence exists of the acceptance of the revised proposal 
suggests that Flores was correct in his assessment. 
The battle for control of Cuetzalan was, of course, a symptom of the 
broader political struggle between Tirado and Barrios. With federal elections 
looming in 1926, the centre of friction switched from Cuetzalan to Zacapoaxtla. 
Ignacio Macip claimed he had been the victim of political intrigue orchestrated 
by Barrios: an accusation that was emphatically denied by Barrios' superior 
officer in Puebla, General Amaya. For good measure, Amaya advised President 
Calles that the Macip brothers were implicated in several disturbances in 
Zacapoaxtla, including the fatal shooting of a youth. Obviously, Amaya was 
keen to support his military commander in the Sierra. 85 
Amaya's account of the situation was reiterated in a complaint from 
Ignacio Macip's political rival in Zacapoaxtla, Constantino Molina. Molina 
asked Calles to help prevent the Macip brothers' unlawful attempts to prolong 
their nepotistic control of political and military authority. Molina directly 
implicated the Macips to the Delahuertista cause, and suggested that despite their 
considerable influence in the region, the Macips were unpopular throughout the 
state of Puebla. As candidate for the Alliance of Socialist Parties, Molina 
appealed to the president to deploy federal forces to uphold the law and ensure 
that fair elections took place. 86 Molina's appeal appears to have found favour. 
Two weeks later the Zacapoaxtla ayuntamiento complained that Barrios forces 
had arrived in the city and were working to ensure Constantino Molina's 
election. In this, Barrios received the full support of the Jefatura in Puebla who 
confirmed that the deployment of his forces was in response to complaints 
regarding the abuses committed by the Macip brothers. 87 Molina was duly 
elected deputy to the federal congress for the district of Zacapoaxtla for the 
period 1926-30. 
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The battle between Tirado and Barrios for control of the district began to 
drift away from the governor. With the Ministry of War supporting Barrios' 
presence in Zacapoaxtla, and with Lombardo Toledano and the pro-Barrios bloc 
in federal congress baying for Tirado's blood, Tirado's position was desperate. 
On 16 August 1926, Tirado sent Calles a list of communiques from serrano 
ayuntamientos seeking remedies for the actions of Barrios' forces. These 
appeals included two telegrammes from Zacapoaxtla reporting that Barrios' men 
had entered Cuetzalan, arrested several members of the ayuntamiento and, on 13 
August 1926, had disbanded the state-imposed authorities. 88 Barrios confirmed 
that the ayuntamiento had been forced to step down but explained that this was a 
result of the spontaneous action of a community tired of the abuses of the 
officials. Barrios added that the vecinos of Cuetzalan had forced the officials 
and their supporters out of town and they were presently taking refuge in 
Zacapoaxtla where they continued to make false accusations against him and his 
troops. 89 General Amaya forwarded Barrios' reply to Calles in a letter that 
contained the damning footnote: 'If all your supporters worked with the loyalty 
and sincerity that senor Tirado displays, then your Supreme Government would 
be lost and the Revolution would fall into the most sorrowful collapse. '° 
Nonetheless, Calles was sufficiently worried by Tirado's accusations to 
order an investigation conducted by Francisco Heredia. Referring to events in 
the Zacapoaxtla district, Heredia confirmed that Tirado's claims were 
fundamentally accurate. The previous ayuntamiento in Cuetzalan had been 
forced out of office by an armed group and were taking refuge in Zacapoaxtla 
together with fifty former vecinos. Heredia added that such an occurrence was 
not uncommon in the Sierra where rival factions strove for local supremacy. 
Heredia added that Barrios' forces, if not actively involved in such actions 
themselves, were at least allowing pro-Barrios groups to terrorise factions loyal 
to Tirado. 91 
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Despite Heredia's report, as discussed in chapter four, Barrios ultimately 
triumphed over Tirado and his enemies in Zacapoaxtla and Cuetzalan. Ignacio 
Macip's influence as deputy in the state congress was severely curtailed 
following Tirado's removal from the governorship. Similarly on Tirado's 
removal, Rufino Landero and Wenceslao Macip lost their positions of influence 
in state government. With the anti-Barrios faction in Zacapoaxtia on the retreat, 
the Vega Bernals found their ability to resist the Flores faction weakened. It 
was during this period that Miguel Vega Bernal was gunned down in the streets 
of Zacapoaxtla. With Tirado deposed and with Barrios deputies lodged in state 
and federal congresses, there was no serious challenge to Barrios' influence in 
the Zacapoaxtla district until 1929, when the governorship of Leonides Almazän 
heralded a more comprehensive attempt to dismantle the cacicazgo. 
Broader applications 
A brief case study can not address the full complexity of Barrios' 
influence in the Zacapoaxtla district. This analysis has concentrated upon key 
moments, players and issues within the district's history during the 1920s which 
shed light on how Barrios controlled the Sierra. 92 
Much of the discussion has revolved around the construction of the 
Zaragoza/Tecolutla road. The project, and the wider programme of regional 
development that it represented, were crucial in Barrios' battle to retain the 
support of his military and political superiors. Similar schemes were conducted 
throughout the Sierra and, as discussed in the previous chapter, the image of 
Barrios as a dynamic symbol of revolutionary progress was vital to his quest for 
regional dominance. 
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From a local perspective, developments such as the Zaragoza/Tecolutla 
project permitted Barrios to extend his military presence and political patronage. 
Under the guise of sustaining the progressive impulse of the Revolution, Barrios 
was able to deploy troops to 'protect' faeneros and provide technical and 
logistical support. Defensas sociales were formed to help 'local men of 
progress' ensure that the campesinos' 'voluntary desire' to co-operate with these 
projects was respected. Thus, the extension of the cacicazgo parallelled the 
advance of revolutionary progress. 
The road project provoked debate and division within Indian 
communities and non-Indian cabeceras alike. Barrios used these issues to 
identify the more amenable sector of society and, through patronage, ensured 
that his friends became the dominant voice in any given community. The nature 
of this process depended upon each local situation. Across the Sierra in 
Amixtlän, where the Galindo family held a similar position to that enjoyed by 
the white elites in Zacapoaxtla, no internal division existed. The Galindos 
agreed to support Barrios' regional domination and his proposals to construct a 
national highway that would pass through Amixtlän on its way to the coast. The 
reward for their loyalty was that afforded to any faithful, influential supporters 
of the cacicazgo. Members of the family received Barrios' backing for their 
political aspirations while others became genre de confianza, jefes de armas, 
holding on to their existing powers. 
In Zacapoaxtla, divisions within the elite and between the district capital 
and coffee-rich Cuetzalan, prevented such an easy accommodation with Barrios. 
Centuries of white supremacy and Zacapoaxtla's fear of losing control to 
Cuetzalan, prevented such a move. Yet, as Flores would realise, federal 
government backing meant that Barrios could no longer be ignored. Carlos and 
Moises Macip crossed the same ethnic barrier as Flores, the decisive saving 
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grace being a common interest in economic development. Just as a mix of 
personal ambitions combined to persuade some to join Barrios, these same 
incentives convinced others that their future lay elsewhere. As Heredia's report 
suggested, this dilemma faced most groups with political aspirations in the 
Sierra: to pledge loyalty to Barrios or to the governor. 
Anthropological studies in the 1960s confirm that the absorption of 
Indian culture into a hybrid national mestizo identity remained more a central 
government ideal than a reality. It is unlikely that these same Indian 
communities were any more culturally integrated forty years earlier. Most 
Indian communities in the Sierra remained on the margins of the processes of 
modernisation found in post-revolutionary Mexico. A degree of economic and 
bureaucratic integration had existed for centuries, but the general trend was a 
stubborn defense of local autonomy, no matter how limited that might be. It 
can be assumed, therefore, that excepting communities whose property was 
directly affected by the project, most Indian communities viewed the 
Zaragoza/Tecolutla road as a necessary evil. A marked scepticism about the 
road bringing them increased economic opportunities was conditioned by the 
fact that their own experiences, and those of their forefathers, were of 
exploitation at the hands of land-owners and/or mestizo traders in the cabeceras. 
Where such road projects did impinge upon Indians throughout the Sierra 
was in the demand for faenas. Each day given to road construction was a day 
lost in the field. It must be remembered, however, that faenas were an integral 
part of serrano life. Local authorities had always obliged Indian males to forfeit 
time from their agricultural duties for the benefit of the community. While most 
faenas would have taken place within the immediate environs, demands for 
work less directly relevant to the needs of the community were common. How 
else, for example, would the Porfiriato communication routes linking Zaragoza 
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to the ranches of the Zacapoaxtla elite have been built and regularly maintained? 
The absence of widespread Indian resistance to faenas suggests that they were 
not the burning issue they were purported to be. More accurately, perhaps, 
faena attendance in the Sierra was viewed as a necessary concession granted to 
external authorities to ensure that communities be left in relative peace. 
All this suggests that Barrios' cacicazgo was a much less rigid structure 
than his image suggests. Barrios demanded obedience and stability. But these 
objectives were achieved through negotiation and involvement in local factional 
disputes. If there was a group within a community prepared to offer these basic 
requirements, it could expect the cacique's support. But it was not in his 
interest to become too involved with the community's internal affairs. Had 
Barrios attempted to ride rough-shod over Indian traditions and enforce a rigid 
regime, then Indian resistance would have been greater. As the example of 
Zacapoaxtla illustrates, protest against Barrios rarely originated from the Indian 
communities themselves. Moreover, this pattern was repeated throughout the 
Sierra where Barrios sought to achieve stability or to get things done. 
Opposition to Barrios' influence, in Zacapoaxtla as in the Sierra as a 
whole, was much more the pastime of his mestizo political opponents. Faenas 
became the focus of complaints against Barrios for several important reasons. 
In many areas of the Sierra, Barrios insisted that faenas should be performed by 
all vecinos, not just Indians. This departure from custom was guaranteed to 
provoke a negative response from mestizos throughout the Sierra. In addition, it 
had become obvious to his political opponents that the life-blood of the 
cacicazgo stemmed from his promotion of regional development and progress. 
Neither Vega Bernal, nor Wenceslao Macip, and not even Governor Tirado 
could risk directly opposing such projects. To do so would have been political 
suicide. The most effective line of attack thus rested on the defence of 
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constitutional guarantees under attack from Barrios. By questioning the 
constitutional legitimacy of faenas, Barrios' opponents could attack his methods 
without criticising the programme itself. Even after his removal from the area, 
the Puebla press attacks against Barrios fell short of criticising his contribution 
to economic reconstruction. Comments were restricted to condemning the price 
that Barrios demanded for his services. 
The actions of the Vega Bernals in Cuetzalan are helpful in shedding 
light on the wider political scene in the district of Zacapoaxtla and beyond. 
Their struggle for local control provides a revealing example of a group driven 
to rebellion, not by ideology, but by the opportunity to raise the stakes in a local 
factional dispute. Their decision to rebel, added a new dimension to a process 
of change that already existed within the area. It also provoked long-term 
consequences for the development of political affiliations in the district. Earlier 
in the Revolution, in the neighbouring district of Tetela, similar decisions were 
being made by the rival factions led by the Marquez family of Otlatlän and Juan 
Francisco Lucas of Tetela. Lucas' death and Barrios' decisive assault on the 
Märquez's headquarters in 1917, settled the issue in favour of the pro-Lucas 
faction. In Cuetzalan, the Vega Bernals proved more resilient and, as a result, 
the political challenge to the pro-Barrios faction survived for much longer. 
Yet the factional dispute between the Vega Bernal and Flores families in 
Cuetzalan did not take place in isolation but was linked to the far broader issue 
of exactly who controlled the district of Zacapoaxtla. Control over the 
organisation of faenas was only the most obvious example of Barrios' move to 
usurp the traditional powers of the white elite in Zacapoaxtla. For centuries it 
had been they who had directed and controlled the labour potential of their 
Indian neighbours. Through Barrios' initiatives, they saw this privilege being 
spirited away by none other than an illiterate Indian. 
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Irrespective of the degree of racism that fuelled the initial animosity 
between Barrios and sectors of the Zacapoaxtla elite, his rise to regional 
prominence soon converted this friction into a political battle for control of the 
district. And unlike the majority of the Sierra, things did not fully go Barrios' 
way. In Claudio Tirado and his Zacapoaxtla allies, Barrios faced a formidable 
challenge in a region where he lacked the popular support that he had already 
established in the districts of Tetela and Zacatlän. Using the fortunes of 
Tirado's followers in Zacapoaxtla and Cuetzalan as local indicators of broader 
trends, it is obvious that when his opponents held influence in Puebla City, 
Barrios was restricted in his efforts to strengthen his grip on the district of 
Zacapoaxtia. During the early, formative years of Barrios' cacicazgo, Tirado 
held the post of senator for the Zacapoaxtla district and his local allies within the 
district held key political posts. (see footnote 34. ) At this stage, Barrios' role in 
Zacapoaxtla affairs was limited to military actions that suffered obstructionism 
and criticism from local authorities. Later, even though Jose Maria Flores had 
become a prestigious figure as Director of the Zaragoza/Tecolutla road project, 
neither he nor Barrios were able to prevent Governor Tirado replacing the pro- 
Flores ayuntamiento in Cuetzalan with another more aligned to the state 
government. Although Barrios possessed the means to stop the state's mounted 
police overseeing the transition of power in the town, any attempt to do so 
would have strengthened Tirado's claim that Barrios was in rebellion against the 
state government. Only when Barrios, Toledano and others had succeeded in 
making Tirado's removal from office inevitable, could Barrios be said to have 
gained control of the district with any degree of certainty. 
How many other areas of the Republic were disputed by factions such as 
those that fought for control of Cuetzalan? How many of the local rebellions of 
the 1920s were rooted in a continuation of local factionalism rather than protests 
against federal authority? While there were undoubtedly many groups who 
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fought for social equality and land reform, there were many other 
'revolutionaries' who neither anticipated, nor desired reform. The Vega 
Bernals' fought for the Delahuertistas because, by doing so, they hoped to 
extend their political influence. When the military option finally ended, 
factionalism in Cuetzalan continued. When Miguel Vega Bernal was gunned 
down in 1927, he was just the latest victim of the continuing friction between 
two rival factions; an open wound that would fester for many years to come. 
275 
Footnotes to Chapter 6 
1 Sosa, Crönica, p. 77. 
2 Thomson, 'Montana and Llanura', pp. 59-78. 
3 It should be noted that few serranos beyond the municipality of Zacapoaxtla are 
prepared to bestow the cabecera such an accolade. Many serranos, particularly those 
from the neighbouring district of Tetela, point out that the indigenous troops that 
fought in Puebla were from other areas of the Sierra and merely mustered in 
Zacapoaxtla prior to deployment. 
4 Ideological differences between the liberalism of Lucas' home town of Xochiapulco 
and the traditional conservatism of Zacapoaxtla, make comparisons between Lucas and 
Barrios difficult to apply in the district of Zacapoaxtla. Barrios came to the district 
with a much broader agenda than Lucas, and a distinct political rationale. Barrios 
quickly reduced his dependency on Xochiapulco for popular support by reaching an 
accommodation with the wide range of communities found within the district. Thus he 
lost little by maintaining a pragmatic, rather than ideological, style of leadership. 
5 Barrios Bonilla, El Cafe en Cuetzalan, p. 38. 
6 For details of the clash between Dieguillo and mestizo migrants see: LaFrance & 
Thomson, 'Juan Francisco Lucas: Patriarch of the Sierra Norte de Puebla'; Thomson, 
'Agrarian Conflict'; Thomson, 'Bulwarks of Patriotic Liberalism'; Valderrama Rouy & 
Ramirez Suarez, 'Resistencia etnica'. These studies show that mestizo encroachment 
was not always met by passive submission. Mestizo actions in Cuetzalan provoked 
both the indigenous raid on the town led by Lucas and the subsequent rebellion led by 
Agustin. This one locality demonstrates how violent reaction against mestizo 
encroachment contributed towards the birth of a new militarist element within Indian 
leadership. In Lucas' case this was to break all known colonial precedents by reaching 
beyond the confines of strictly localised influence. 
7 These families should be viewed as mestizos as although their wealth and habits may 
have made many Indians to view them as members of the white elite, the Zacapoaxtla 
elite showed little willingness to admit them into their number. 
An indication of the Flores faction's economic and social control in Cuetzalan is 
demonstrated by the fact that, together with Ignacio Maria Orduna, Jesüs Flores and 
Jose Maria Calderön had a monopoly on aguardiente production. As Indians were the 
main consumers of aguardiente, such a monopoly enabled these mestizo families to 
gain considerable influence in the lives of the many Indians who fell into debt as a 
result of excessive drinking. For details of aguardiente production see: Barrios 
Bonilla, El Cafe en Cuetzalan, p. 44. 
8 This gradual marginalisation of the Nahua community of Cuetzalan is described in 
Lourdes-Arizpe, Parentesco y economta, p. 43. 
Lourdes-Arizpe's study of Zacatipan, reveals the effects of pre-revolutionary change. 
The inhabitants of Zacatipan once lived in Cuetzalan. When confronted by mestizo 
migration, they moved to nearby San Andres Tzicuilan. Further mestizo settlement 
threatened Indian control of San Andres and only by moving to a remote hilltop, where 
the mestizo desire for land was unlikely to reach them, did the community of Zacatipan 
find relative peace. 
9 Nickel, H. J., Morfologta social de la hacienda mexicana, (Mexico, 1988), p. 235. 
10 That such tension still survives is apparent in an anecdote related to the author by a 
vecina of Cuetzalan in 1993: 
A travelling salesman, on his way to Cuetzalan, broke his journey with an overnight 
stay in Zacapoaxtla. That evening he struck up conversat 
asked 
ion with the hotel owner who 
him why he was heading to Cuetzala n. The salesman replied that he was trying 
tzalan to purchase his company's ran ge of women's to persuade the traders in e 
undergarments. The hotel owner gave a mirthful laugh and told the salesman that he 
276 
was wasting his time. 'The women of Cuetzalan are all ignorant Indians, they don't 
wear underwear. ' 
11 Hoffmann, 0., Tierra y territorio en Xico, Veracruz, (Xalapa, 1992). Hoffmann's 
study of the changes heralded by the introduction of coffee into the Coatepec district of 
Veracruz makes an interesting comparison with events in Zacapoaxtla. 
12 Interview with Baudelio Rivera, 16 Dec. 1993, Cuetzalan. 
Rivera was a servant in the household of Miguel and Epigmenia Vega Bernal. He 
states that Miguel Vega Bernal was the local school teacher in Cuetzalan. 
13 Peral, M. A., Diccionario Histörico, Biogrdfico y Geogrdfico del Estado de Puebla, 
quoted by Hernändez Enriquez, Historia Moderna de Puebla, p. 17. 
14 AMC, Caja 126, Presidencia, 1914. 
Thirteen members of a Tirado family lived in Cuetzalan in 1914. 
15 APGL. 1914. See letter dated 27 July 1914 addressed to General Antonio Medina. 
16 AML, Fomento, exp. 4, Jan. 1921. 
See communiques 28 March 1921 from the state government to the municipal president 
of Libres regarding the invasion of Miguel Macip's farm by twenty armed men from 
the town of San Miguel Tenextatiloyan. 
17 Interview with Jose Flores Huidobro, 13 Dec. 1993, Cuetzalan. 
As in Zacapoaxtla, the rising dominant group in Cuetzalan society was reinforced 
through social and personal ties. Jesus Flores' son, Jose Maria, married the daughter 
of Jose Maria Huidobro. Jesus Flores was considered to be a cacique whose influence 
was due to his success in coffee. Reflecting the Sierra politics of his day, Flores was 
seen as a liberal patriarch and an anti-cleric. Jos6 Maria Huidobro was an officer with 
the Ejercito Oriente at the battle of 5 de mayo, who later sought refuge in the rural 
obscurity of Cuetzalan. He, too, shared the liberal sentiments of the Flores family, yet 
such liberalism did not extend beyond the bounds of ethnicity. Huidobro viewed the 
local Indian community with contempt, and could never bring himself fully to accept 
the prominent position of the Indian leader, Juan Francisco Lucas. 
18 Interview with Josh Flores Huidobro, 13 Dec. 1993, Cuetzalan. 
19 Upon Lucas' death in Feb. 1917, command of the Brigada Serrana was divided. 
Barrios controlled the Tetela district and Tranquilino Quintero's forces were deployed 
to Teziutlän. Rivalry between the two officers ended in 1919 when Quintero was 
moved to an administrative job as head of the Corp de Invdlidos. As a consequence, 
Barrios assumed command of the entire Sierra Norte military sector, including the 
district of Zacapoaxtla. 
20 AMC, Caja 137, Gobernaci6n, exp. 2,104. 
See the municipal president's four monthly report dated 31 Aug. 1918. 
21 AMC, Caja 140A, Presidencia, exp. 2,33. 
See letter dated 17 July 1919. 
22 ADN, C, 2-754, tomo 1, Vega Bernal, Salvador. 
See archive note of report by Colonel Dinörin dated 16 Feb. 1918. 
23 Interview with Salvador Vega Rodriguez, 14 Dec. 1993, Cuetzalan. 
24 Interview with Baudelio Rivera, 16 Dec. 1993, Cuetzalan. 
25 AMC, Caja 140A. Presidencia, exp. 2,33. 
26 Interview with Baudelio Rivera, 16 Dec. 1993, Cuetzalan. 
Senor Rivera's comments must be viewed in light of the fact that before taking up of 
arms, he had been employed as a mono in the Vega Bernal household. It is, therefore, 
difficult to separate the extent to which the desire for social justice, rather than loyalty 
to his employer, influenced his decision to follow Salvador Vega Bernal into battle. 
277 
27 Knight, 'Caudillo and peasant', p 49. 
This view of the Vega Bernal family certainly satisfies Knight's assertion that Villistas 
were commonly groups whose allegiance to the cause was uncertain and superficial, 
and who were often local, anti-Carrancista movements merely assuming the Villista 
label for convenience. 
28 AMZ'x, Gobernaciön, 27,58/9. 
See correspondence dated 29 July 1920 and 3 Aug. 1920. 
29 AGN, O-C, 816-P-45- 
See page 7 of the military report written by General Almazän dated 1 May 1923. 
30 For more details refer to chapter 2. 
31 ADN, C, 2-754, tomo 1, ff. 51 & 55. 
32 Interview with Salvador Vega Rodriguez, 14 Dec. 1993, Cuetzalan. 
33 Hernändez Enriquez, Historia Moderna de Puebla, p. 73. 
34 AMZ'x, Gobernaciön, 24,1923. 
See letter dated 21 April 1923 from the municipal president of Zacapoaxtla to the state 
government. 
AMC, Caja 153, Justicia, 189. 
Copy of judicial enquiry dated 20 June 1923. 
AGN, O-C, 816-P-45. 
See page 8 of the military report written by Juan A. Almazän dated 1 May 1923. 
35 AMC, Caja 152, Gobernaciön, 144. 
See letter dated 22 April 1923 from Victor Bernal to the state government and 
municipal president in Zacapoaxtla. 
36 AGN, O-C, 816-P-45. 
The report demonstrated the extent of the hegemony that Senator Claudio Tirado 
exercised: Wenceslao Macip was federal deputy; his brother, Ignacio, the Recaudador 
de Rentas; Victor Vega Bernal was municipal president of Cuetzalan; Arnulfo Ortega, 
cutnado of the Macips was Juez Correccional in Cuetzalan; Salvador Vega Bernal, who 
was afforded a continuing military presence in the region thanks to a fifteen man escort 
funded by the Ministry of War. These individuals, by family or political ties, 
represented a continuous chain of patronage that flowed from the state government to 
the municipal judge. 
37 BLC. RHAM. Caja 1922. Telegrammes for January 1922. 
See communique dated 22 Jan. 19/22 from Barrios to the Jefatura in Puebla. 
According to Demetrio Barrios, Vega Bernal's troops had been operating in the sierra 
caliente near Papantla and it was clear from their actions that they were engaging either 
in rebellion or banditry . Similar reports of rebel activity in the same area were said to have been the work of troops led by Lindoro Hera ndez. 
38 ADN, C, 2-754, f. 127. 
Vecinos of Coxquihui, Veracruz, claimed that Governor Manjarrez was supporting the 
Vega Bernal family. As a result, they were suffering repeated robberies, atrocities and 
extortion by Vega Bernal's troops. 
ADN, C, 2-754, ff. 126 & 129. 
Jose Maria Flores reinforced the claim of Coxquihui vecinos, stating that Vega Bernal's 
troops were subversives and dedicated to banditry. 
BLC. RHAM. Caja 1922. Telegrammes for August 1922. 
See communique dated 25 Aug. 1922 from Barrios to the Jefatura in Puebla, informing 
that Rogelio Vega and others were distributing seditious public propaganda in the sierra 
caliente and in the district of Tlatlauquitepec. 
39 ADN, C, 2-754, f. 14. 
278 
40 ADN, C, 2-754, ff. 291-93. 
See declaration dated 9 March 1924 made by Vega Bernal to the Ministry of War. 
41 ADN, C, 2-754, if. 300-2. 
42 This view was argued by Pare in Caciquismo y poder politico, p. 42. 
43 Interview with Jaime Mora, 13 Dec. 1993, Cuetzalan. 
Senor Mora reflects the prevalent belief in Cuetzalan that Zacapoaxtia objections were 
based upon the fear that Cuetzalan would be better suited to capitalise upon the 
expanding markets promised by improved communications. 
44 AMZ'x, Estadfstica, 4,64 (Jan. 1920). 
45 AMZx, Fomento, 58,27 (Jan. 1920). 
46 El Monitor, no. 917,19 Jan. 1921, p. 2. 
47 Periödico Oficial del Estado de Puebla, 1921. no. 20, dated 17 May 1921. 
48 Sosa, Crönica, pp. 132-35. 
49 AMZ'x, Fomento, 1921, no. 1356. 
50 AMZ'x. Fomento, 1921, no. 1380. 
51 AGN, O-C, 816-P-45. (anexo no. 1,. pp. 1-3). 
52 Interview with Jost Flores Huidobro, 13 December 1993, Cuetzalan. 
Flores suggests that his father's low opinion of the Indian serranos meant that he was 
very reluctant to enter into a partnership with Gabriel Barrios. 
53 AGN, O-C, 816-P-45. (anexo no. 13. p. 13). 
54 AGN, O-C, 701-C-9. 
See telegramme sent to Obregön dated 14 Nov. 1921 and his reply dated 15 Nov. 
1921. 
55 AGN, O-C, 816-Z-20. 
See publications entitled, Carretera, Zaragoza - Tecolutla Hermosa Obra, and UNA 
MUESTRA DE VERDADERO PROGRESO es la carretera que se construye de 
Zaragoza a Texcolutla. 
56 El Monitor, 18 June 1921, no. 1075, p. 1. 
A year later, these suspicions appear to have been confirmed when the Puebla daily, El 
Monitor, announced that the state government had granted a concession for Senor 
Agustfn Azpfroz to establish a bus service between Zacapoaxtla and Cotzala 
(Cuetzalan). 
ADN, C, 2-1145. f. 837, dated 6 April 1920. 
57 AMZ'x, Fomento, 58,1-20,1920. 
58 AMZ'x, Fomento, 18,1923. 
See correspondence between Victor Bernal and Mois¬s Macip dated 25 May 1922 and 
27 May 1922. 
59 AGN, O-C, 816-P-45. (Anexo 11, p. 1. ) 
60 ADN, C, 2-754, f. 216. 
See letter dated 9 Oct. 1921 from vecinos of Cuetzalan to the Jefe de Operaciones 
Militares in Puebla. 
61 Ibid., f. 236. 
See letter dated 20 April 1922 from Salvador Vega Bernal to the Jefatura. 
279 
62 ADN, C, 2-754. f. 139. 
63 AGN, O-C, 701-C-9. 
See letter to President Obreg6n dated 14 Nov. 1921. 
BLC. RHAM. Caja 1925. Reports for May 1925. 
See letter dated 30 April 1925 to President Calles from vecinos of Cuetzalan. 
See letter dated 25 May 1925 to Gobernaci6n from vecinos of Cuetzalan. 
64 Indeed, on two occasions during the Vega Bernals' control of the Cuetzalan 
ayuntamiento accusations of abuses by Barrios' forces were forwarded to Barrios' 
military superiors. On one occasion, a delegation of Indians travelled to Puebla City in 
an attempt to stop the faenas. Upon their return, it was alleged that one of the 
delegates was killed by Barrios troops. 
65 BLC. RHAM. Ca a 1926. Letters received November 1926. 
See letter dated 18 
Nov. 
1926. 
66 Torres Trueba, 'Faccionalismo en un municipio mexicano', pp. 772-49. 
67 Lourdes-Arizpe, Parentesco y Economla, p. 65. 
When asked for their views on a proposal to link the village by road to the national 
highway at Cuetzalan, one Zacatipan vecino replied skeptically: 'Who would benefit 
from a road that carries trucks? ' 
68 For a detailed explanation of the complexities of the Nahua's vision of the world, 
see: Taggart, Nahua Myth and Social Structure. 
69 An excellent account of the dilemmas raised as a traditional community attempts to 
embrace modernity is given in; Reck, G. G., In the Shadow of Tlaloc. (Life in a 
Mexican Village), (Harmondsworth, 1978). 
70 ACP. See Listas de diputados de Legislatura del Estado de Puebla. 
71 AMC, Caja 153, Justicia, 48. 
See internal report dated 11 Oct. 1923. 
72 ADN, C, 2-1145, ff. 314-15. 
See letter dated 22 July 1926 from vecinos of Cuetzalan to President Calles. 
73 Interview with Salvador Vega Rodriguez, 12 Dec. 1993, Cuetzalan. 
Interview with Francisco Landero Alamo, 10 Dec. 1993, Zacapoaxtla. 
Interview with Alberto Toral, 10 Dec. 1993, Zacapoaxtla. 
Miguel Vega Bernal 'S grave occupies a prestigious position in the principal grave yard 
in Zacapoaxtla, just to the right of the main church entrance. 
74 AGN, O-C, 408-D-12, leg. 1. 
See letter dated 4 Feb. 1926 from Tirado to Calles in which he refers to Rufino 
Landero's loyalty. 
75 AGN, O-C, 408-P-16. 
See letter dated 2 Dec. 1924 from Ignacio Macip to President Calles, referring to 
Barrios' forces trying to prejudice his electoral campaign. 
76 AGN, O-C, 408-P-20, leg. 1. 
See telegramme dated 13 Feb. 1925 from Flores and others to Calles. 
77 BLC. RHAM. Ca a 1925. Reports received/sent May 1925. 
See copy of letters 
dated 
30 May 1925 and 5 June 1925 sent to Barrios by the Jefatura. 
The defensa social to which the letters of complaint refers, is an example of the 
cuerpos voluntarios that Barrios deployed throughout the Sierra. Falling into the 
general pattern, Barrios had chosen Huidobro, and later Flores, to lead the cuerpo as 
Hefe de arenas. As in many other Indian and mestizo communities, Barrios identified 
the leaders of the most influential faction and incorporated them within the cacicazgo. 
78 BLC. RHAM. Caja 1925. Private letters received June 1925. 
See copy of letter dated 12 June 1925 sent to Flores by Molina. 
79 AGN, O-C, 701-P-9. 
See letter dated 13 June 1925 from Flores to Calles. 
BLC. RHAM. Ca'a 1925. Telegrammes July 1925. 
See telegramme 
dated 
23 June 1925 sent by Santa Fe. 
80 BLC. RHAM. Caja 1925. Reports received/sent August 1925. 
See copy of Tirado letter dated 4 Aug. 1925 sent to Barrios by the Jefatura. 
AGN, O-C, 408-P-20, leg. 1. 
See telegramme dated 8 Aug. 1925 from Tirado to Calles. 
81 AGN, O-C, 408-P-20, leg. 1. 
See telegramme dated 7 Aug. 1925. 
See telegramme to Calles dated 10 Aug. 1925. 
82 AGN, O-C, 408-P-20, leg. 2. 
See telegramme from Tirado to Calles dated 10 Aug. 1925 and from vecinos to Calles 
dated 21 Aug. 1925. 
83 AGN, O-C, 408-P-20, leg. 2. 
See telegramme dated 13 Aug 1925 from Ortiz to Calles; telegramme dated 13 Aug. 
1925 from Flores to Calles and dated 18 Aug. 1925 from vecinos of Cuetzalan from 
their refuge in Casastepec to Calles. 
84 BLC. RHAM. Ca'a 1925. Letters received October 1925. 
See letter dated 2 
Oct. 
1925 from Flores to Demetrio Barrios. Due to its lack of 
reference in any other archives, a degree of supposition regarding the nature of the 
plebiscite has been necessary. 
85 AGN, O-C, 408-D-12. 
See telegramme dated 17 June 1926 from Amaya to Calles. 
86 AGN, O-C, 408-D-12. 
See telegramme dated 23 June 1926 from Molina to Calles. 
87 BLC. RHAM. Caja 1926. Reports July 1926. 
See copy of the letters dated 9 July 1926 sent to Barrios from the Jefatura. 
88 BLC. RHAM. Caja 1926. Correspondence August 1926. 
See copies of various letters and telegrammes dated 16 Aug. 1926 and 17 Aug. 1926 
sent by Tirado to Calles. 
AGN, O-C, 408-P-20, leg. 3. (Further copy of above correspondence. ) 
89 BLC. RHAM. Caja 1926. Correspondence August 1926. 
See Barrios' reply to his Jefatura dated 30 Aug. 1926. 
90 AGN, O-C, 408-P-20, leg. 3. no. 9274. 
Memorandum dated 2 Sept. 1926 from Amaya to Calles. 
91 AGN, O-C, 408-P-20, leg. 3. 
See report dated 1 Sept. 1926 from Heredia to Calles. 
92 In this respect, no mention has been made of Julio Lobato, one of Barrios', /efes de 
arenas who operated in the Zacapoaxtla district. Lobato undoubtedly acted on Barrios' 
behalf during the late 1920s, becoming municipal president of Zacapoaxtla in 1930. 
He was not, however, a major figure in the broader political frictions that affected the 
district during the 1920s. 
See Par6, 'Inter-ethnic and class relations', pp. 407-8, for an analysis of Lobato's 
subsequent role in local politics. Her pseudonym, 'Jaime Lira' plainly refers to 
Lobato. 
281 
7. Taming the tiger 
The transfer of the 46th. Battalion to Mexico City in 1930 finally ended the 
military hold that Barrios had enjoyed throughout the Sierra for over a decade. 
Perhaps the writing had been on the wall two years earlier when Calles 
expressed his aspirations for the future role of the army in his address to the 
federal congress. 'Never before have I felt so entitled, as I do today, to place 
myself before the nation as the guarantor of the noble and disinterested conduct 
of the Army. " His words perhaps reflect the point at which the reform 
measures promulgated by central government had decisively tipped the balance 
in favour of military subordination. This national shift towards the 
centralisation of power had inevitable repercussions in the Sierra de Puebla. 
More than ever before, Barrios' political enemies were encouraged to 
express their grievances. At the laborista convention in Puebla in 1928, Vicente 
Lombardo Toledano reflected the changing political mood. Toledano openly 
attacked his former patron, alleging that Barrios so controlled the lives of 
serranos he had become the legal, executive and military chief of all serrano 
communities. 2 A Cuetzalan delegate spoke of the persecution of CROM 
members, and of large-scale fraud in which Bravo Izquierdo's state government 
had allowed funds destined for road projects to reach the pockets of Barrios and 
his cronies. 
Calles' speech in the federal congress signalled that the campaign against 
Barrios could begin in earnest. Days later, a La Opinion editorial linked the 
dictatorship of Abraham Lucas to that of Barrios. The paper stated that the time 
had come for serranos to be released from decades of oppression by caciques. 3 
This stance directly contradicted the paper's previous praise for Barrios' 
initiatives in the Sierra and considerable editorial space was given to clarify its 
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position. In acknowledging his beneficial influences, La Opinion now argued 
that the price of regional domination that Barrios demanded for such services 
was too high for post-revolutionary Mexico to pay. 4 
The political environment at both state and national levels encouraged 
attacks on caciques such as Barrios. Barrios' structure of prominent military 
and political allies began to crumble under increasing federal pressure. Those 
who had previously seen their complaints against Barrios ignored were suddenly 
given encouragement. The time was ripe for his many political enemies to 
round upon Barrios and jostle into position for the skirmish for local power that 
would succeed his removal. 
For the first time in over a decade, cracks began to appear in the 
cacicazgo. Unions in Teziutlän, no doubt with Toledano's encouragement, 
acted with uncharacteristic confidence in alleging to CROM that Barrios had 
colluded with company owners and used force to discourage workers from 
organising unions. 5 Barrios denied all charges claiming that no such 
organisations existed and that the accusers were nothing more than a small group 
of agitators who lacked popular support. Across the Sierra in Zacatlän, 
Demetrio Barrios felt obliged to make a public statement denying troop 
interference in favour of municipal president, Angel Berrera, during the 
November 1928 elections. 6 In the past Barrios had been able to shrug off such 
accusations, secure in the knowledge that the prospects of being found guilty 
were remote. In the changed environment, however, every charge acted further 
to jeopardise his control of the Sierra. The vital difference was that federal 
authorities were now fully behind any state government measures to investigate 
and, where necessary, curb such abuses. 
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The state government did not fail to seize the initiative. Selected at a 
laborista convention that had so directly attacked Barrios, Governor Leonides 
Andreu Almazdn wasted little time in pursuing these attacks to their logical 
conclusions. Federal control of Puebla politics had produced a new 
phenomenon: the governor could take steps to increase his constitutional 
jurisdiction to include the Sierra, confident in the knowledge that the federal 
government and, by extension, the Ministry of War would counter any moves 
by Barrios to oppose him. 7 
In his first month in office, Almazän attacked the comer-stone of the 
cacicazgo by declaring void the elections for Zacatlän and Teziutlän and 
imposing his own juntas to take over the ayuntamientos. 8 There could be no 
doubt that the state executive was determined to wrest power away from the 
cacique and reinstate the authority given to the governor under the state 
constitution. In an equally crucial move, the governor acted to undermine 
Barrios' grass-root network by replacing the jefes de arenas and cuerpos 
voluntarios with similarly structured security forces of his own. The vital 
difference between these new groups and their predecessors was that the 
members were chosen by the state governor and placed under the control of 
municipal presidents loyal to the governor. 9 
Reports issued from the Sierra suggest that Barrios would not relinquish 
his cacicazgo without a fight. According to the provisional municipal president 
of Pahuatlän, Barrios' men refused to accept the installation of state-sponsored 
fuerzas de seguridad püblica, had terrorised them and had replaced the 
ayuntamientos designated by the state government with others loyal to Barrios. 
President Portes Gil responded by asking the Ministry of War to ensure that 
stability was restored and, if all else failed, to remove Barrios' forces from the 
affected regions. 10 Meanwhile, the governor continued to enlist fuerzas in the 
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regions perceived to be most badly affected by Barrios abuses. " Portes Gil's 
response is a clear indication that the federal authorities were fully behind the 
initiatives being taken by Governor Almazän to neutralise Barrios' power in the 
Sierra. 
The pressure on Barrios increased with the deployment of troops of the 
non-serrano 45th. Battalion to Zacatlän, Teziutlän and Libres to monitor the 
peaceful installation of provisional ayuntamientos following the nullification of 
the 1929 elections. For the second year running, the governor had intervened to 
impose his own ayuntamiento in Zacatlän, home of the 46th. Battalion. For a 
time, Zacatlän had two ayuntamientos: Barrios loyalists occupied the municipal 
palace, while the governor's provisional ayuntamiento took up residence in a 
nearby hotel. 
Fidel Arroyo and other faithful supporters sent appeals far and wide 
seeking assistance for Barrios. They asked Governor Almazdn to stop illegal 
attempts by unelected representatives to take over the ayuntamiento. Warnings 
were dispatched to the President and Gobernaciön stating that the revolutionary 
pedigree of the people of Zacatlän would not allow them to stand by and see 
their rights snatched away by a group of reactionaries. Similar letters were sent 
to the federal congress accusing Governor Almazän of trying to impose 
reactionaries into the ayuntamiento. A plea was sent to General Almada giving 
details of a large public demonstration staged in the streets of Zacatlän in 
support of the ayuntamiento and complained of attempts to prevent it by the 
45th. Battalion. Demetrio Barrios sent letters and photographs of the public 
demonstration to Ricardo Marquez Galindo in Mexico City, asking him to use 
the national press and his political power to bring the case to the attention of 
those with influence-12 
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Yet Barrios had already lost the propaganda war; Marquez Galindo's 
efforts were ineffective. Jose Maria Flores had already informed Barrios of the 
harsh attacks being made against Barrios in the national press, and the coverage 
in Puebla provided cold comfort. Apparently acting as the state government's 
official soap-box, La Opinion published a lengthy article defending the 
governor's anti-cacique initiative, and speculating on the chances of Barrios' 
forces continuing to intimidate the popular vote in the Sierra. The paper 
heralded the deployment of the 45th. Battalion to the Sierra as a victory for 
democracy over caciquismo, while a further article commented upon the 
strength of federal support for the governor's initiative. 13 
By March 1930, the cacicazgo had run out of options. In a letter to 
Marquez Galindo, Demetrio Barrios described the situation in Zacatlän: 
The visitador de Administraciön, [Constantino Belmar] who is now 
acting-secretary here in Zacatlän, is traing to agitate the communities, 
saying that they should reject their local authorities, kill their 
secretaries, (who are also serving as teachers) should not pay the 
teachers as the state government will provide for them, and that if the 
officials do not leave their positions he will organise the deployment of 
troops to help remove them. 
As you well know, the people have always been more disposed to 
chaos than order and only await the opportunity to follow the road to 
the type of disorder that has already been witnessed in Olintla and 
Jopala. The secretary is now persecuting those ayuntamientos who do 
not follow his orders, and has already imprisoned various officials 
including the entire junta auxiliar of San Francisco Ixquihuacän and 
some of our friends, as well as closing several schools. 
We are at a loss to where we should complain; the Standing 
Committee, Gobernaciön, the Secretary of Education, or to the 
President. Complaints to the governor would be futile. 
As the case is urgent I would be grateful if you could inform us if we 
still have sympathisers in the Standing Committee or, if not, where the 
various communities might send their complaints in order to resist 
these destructive labours. 4 
The content and the tone of desperation conveyed within this letter depicts a 
cacicazgo falling apart at the seams. The foundations of the structure were 
being eroded by a combined political onslaught of federal and state 
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governments, using all the machinery at their disposal to secure their advantage. 
The very secretaries, local officials and teachers who had pledged loyalty to 
Barrios in exchange for their posts, saw their positions threatened by a force 
more formidable than that of their patron. Demetrio Barrios was clearly unsure 
of the residual political support that he and his brother enjoyed beyond the 
Sierra. 
One of Barrios' remaining representatives in Mexico City, deputy 
Salustio Cabrera, endeavoured to enlist the help of an old ally, General Bravo 
Izquierdo, to dilute Ministry of War hostility towards Barrios. Bravo Izquierdo, 
then commander-in-chief of the Infantry, expressed his continued support for 
Barrios and pledged never to act to the detriment of his interests. He also 
promised to try to enlist the support of General Amaro, chief of the Ministry of 
War. ' 5 But times had changed, and even the help of influential friends in the 
Ministry could not turn the tide of subordination of the military to political 
objectives. The politicians held firm, and the non-serrano 45th. Battalion 
remained in the Sierra long after Barrios' battalion had left. 
During the 46th. Battalion's years at their Mexico City barracks in San 
Joaquin, Tacuba, Barrios' troops were largely occupied in performing 
ceremonial duties. In addition, they lent support to the training programmes of 
the Colegio Militar and conducted their duties with such enthusiasm that they 
gained commendation from General Amaro. Continuing allegations of abuses 
by Barrios forces, who unofficially remained in the Sierra, suggest that the 
decision to transfer Barrios and his men to Mexico City was only partially 
successful in breaking up Barrios' cacicazgo. 
Only with the battalion's transfer to Chiapas in 1936 did Barrios' grip on 
the Sierra loosen to the extent that it no longer caused anxiety among state and 
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federal authorities. During their three years in Chiapas, Barrios' forces assumed 
familiar duties: responsibility for maintaining regional security and supporting 
the region's communication development projects. The troops clashed several 
times with religious fan iticos' and agraristas. During these operations the 
battalion made Mexican military history by becoming the first troops to be 
deployed by air. So efficiently did the battalion perform its duties that it earned 
commendations from President Läzaro Cardenas. Yet there was a high price to 
pay for such honours: many of the Indian soldiers from the Sierra succumbed to 
the tropical diseases then prevalent in the region. Further tours of duty took 
place in Oaxaca, Veracruz, and Tlaxcala before the 46th. Battalion returned to 
the state of Puebla, spending time in Atlixco before being transferred to its 
present garrison at Tehuacän. 
The battalion's move to Tlaxcala on 26 December 1940 coincided with 
Gabriel Barrios' recall to Mexico City in preparation for his retirement from 
military service in February 1941. He returned to the Sierra de Puebla and, 
although lacking the degree of influence he previously enjoyed, resumed an 
active role in local affairs. He became president of a committee to organise the 
renovation of the irrigation channel that his troops had built twenty years earlier; 
he was chairman of the Tetela district's Cattle-breeders Association; and he 
became the Sierra's coordinator for the programmes of adult education then 
promoted by the Avila Camacho brothers at both state and federal levels. For 
many of his years of retirement he lived in the hilltop village of Cuacuila, until 
ill-health persuaded him to move to his Tonalapa house in the valley below. He 
remained in the Sierra until the final days of his life when he was admitted to 
the Military Hospital in Mexico City. On 2 May 1964, Barrios died from a 
stroke. Two days later he was buried with full military honours at the Panteön 
Frances de San Joaquin, within sight of the ex-convent that had served as the 
battalion's headquarters during its years in Mexico City. 
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What kind of cacique was Gabriel Barios? 
Serrano folklore maintains that as Juan Francisco Lucas lay close to 
death he handed command of his Brigada Serrana to Gabriel Barrios with one 
simple piece of advice: 'In all your actions as commander, remain loyal to the 
federal government. ' Try as his political opponents might to prove the contrary, 
Barrios appears to have followed this advice to the letter. When, in spring 
1930, Barrios finally received orders to muster his troops for redeployment in 
Mexico City, there was no serious question of him disobeying. It was the 
underlying respect for his superiors that ultimately saved him from the fate 
suffered by leaders like Primo Tapia and Manuel Montes, and that would later 
befall Saturnino Cedillo. 
Certainly, Barrios vacillated a little, asking for further time to prepare 
his troops for the transfer. This was nothing new, he had always sought room 
for manoeuvre while remaining within the bounds of federal tolerance. In fact, 
the delay exposed the true nature of his military support. In the precious little 
time before redeployment, Barrios hastily contacted his jefes de armas and 
cuerpos voluntarios ordering them to assemble in Zacatlän. Chaotic days 
followed, as old soldiers pleaded dispensation from military duty. Occasional 
campaigns in the vicinity of the Sierra had caused few problems, but transferral 
to Mexico City and unknown destinations thereafter, was too much for many. 
Conversely, many younger serranos rushed to take the places of the veterans, 
viewing this as an opportunity to broaden their horizons. The few regular 
officers of the battalion engaged in several days of intense training. Barrios had 
always sustained the image that he commanded a disciplined, professional unit; 
he had only a few days to transform his assembly of casual auxiliaries into a 
semblance of the efficient fighting force he professed to lead. 
289 
The degree to which any post-revolutionary regional leader was 
dependent upon, and therefore loyal to, the federal government rested on a 
combination of variables: military potential; sources of financial support; 
ideological considerations; the prevailing social and economic conditions in his 
area of operations. In addition, such relationships were rarely static but varied 
in accordance with contemporary developments. It is all the more remarkable, 
therefore, that the underlying tenor of Barrios' relationship with his federal 
superiors throughout the 1920s was set during the early years of his rise to 
power. There is no evidence that Barrios ever seriously contradicted Lucas' 
advice to remain loyal to recognised federal authority. Through his ties with the 
Cabrera Lobato family, Barrios became closely associated with the Carrancista 
cause and, as a result, received large quantities of federal arms and funds to 
sustain his efforts in the Sierra. Federal patronage was vital to Barrios' 
ambitions to establish a stable power structure within his region, and at no time 
did his actions suggest that he waivered in his support for Carranza. 
The collapse of the Carrancista administration was a critical moment for 
the Barrios brothers. They made strenuous efforts to convince Obregön's 
generals of their allegiance to the aguaprietista cause. An indication of Barrios' 
vulnerability was his decision to stand down his troops and allow his military 
zone to be temporarily controlled by his bitter local enemy, the ex-Villista, 
Salvador Vega Bernal. Barrios meanwhile, issued repeated declarations of 
loyalty to Obreg6n to counter persistent rumours that he was on the point of 
rebelling. All this seems to suggests that the Barrios brothers were uncertain of 
their military strength. Lucas' influence was already on the wain, leadership of 
the Brigada Serrana had come fairly late in the Revolution, and Carranza's fall 
had prematurely interrupted Barrios' attempts to broaden his military 
recruitment potential beyond the traditional centres of mobilisation: Tetela and 
Xochiapulco. In May 1920 Barrios' network of cuerpos voluntarios was far 
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from complete. This suggests that Barrios remained dependent upon continued 
federal government patronage during the early years of the Sonorense. Given 
Barrios' position, it is, perhaps, a great irony that even when Obregön's 
generals cautioned against allowing Barrios to retain his military position, the 
politicians' historic ignorance of the Sierra prevented the federal government 
from taming Barrios before he had a chance to establish control over the 
territory. Thus, in 1920 with neither the federal government nor Barrios 
sufficiently confident to adopt a more strident position, a relationship of inter- 
dependency was established. Neither side was sufficiently confident of the 
extent to which they could impose their will upon the other. 
This uncertainty, together with the peculiarities of Puebla politics, 
enabled Barrios to establish direct relationships with figures of such influence 
rarely accessible to military leaders of his limited status. During the same 
period, for example, the caciques of Pisaflores pursued their conflicting 
ambitions through links with more powerful caudillos: Otilio Rubio through his 
friendship with Saturnino Cedillo; and Otilio Villegas through his connections 
with ex-governor Nicolas Flores and governor Matias Rodriguez. In San Luis 
Potosi, despite his family's previous position of local prominence, the autonomy 
of the cacique, Gonzalo N. Santos, was nonetheless restricted by his need to 
consider the reactions of Saturnino Cedillo. 16 In Michoacan, Primo Tapia used 
his relationship with governor Mügica and later his prestige within the League 
of Agrarian Communities to project his message beyond the Zacapu region. 
The absence of a dominant figure in Puebla state politics and Barrios' lack of 
political ideology, meant that there was no independent intermediary through 
whom he was forced to negotiate. Instead, Barrios employed a more direct 
approach, using the structures of federal power; the Ministry of War, 
Presidencia, Gobernaciön, and SCOP, to capture the attention of national 
leaders. 
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That his sole source of access to the president was not through the 
Ministry of War, indicated the process by which Barrios successfully broadened 
his activities within the Sierra from purely military origins. During the mid- 
1920s, having proved his military fidelity and with various programmes of 
regional development in progress, Barrios reached the climax of his 
independence from federal control. During this period, his military chiefs 
protected him from criticism, and federal government departments were wary of 
prejudicing regional development in the Sierra by investigating allegations 
against Barrios too closely. Thus the 1920s was a period in which Barrios 
moved from a tentative hold on the Sierra to a point of considerable autonomy. 
His ultimate fall in 1930 should not be seen as an indication of the shallowness 
of the roots that sustained his empire. After all, much more powerful leaders 
than he would succumb to federal pressure. More accurately, it reflects the 
eventual ability of an authoritative figure to occupy the previous vacuum in 
Puebla politics. Unfortunately for Barrios, the broader political climate meant 
that it was too late to attempt an accommodation with Governor Leonides 
Almazän. Calles' speech before the federal congress in 1928 put pay to any 
possibility of Barrios yielding direct access to federal power in return for 
continued autonomy in the Sierra. 
The link between Gabriel Barrios and the Indian troops under his 
command was a constant, vital factor in the cacicazgo's success during the 
1920s. Indeed, those who went to Mexico City, and later to Chiapas and 
Oaxaca, were almost all Indians recruited from the mountain villages of the 
Sierra. Two decades later, following an assassination attempt on President 
Avila Camacho, the poblano president turned to Demetrio Barrios and the 
Indian soldiers of the renamed 37th. Battalion to provide a reliable presidential 
bodyguard. For many of those who fought in the Brigada Serrana during the 
Revolution, Gabriel Barrios represented continuity with the past. Barrios took 
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over Lucas' patriarchal role and was careful to maintain close cultural ties with 
his men. Throughout his life Gabriel preferred the rustic appeal of the 
mountains surrounding the village of Cuacuila, while his brother Demetrio chose 
the relative civility of life in Zacatlän. Gabriel Barrios never fully mastered the 
Spanish language, nor adopted the refined manners of his superiors. Yet the 
singular influence Barrios held over his men forced his superior officers and 
politicians to respect his chosen way of life. 
Certainly, Barrios' relationship with his following suggests that he would 
not have been out of place in the ranks of the charismatic caudillos who fought 
in the civil and patriotic wars of Mexico's first century of Independence. Like 
many ranchero caciques of his time, Barrios' political ambitions were limited to 
the complete control of his locality. He did not seek to transform serrano 
society. Juarista liberalism had already yielded sufficient change. And this is 
where the Sierra was exceptional. Although Barrios was deeply committed to 
liberal ethics of self-determination and independence, his popular base did not 
possess any ideological slogan. Barrios' power derived from the Indian serranos 
who followed him into battle; only an Indian patriarchal figure could fulfil the 
role expected of such a leader. Many mestizo caudillos occupied similar 
intermediary roles elsewhere. But in the Sierra de Puebla, ethnic considerations 
and historic precedents narrowed the options available. 
Once his military position was secure, Barrios' understanding of serrano 
society enabled him to establish a strong network of clients. By acknowledging 
a community's pre-existing social structure, whether mestizo or Indian, Barrios 
sought to implant his authority while causing minimum disruption. Reflecting 
the diversity of ethnic and social circumstances in the Sierra, no two 
communities were approached in the same manner. The cacicazgo was both 
pragmatic and flexible in its application at the grass-roots level. Discipline and 
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organisation were an essential part of the cacicazgo, but these were employed 
more in connection with external issues, such as military campaigns and the 
construction of effective communications, than the daily lives of serrano 
communities. 
It was his readiness to embrace new methods of control that defies 
Barrios' categorisation as one of a dying breed of traditional caudillos. His 
extensive system of telecommunications was a sign of a more ambitious project 
to open up the Sierra by the construction and maintenance of roads. Such 
projects sustained the flow of federal goodwill long after the pacification of the 
country had diminished the need for Barrios' military services. Through his 
contacts, Barrios penetrated the corridors of bureaucracy in Mexico City and 
convinced successive presidents that his presence in the Sierra was vital to post- 
revolutionary reconstruction. 
Yet the benefits of Barrios' interest in regional economic regeneration 
went further than securing his position with the federal authorities. Barrios 
needed to broaden his appeal at the local level beyond his ability to provide 
military protection. He had to satisfy the expectations of his supporters. Ivonne 
Barrios Kuri has two vivid images of her grandfather during the last years of the 
cacique's life. She recalls a stern man who curtailed her holiday in Cuacuila 
because she had ridden his favourite horse without permission. She also 
remembers him as an old man who spent hours on the verandah of his house in 
Cuacuila listening to the problems brought to him by serrano Indians from far 
and wide. Always conversing in nahuatl, he patiently listened, and the 
campesinos would solemnly nod in revered silence as Barrios prescribed the 
solution to their particular problem. Subjective memories perhaps, yet his 
grand-daughter confirms Barrios' image as 'a firm man who did much good for 
his people'. 17 
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It is this very ambiguity that suggests the need to reappraise our 
understanding of the role post-revolutionary leaders played in such issues as 
agrarian reform and rural development. While the evidence identifies the 
existence of both agrarian and traditional leaders, Barrios' actions suggest the 
existence of a different type who, in pursuit of self-preservation, developed a 
distinct response to post-revolutionary reform. 
The cynical adoption of a revolutionary stance in order to gain popular 
support was, of course, nothing new. Yet in attempting to introduce initiatives 
to improve the lives of the serranos upon whom he depended, Barrios pursued a 
policy that corresponded with his own convictions that, in turn, had been shaped 
by historical precedents. Just as Lucas had sustained his image as the 'Patriarch 
of the Sierra' by responding to the needs of his supporters, so Barrios was 
required to accept the responsibilities that accompanied his inherited legitimacy. 
Whether a serrano had problems with a neighbour; an authority with vecinos 
who refused to do faenas; or an entire community plagued by banditry and 
indiscipline, all came to Cuacuila in search of a solution. By organising the 
building of schools, irrigation channels, improving water supplies and 
encouraging agricultural improvements, Barrios maintained the same form of 
benevolent patronage that Lucas had employed to protect serranos from enforced 
conscription and desamortizaciön. 
In this way, circumstances combined to produce a regional cacique who 
fiercely resisted agrarian reform, but who nonetheless adopted measures to 
improve the lives of campesinos. Across the border in Veracruz, the agrarian 
governor, Adalberto Tejeda, had belatedly realised that it was insufficient 
merely to provide campesinos with land. Campesino grievances identified the 
need for structural reform to provide access to credit, education, markets and 
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technology. '8 In the Sierra de Puebla, the 'enemy of the campesino' was 
already bringing such reforms to fruition. The vital difference was that whereas 
Tejeda sought to promote such reforms through state initiatives, Barrios' 
projects relied upon the serrano people helping themselves. Thus, local groups 
began to create agrarian co-operatives, and committees for sanitation and water 
provision, which would then attract state support rather than the other way 
around. Such an approach was inherent in a region that had a proud history of 
independence. By reflecting the peculiar characteristics of the Sierra, Barrios 
forestalled the time when state organisations would appropriate the machinery of 
government within the Sierra. Patronage continued to flow through a native, 
Indian patriarch rather than through local and regional agrarian committees such 
as those found on the altiplano. 
Perhaps too much emphasis has previously been placed upon viewing 
local and regional power struggles as scaled-down versions of the broader 
conflict between traditional and modem power structures, or agrarista and 
laborista tendencies. Such issues did not exist in the Sierra. Instead, the 
region's history and socio-economic circumstances called for a leader who 
encompassed features found at both extremes of the dichotomy: a traditional 
patriarch who, nonetheless, used the formal bureaucratic structures of the 
Revolution to distribute patronage of a type more usually attributed to agrarian 
caudillos. 
It is, perhaps, for this reason that the image of Gabriel Barrios varied in 
accordance with the perspective of those who knew him. For many white elite 
and mestizos, he was a necessary evil in their ambitions for political 
advancement: for many Nahuas, he was a benevolent patriarch possessing 
mystical qualities. He was both a charismatic, traditional military cacique, and 
a modernising bureaucrat who used his contacts to his advantage. In this 
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respect, the Barrios cacicazgo was not unique. Pansters' study of Puebla politics 
in the late 1930s and 1940s, concludes by describing avilacamachismo as a 
personalistic system sustained by the institutional structure. 19 Enrique Marquez 
describes the pragmatism of Gonzalo Santos in San Luis Potosi as a cacique who 
moved to claim the political void left unoccupied by others. 20 A decade earlier 
in the Sierra de Puebla, a similar space existed between the need to respect 
Indian traditions while demonstrating loyalty to the federal government. Within 
the broad spectrum of post-revolutionary caudillismo there was room for 
opportunists, hombres liquidos, 21 who possessed sufficient foresight to adapt 
their style of leadership to reflect the changing environments and the individual 
circumstances of their territory. 
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Footnotes for Chapter 7 
I Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, p. 386. 
2 La Opini6n, 6 Oct. 1928, no. 1625, pp. 1&6. 
3 La Opiniön, 13 Sept. 1928, no. 1603, p. 3. 
Infact, if Barrios had inherited a cacicazgo from anyone it was Juan Francisco Lucas, 
not his son Abraham. Perhaps the paper intentionally allowed the confusion to arise in 
order to tarnish the political position of Abraham Lucas. 
4 La Opiniön, 6 Oct. 1928, no. 1625, pp. 1&6. 
5 ADN, C, 2-1145, ff. 381-83,388-89,402-3. 
See letters from CROM. dated 7 Nov. 1928,15 Nov. 1928 and 20 Dec. 1928. 
6 BLC. RHAM. Caja 1928. Letters for December 1928. 
See declaration dated 13 Dec. 1928. The complaint was lodged by the 'Pro-Andr6u 
Almazän' group in Puebla City. 
BLC. RHAM. Caja 1929. Documents for February 1929. 
Letter dated 25 Feb. 1929 from the municipal president of Zacatldn to Demetrio 
Barrios informing Barrios of the imposition. 
Although Barrios contested the decision, his candidate, Becerra, did not become 
municipal president and a provisional ayuntamiento under the presidency of Vicente 
Gonzalez was installed on 20 Feb. 1929. Barrios may have been somewhat placated as 
the ayuntamiento included several of his supporters: Alberto Galindo, Rodolfo Arroyo 
and Hermilio Barrios. 
7 This move repeats that of the 1884/5 period, when M6ndez and the Montana 
movement were pushed aside as federal interests ensured the imposition of an outside 
governor, Rosendo Marquez. 
8 AML, Gobernaciön, exp. 10,1929. 
See letter dated 15 Feb. 1929 from the state government to the municipal president of 
Libres. 
BLC. RHAM. Caja 1929. Documents for February 1929. 
See letter dated 25 Feb. 1929 from the provisional municipal president to Demetrio 
Barrios informing him of the state government's move. 
BLC. RHAM. Cala 1929. Letters for May 1929. 
A letter dated 8 May 1929 from Eliseo W. Dominguez to Demetrio Barrios refers to 
some of the voting irregularities that were identified in the Sierra. These included the 
substitution of one name for another - an alteration all the more easily detected by the 
use of different coloured ink! 
9 BLC. RHAM. Caja 1929. Letters sent/received May 1929. 
One of the first jefes de arenas to receive notice from governor Almazän that he and his 
forces were to be disbanded was Est6ban Islas of Honey, Pue. 
See letters dated 2 May 1929 and 12 May 1929 from the state government to Esteban 
Islas. 
10 BLC. RHAM. Caja 1930. Correspondence for January 1930. 
See letter dated 26 Jan. 1930 from the Jefatura in Puebla to Barrios. 
ADN, C, 2-1145, f. 344. 
This document contains a copy of the complaint sent to the President by Victor C. 
Valderrabano, municipal president of Pahuatlän. 
11 BLC. RHAM. Caja 1930. Correspondence for January 1930. 
See letters dated 22 Jan. 1930 and 23 Jan. 1930 from the Jefatura to Barrios giving 
notice of the governor's actions in various communities within the district of 
Huauchinango. 
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12 BLC. RHAM. Caja 1930. Telegrammes for February 1930. 
See telegrammes dated 14 Feb. 1930,15 Feb. 1930 and 21 Feb. 1930. 
13 BLC. RHAM. Caja 1930. 
See correspondence date 18 Feb. 1930 between Jose Maria Flores and Barrios 
regarding adverse press coverage in Mexico City. 
A series of articles relating to Barrios' cacicazgo were published in La Opinion, 
particularly between 19 Feb. 1930 and 28 Feb. 1930. 
14 BLC. RHAM. Caja 1930. 
See letter dated 31 March 1930 from Demetrio Barrios to Ricardo Marquez Galindo. 
15 BLC. RHAM. Caja 1930. 
See letter dated 6 March 1930 from Bravo Izquierdo to Barrios. 
16 Marquez, 'Gonzalo N. Santos', p. 389; Falc6n, Revoluciön y caciquismo, pp. 197- 
98. 
17 In the many interviews conducted in the Sierra de Puebla with former allies and 
enemies of the Barrios family, almost all expressed this as the characteristic that most 
accurately described Gabriel Barrios. 
18 Fowler, Agrarian Radicalism, pp. 104-5. 
19 Pansters, Politics and Power in Puebla, p. 168. 
20 Marquez, 'Gonzalo N. Santos', p. 391. 
21 Ibid., p. 389. 
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APPENDIX I 
A JUAN FRANCISCO LUCAS. 
PATRIARCA DE LA SIERRA DE PUEBLA. 
Debil mi voz, para cantar al hombre 
que en su civico amor, buscö lo excelso; 
debil, la rima, de mi pobre verso 
para poder, glorificar su nombre... 
Nombre que vä, por montes y llanuras 
en la Sierra de Puebla, como un grito 
que intentase horadar el infinito, 
y clavarse en el grise, de las alturas. 
Nombre que en rayos de fulgor se enmarca, 
aureolado en los anos, por la gloria 
que lo guarda en los fastos de la historia 
con dos sölas palabras: TI Patriarca'. 
'Juan Francisco Lucas. Gloria inmensa 
de Zacapoaxtla, que se yergue y sube, 
cual si quisiera desgarrar la nube 
para quedar, sobre el azul suspensa. 
Aqui, donde despeinan los pinares 
sus crenchas lacias, que sacude el viento, 
y el tzentzontle, desgrana somnoliento 
la cascada en cristal, de sus cantares. 
Aqui, donde recorta la montaria 
se perfil, limitando el horizante; 
y deja ver, el empinado monte, 
el hosco pico de su cresta huratia. 
Aqui, en Comaltepec, la rubia aurora 
meciö su cuna, bajo el sol de junio; 
y el destino lo lleva al plenilunio 
marcando el alto, en la precisa hora. 
Y, sus risas de nifio, cantarinas, 
van por lomas, oteros, y brenales, 
haciendo estremecer los pastizales 
para luego perderse en las colinas. 
Y le viö corretear el arroyuelo, 
trepar, en las auroras matinales 
al Cerro gris azul de - Los Cristales - 
siguiendo de las ayes el revuelo. 
Y su caräcter forja la montana, 
la solemne quietud, de la canada; 
su püber ansia, sin querer, atada 
con ei diario bregar, de la cabana. 
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Llora la Patria en su dolor convulsa, 
ante el ultraje vil, del extranjero; 
ei pueblo lucha, denodado y fiero, 
lleno de ardor, de natural repulsa. 
Rasga la plaza, de la poblana sierra, 
el horrendo fragor de la metralla; 
el ansia vibra, el patriotismo estalla, 
y Marte pasa, pregonando: 'guerra'. 
Y Juan Francisco Lucas, alza ufano, 
del Plan de Ayutla la triunfal bandera; 
y la Sierra se vuelve intensa hoguera, 
queriendo ahogar, al invasor profano. 
Y el indio recio, de semblante arisco, 
que retaba el furor de las tormentas, 
corre a enfrentarse a las batallas cruentas, 
oa sofocar, el brote levantisco. 
Soidado, General, no importa el grado; 
dispuesto se halla, con el rifle en mano, 
a defender, el Suelo Mexicano, 
para 61, primero... para 61 'sagrado'. 
Y sin temor, se Lanza a la batalla 
que se Libra el Fuerte de Loreto; 
ya la muerte se encara en franco reto 
con un valor, que en temerario raya. 
Despue s... mäs tarde, cuando ya la Oliva 
cirie a la Patria, cuando el Angel vela 
para guardar la Paz, allä en Tetela, 
sus restos cubre, gratitud votiva... 
Y alza el tiempo plegadizo puente 
abriendo paso a su ganada gloria; 
y eleva un monumento a su memoria 
la fe del pueblo, que lo aclama ardiente. 
-0- 
Juan Francisco Lucas: A ti se llegan 
hombres y nifios del Solar que es tuyo; 
hay en sus almas, verdadero orgullo, 
cuando la ofrenda de su amor to entregan. 
Estin hoy ante ti, los sucesores 
de muchos, que al austriaco combatieron; 
hijos de aquellos, que cayendo vieron 
ondear la Ensefia de los tres colores. 
Estän hoy ante ti, del Internado 
los nillos, que to honran y to aman; 
los nii os y los hombres que to Haman: 
' Patriarca' 
. 
'Su patriarca venerado' . 
Reproduced as originally written by Sara Malfavon. (1956) 
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APPENDIX II 
EVOLUTION OF THE BRIGADA SERRANA 
Until 31 Dec. 1919 
1 Jan. 1920 -2 Feb. 1921 
- Brigada Serrana 
- 'Serrano de Puebla' Infantry Regiment 
3 Feb. 1921 -4 March 1921 - 54th. Battalion 
5 March 1921 -4 Aug. 1921 - 8th. Auxiliary Battalion 
5 Aug. 1921 - 31 Dec. 1921 - 59th. Auxiliary Battalion 
1 Jan. 1922 -7 July 1942 - 46th. Battalion 
MILITARY CAREER OF GABRIEL BARRIOS CABRERA 
6 June 1913 - 2nd. Captain and head of the Cuacuila Company of the Brigada Serrana. 
8 July 1914 - Captain with same responsibilities. 
29 Sept. 1915 - Major and head of the Juan N. Mendez Battalion of the Brigada Serrana. 
15 Aug. 1917 - Lieutenant Colonel and head of the Brigada Serrana. 
27 April 1920 - Colonel and head of the 'Serrano de Puebla' Infantry Regiment. 
27 Nov. 1920 - Brigadier General with same 
responsibilities. 
16 Nov. 1940 - General of the Brigade. 
Source. ADN, C, 2-1145, if. 1374-46. 
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APPENDIX III 
1917 FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
Article 76 
The exclusive powers of the Senate are: 
v) To declare, whenever the constitutional powers of a State have disappeared, 
that the condition has arisen for appointing a provisional governor, who shall 
call elections in accordance with the constitutional laws of the said State. The 
appointment of a governor shall be made by the Senate from a list of three 
proposed by the President of the Republic, with the approval of two thirds of the 
members present, and during adjournments, by the Permanent Committee, 
according to the same rules. The official thus appointed cannot be elected 
constitutional governor in the elections held pursuant to the call which he issues. 
This provision shall govern whenever the constitution of a State does not make 
provision for such cases. 
vi) To settle political questions which may arise between the powers of a State, 
whenever any of them shall apply to the Senate for the purpose, or whenever, 
by reason of such questions, the constitutional order shall be interrupted through 
a conflict of arms. In this event the Senate shall declare its decision, subjecting 
itself to the General Constitution of the Republic and to that of the State. 
The law shall regulate the exercise of this and of the foregoing powers. 
Source: O. A. S., Washington D. C., 1961 
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